Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Prior Analytics', 'A Survey of Metaphysics' and 'Authority and the Individual'

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78 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 4. Metaphysics as Science
Metaphysics is concerned with the fundamental structure of reality as a whole [Lowe]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 6. Metaphysics as Conceptual
Maybe such concepts as causation, identity and existence are primitive and irreducible [Lowe]
1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 2. Positivism
If all that exists is what is being measured, what about the people and instruments doing the measuring? [Lowe]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 6. Ockham's Razor
It is more extravagant, in general, to revise one's logic than to augment one's ontology [Lowe]
4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 1. Aristotelian Logic
Aristotle was the first to use schematic letters in logic [Aristotle, by Potter]
Aristotelian syllogisms are three-part, subject-predicate, existentially committed, with laws of thought [Aristotle, by Hanna]
Aristotelian sentences are made up by one of four 'formative' connectors [Aristotle, by Engelbretsen]
Aristotelian identified 256 possible syllogisms, saying that 19 are valid [Aristotle, by Devlin]
Aristotle replaced Plato's noun-verb form with unions of pairs of terms by one of four 'copulae' [Aristotle, by Engelbretsen/Sayward]
Aristotle listed nineteen valid syllogisms (though a few of them were wrong) [Aristotle, by Devlin]
4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 2. Syllogistic Logic
Aristotle's said some Fs are G or some Fs are not G, forgetting that there might be no Fs [Bostock on Aristotle]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 4. Alethic Modal Logic
There are three different deductions for actual terms, necessary terms and possible terms [Aristotle]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 3. Deductive Consequence |-
Deduction is when we suppose one thing, and another necessarily follows [Aristotle]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
Aristotle places terms at opposite ends, joined by a quantified copula [Aristotle, by Sommers]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 7. Predicates in Logic
Aristotle's logic is based on the subject/predicate distinction, which leads him to substances and properties [Aristotle, by Benardete,JA]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 1. Quantification
Affirming/denying sentences are universal, particular, or indeterminate [Aristotle]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 3. Objectual Quantification
Aristotelian logic has two quantifiers of the subject ('all' and 'some') [Aristotle, by Devlin]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 4. Paradoxes in Logic / a. Achilles paradox
An infinite series of tasks can't be completed because it has no last member [Lowe]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 1. Mathematics
It might be argued that mathematics does not, or should not, aim at truth [Lowe]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / a. For mathematical platonism
If there are infinite numbers and finite concrete objects, this implies that numbers are abstract objects [Lowe]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 4. Abstract Existence
Nominalists deny abstract objects, because we can have no reason to believe in their existence [Lowe]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 1. Nature of Change
Change can be of composition (the component parts), or quality (properties), or substance [Lowe]
Four theories of qualitative change are 'a is F now', or 'a is F-at-t', or 'a-at-t is F', or 'a is-at-t F' [Lowe, by PG]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / a. Nature of events
Numerically distinct events of the same kind (like two battles) can coincide in space and time [Lowe]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / b. Events as primitive
Maybe modern physics requires an event-ontology, rather than a thing-ontology [Lowe]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / c. Reduction of events
Maybe an event is the exemplification of a property at a time [Lowe]
Events are changes in the properties of or relations between things [Lowe]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 3. Proposed Categories
The main categories of existence are either universal and particular, or abstract and concrete [Lowe]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / a. Nature of tropes
Trope theory says blueness is a real feature of objects, but not the same as an identical blue found elsewhere [Lowe]
Maybe a cushion is just a bundle of tropes, such as roundness, blueness and softness [Lowe]
Tropes seem to be abstract entities, because they can't exist alone, but must come in bundles [Lowe]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
The category of universals can be sub-divided into properties and relations [Lowe]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / b. Nominalism about universals
Nominalists believe that only particulars exist [Lowe]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 3. Predicate Nominalism
'Is non-self-exemplifying' is a predicate which cannot denote a property (as it would be a contradiction) [Lowe]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 5. Class Nominalism
If 'blueness' is a set of particulars, there is danger of circularity, or using universals, in identifying the set [Lowe]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 6. Nihilism about Objects
Conventionalists see the world as an amorphous lump without identities, but are we part of the lump? [Lowe]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
Statues can't survive much change to their shape, unlike lumps of bronze, which must retain material [Lowe]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 9. Ship of Theseus
If old parts are stored and then appropriated, they are no longer part of the original (which is the renovated ship). [Lowe]
