62 ideas
9288 | The magic of Asclepius enters Renaissance thought mixed into Ficino's neo-platonism [Yates] |
9291 | The dating, in 1614, of the Hermetic writings as post-Christian is the end of the Renaissance [Yates] |
12274 | Begin examination with basics, and subdivide till you can go no further [Aristotle] |
12260 | Dialectic starts from generally accepted opinions [Aristotle] |
12291 | There can't be one definition of two things, or two definitions of the same thing [Aristotle] |
12292 | Definitions are easily destroyed, since they can contain very many assertions [Aristotle] |
12272 | We describe the essence of a particular thing by means of its differentiae [Aristotle] |
12279 | The differentia indicate the qualities, but not the essence [Aristotle] |
12283 | In definitions the first term to be assigned ought to be the genus [Aristotle] |
12289 | The genera and the differentiae are part of the essence [Aristotle] |
12261 | Differentia are generic, and belong with genus [Aristotle] |
12263 | 'Genus' is part of the essence shared among several things [Aristotle] |
12285 | The definition is peculiar to one thing, not common to many [Aristotle] |
14415 | A ground must be about its truth, and not just necessitate it [Merricks] |
14408 | Truthmaker needs truths to be 'about' something, and that is often unclear [Merricks] |
14395 | If a ball changes from red to white, Truthmaker says some thing must make the change true [Merricks] |
14398 | Truthmaker says if an entity is removed, some nonexistence truthmaker must replace it [Merricks] |
14403 | If Truthmaker says each truth is made by the existence of something, the theory had de re modality at is core [Merricks] |
14397 | Truthmaker demands not just a predication, but an existing state of affairs with essential ingredients [Merricks] |
14396 | If 'truth supervenes on being', worlds with the same entities, properties and relations have the same truths [Merricks] |
14400 | If truth supervenes on being, that won't explain why truth depends on being [Merricks] |
14394 | It is implausible that claims about non-existence are about existing things [Merricks] |
14390 | Truthmaker isn't the correspondence theory, because it offers no analysis of truth [Merricks] |
14412 | Speculations about non-existent things are not about existent things, so Truthmaker is false [Merricks] |
14414 | I am a truthmaker for 'that a human exists', but is it about me? [Merricks] |
14418 | Being true is not a relation, it is a primitive monadic property [Merricks] |
14391 | If the correspondence theory is right, then necessary truths must correspond to something [Merricks] |
14419 | Deflationism just says there is no property of being truth [Merricks] |
11261 | Puzzles arise when reasoning seems equal on both sides [Aristotle] |
12273 | Unit is the starting point of number [Aristotle] |
14393 | The totality state is the most plausible truthmaker for negative existential truths [Merricks] |
12267 | There are ten categories: essence, quantity, quality, relation, place, time, position, state, activity, passivity [Aristotle] |
12282 | An individual property has to exist (in past, present or future) [Aristotle] |
12264 | An 'accident' is something which may possibly either belong or not belong to a thing [Aristotle] |
14413 | Some properties seem to be primitive, but others can be analysed [Merricks] |
14416 | An object can have a disposition when the revelant conditional is false [Merricks] |
14392 | Fregeans say 'hobbits do not exist' is just 'being a hobbit' is not exemplified [Merricks] |
12280 | Genus gives the essence better than the differentiae do [Aristotle] |
13269 | In the case of a house the parts can exist without the whole, so parts are not the whole [Aristotle] |
12284 | Everything that is has one single essence [Aristotle] |
12262 | An 'idion' belongs uniquely to a thing, but is not part of its essence [Aristotle] |
14410 | You believe you existed last year, but your segment doesn't, so they have different beliefs [Merricks] |
12290 | Destruction is dissolution of essence [Aristotle] |
12286 | If two things are the same, they must have the same source and origin [Aristotle] |
12266 | 'Same' is mainly for names or definitions, but also for propria, and for accidents [Aristotle] |
12287 | Two identical things have the same accidents, they are the same; if the accidents differ, they're different [Aristotle] |
12288 | Numerical sameness and generic sameness are not the same [Aristotle] |
12259 | Reasoning is when some results follow necessarily from certain claims [Aristotle] |
14417 | Counterfactuals aren't about actuality, so they lack truthmakers or a supervenience base [Merricks] |
14402 | If 'Fido is possibly black' depends on Fido's counterparts, then it has no actual truthmaker [Merricks] |
12271 | Induction is the progress from particulars to universals [Aristotle] |
12293 | We say 'so in cases of this kind', but how do you decide what is 'of this kind'? [Aristotle] |
12277 | Friendship is preferable to money, since its excess is preferable [Aristotle] |
12276 | Justice and self-control are better than courage, because they are always useful [Aristotle] |
12275 | We value friendship just for its own sake [Aristotle] |
12281 | Man is intrinsically a civilized animal [Aristotle] |
12265 | All water is the same, because of a certain similarity [Aristotle] |
14406 | Presentists say that things have existed and will exist, not that they are instantaneous [Merricks] |
14407 | Presentist should deny there is a present time, and just say that things 'exist' [Merricks] |
14411 | Maybe only presentism allows change, by now having a property, and then lacking it [Merricks] |
14405 | How can a presentist explain an object's having existed? [Merricks] |
12278 | 'Being' and 'oneness' are predicated of everything which exists [Aristotle] |