102 ideas
9414 | Metaphysics is the mapping of possibilities [Lowe, by Mumford] |
16414 | Science needs metaphysics to weed out its presuppositions [Lowe, by Hofweber] |
8282 | Only metaphysics can decide whether identity survives through change [Lowe] |
16127 | Metaphysics tells us what there could be, rather than what there is [Lowe] |
12274 | Begin examination with basics, and subdivide till you can go no further [Aristotle] |
12260 | Dialectic starts from generally accepted opinions [Aristotle] |
12291 | There can't be one definition of two things, or two definitions of the same thing [Aristotle] |
12292 | Definitions are easily destroyed, since they can contain very many assertions [Aristotle] |
12283 | In definitions the first term to be assigned ought to be the genus [Aristotle] |
12272 | We describe the essence of a particular thing by means of its differentiae [Aristotle] |
12279 | The differentia indicate the qualities, but not the essence [Aristotle] |
12289 | The genera and the differentiae are part of the essence [Aristotle] |
12261 | Differentia are generic, and belong with genus [Aristotle] |
12263 | 'Genus' is part of the essence shared among several things [Aristotle] |
12285 | The definition is peculiar to one thing, not common to many [Aristotle] |
8262 | How can a theory of meaning show the ontological commitments of two paraphrases of one idea? [Lowe] |
8315 | Maybe facts are just true propositions [Lowe] |
8319 | One-to-one correspondence would need countable, individuable items [Lowe] |
8309 | A set is a 'number of things', not a 'collection', because nothing actually collects the members [Lowe] |
8322 | I don't believe in the empty set, because (lacking members) it lacks identity-conditions [Lowe] |
8312 | It is better if the existential quantifier refers to 'something', rather than a 'thing' which needs individuation [Lowe] |
11261 | Puzzles arise when reasoning seems equal on both sides [Aristotle] |
12273 | Unit is the starting point of number [Aristotle] |
8297 | Numbers are universals, being sets whose instances are sets of appropriate cardinality [Lowe] |
8266 | Simple counting is more basic than spotting that one-to-one correlation makes sets equinumerous [Lowe] |
8302 | Fs and Gs are identical in number if they one-to-one correlate with one another [Lowe] |
8298 | Sets are instances of numbers (rather than 'collections'); numbers explain sets, not vice versa [Lowe] |
8311 | If 2 is a particular, then adding particulars to themselves does nothing, and 2+2=2 [Lowe] |
8310 | Does the existence of numbers matter, in the way space, time and persons do? [Lowe] |
8321 | All possible worlds contain abstracta (e.g. numbers), which means they contain concrete objects [Lowe] |
8300 | Perhaps possession of causal power is the hallmark of existence (and a reason to deny the void) [Lowe] |
8281 | Heraclitus says change is new creation, and Spinoza that it is just phases of the one substance [Lowe] |
8270 | Events are changes or non-changes in properties and relations of persisting objects [Lowe] |
8308 | Events are ontologically indispensable for singular causal explanations [Lowe] |
8314 | Are facts wholly abstract, or can they contain some concrete constituents? [Lowe] |
8316 | Facts cannot be wholly abstract if they enter into causal relations [Lowe] |
8318 | The problem with the structured complex view of facts is what binds the constituents [Lowe] |
8323 | It is whimsical to try to count facts - how many facts did I learn before breakfast? [Lowe] |
8313 | Facts are needed for truth-making and causation, but they seem to lack identity criteria [Lowe] |
8258 | Two of the main rivals for the foundations of ontology are substances, and facts or states-of-affairs [Lowe] |
8301 | Some abstractions exist despite lacking causal powers, because explanation needs them [Lowe] |
8283 | Ontological categories are not natural kinds: the latter can only be distinguished using the former [Lowe] |
8284 | The top division of categories is either abstract/concrete, or universal/particular, or necessary/contingent [Lowe] |
13122 | Lowe divides things into universals and particulars, then kinds and properties, and abstract/concrete [Lowe, by Westerhoff] |
12267 | There are ten categories: essence, quantity, quality, relation, place, time, position, state, activity, passivity [Aristotle] |
12282 | An individual property has to exist (in past, present or future) [Aristotle] |
12264 | An 'accident' is something which may possibly either belong or not belong to a thing [Aristotle] |
8273 | Is 'the Thames is broad in London' relational, or adverbial, or segmental? [Lowe] |
8285 | I prefer 'modes' to 'tropes', because it emphasises their dependence [Lowe] |
8286 | Tropes cannot have clear identity-conditions, so they are not objects [Lowe] |