If 5% replacement preserves a ship, we can replace 4% and 4% again, and still retain the ship [Lowe]
A renovation or a reconstruction of an original ship would be accepted, as long as the other one didn't exist [Lowe]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
Identity of Indiscernibles (same properties, same thing) ) is not Leibniz's Law (same thing, same properties) [Lowe]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 4. De re / De dicto modality
A deduction is necessary if the major (but not the minor) premise is also necessary [Aristotle]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
It is impossible to reach a valid false conclusion from true premises, so reason itself depends on possibility [Lowe]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
We might eliminate 'possible' and 'necessary' in favour of quantification over possible worlds [Lowe]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 6. Falsification
Unfalsifiability may be a failure in an empirical theory, but it is a virtue in metaphysics [Lowe]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / d. Explaining people
The behaviour of persons and social groups seems to need rational rather than causal explanation [Lowe]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 5. Generalisation by mind
Linguistic terms form a hierarchy, with higher terms predicable of increasing numbers of things [Aristotle, by Engelbretsen]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 5. Abstracta by Negation
The centre of mass of the solar system is a non-causal abstract object, despite having a location [Lowe]
Concrete and abstract objects are distinct because the former have causal powers and relations [Lowe]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
We divide mankind into friend and foe, and cooperate with one and compete with the other [Russell]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / c. A unified people
Gradually loyalty to a creed increased, which could even outweigh nationality [Russell]
Increasingly war expands communities, and unifies them through fear [Russell]
In early societies the leaders needed cohesion, but the rest just had to obey [Russell]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 2. Population / b. State population
The economic and political advantages of great size seem to have no upper limit [Russell]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 1. Purpose of a State
Government has a negative purpose, to prevent trouble, and a positive aim of realising our desires [Russell]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 2. Leaders / b. Monarchy
A monarch is known to everyone in the group, and can thus unite large groups [Russell]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 4. Changing the State / b. Devolution
Power should be with smaller bodies, as long as it doesn't restrict central powers [Russell]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 2. Anarchism
In an anarchy universities, research, books, and even seaside holidays, would be impossible [Russell]
A state is essential, to control greedy or predatory impulses [Russell]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / f. Against democracy
In democracy we are more aware of being governed than of our tiny share in government [Russell]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 8. Socialism
Being a slave of society is hardly better than being a slave of a despot [Russell]
Managers are just as remote from workers under nationalisation as under capitalism [Russell]
Socialists say economic justice needs some state control of industries, and of foreign trade [Russell]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 1. Slavery
Slavery began the divorce between the work and the purposes of the worker [Russell]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 1. Grounds of equality
Slaves can be just as equal as free people [Russell]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 4. Economic equality
Scarce goods may be denied entirely, to avoid their unequal distribution [Russell]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 1. Basis of justice
Modern justice is seen as equality, apart from modest extra rewards for exceptional desert [Russell]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 5. Direction of causation
If the concept of a cause says it precedes its effect, that rules out backward causation by definition [Lowe]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
It seems proper to say that only substances (rather than events) have causal powers [Lowe]
The theories of fact causation and event causation are both worth serious consideration [Lowe]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / c. Conditions of causation
Causal overdetermination is either actual overdetermination, or pre-emption, or the fail-safe case [Lowe]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / b. Nomological causation
Causation may be instances of laws (seen either as constant conjunctions, or as necessities) [Lowe]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / d. Causal necessity
Hume showed that causation could at most be natural necessity, never metaphysical necessity [Lowe]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 1. Laws of Nature
The normative view says laws show the natural behaviour of natural kind members [Lowe, by Mumford/Anjum]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 9. Counterfactual Claims
'If he wasn't born he wouldn't have died' doesn't mean birth causes death, so causation isn't counterfactual [Lowe]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / a. Explaining movement
If motion is change of distance between objects, it involves no intrinsic change in the objects [Lowe]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 3. Points in Space
Surfaces, lines and points are not, strictly speaking, parts of space, but 'limits', which are abstract [Lowe]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 5. Relational Space
If space is entirely relational, what makes a boundary, or a place unoccupied by physical objects? [Lowe]