8294 | How can tropes depend on objects for their identity, if objects are just bundles of tropes? [Lowe] |
8295 | Why cannot a trope float off and join another bundle? [Lowe] |
8296 | Does a ball snug in plaster have one trope, or two which coincide? [Lowe] |
8288 | Sortal terms for universals involve a substance, whereas adjectival terms do not [Lowe] |
8293 | Real universals are needed to explain laws of nature [Lowe] |
8307 | Particulars are instantiations, and universals are instantiables [Lowe] |
8267 | Perhaps concrete objects are entities which are in space-time and subject to causality [Lowe] |
8265 | Our commitment to the existence of objects should depend on their explanatory value [Lowe] |
8275 | Objects are entities with full identity-conditions, but there are entities other than objects [Lowe] |
16130 | To be an object at all requires identity-conditions [Lowe] |
8263 | An object is an entity which has identity-conditions [Lowe] |
8268 | Some things (such as electrons) can be countable, while lacking proper identity [Lowe] |
8303 | Criteria of identity cannot individuate objects, because they are shared among different types [Lowe] |
8292 | Diversity of two tigers is their difference in space-time; difference of matter is a consequence [Lowe] |
12280 | Genus gives the essence better than the differentiae do [Aristotle] |
8291 | Individuation principles identify what kind it is; identity criteria distinguish items of the same kind [Lowe] |
16128 | A 'substance' is an object which doesn't depend for existence on other objects [Lowe] |
8279 | The identity of composite objects isn't fixed by original composition, because how do you identify the origin? [Lowe] |
13269 | In the case of a house the parts can exist without the whole, so parts are not the whole [Aristotle] |
12284 | Everything that is has one single essence [Aristotle] |
12262 | An 'idion' belongs uniquely to a thing, but is not part of its essence [Aristotle] |
8271 | An object 'endures' if it is always wholly present, and 'perdures' if different parts exist at different times [Lowe] |
8272 | How can you identify temporal parts of tomatoes without referring to tomatoes? [Lowe] |
12290 | Destruction is dissolution of essence [Aristotle] |
12286 | If two things are the same, they must have the same source and origin [Aristotle] |
8305 | A clear idea of the kind of an object must precede a criterion of identity for it [Lowe] |
8290 | One view is that two objects of the same type are only distinguished by differing in matter [Lowe] |
12266 | 'Same' is mainly for names or definitions, but also for propria, and for accidents [Aristotle] |
12287 | Two identical things have the same accidents, they are the same; if the accidents differ, they're different [Aristotle] |
12288 | Numerical sameness and generic sameness are not the same [Aristotle] |
15079 | 'Conceptual' necessity is narrow logical necessity, true because of concepts and logical laws [Lowe] |
16063 | Metaphysical necessity is logical necessity 'broadly construed' [Lowe, by Lynch/Glasgow] |
12259 | Reasoning is when some results follow necessarily from certain claims [Aristotle] |
8260 | Logical necessity can be 'strict' (laws), or 'narrow' (laws and definitions), or 'broad' (all logical worlds) [Lowe] |
16131 | The metaphysically possible is what acceptable principles and categories will permit [Lowe] |
8320 | Does every abstract possible world exist in every possible world? [Lowe] |
8280 | While space may just be appearance, time and change can't be, because the appearances change [Lowe] |
8276 | Properties or qualities are essentially adjectival, not objectual [Lowe] |
12271 | Induction is the progress from particulars to universals [Aristotle] |
12293 | We say 'so in cases of this kind', but how do you decide what is 'of this kind'? [Aristotle] |
20363 | Leaves are unequal, but we form the concept 'leaf' by discarding their individual differences [Nietzsche] |
8289 | The idea that Cartesian souls are made of some ghostly 'immaterial' stuff is quite unwarranted [Lowe] |
8299 | Abstractions are non-spatial, or dependent, or derived from concepts [Lowe] |
8306 | You can think of a direction without a line, but a direction existing with no lines is inconceivable [Lowe] |
12276 | Justice and self-control are better than courage, because they are always useful [Aristotle] |
12277 | Friendship is preferable to money, since its excess is preferable [Aristotle] |
12275 | We value friendship just for its own sake [Aristotle] |
12281 | Man is intrinsically a civilized animal [Aristotle] |
12265 | All water is the same, because of a certain similarity [Aristotle] |
8317 | To cite facts as the elements in causation is to confuse states of affairs with states of objects [Lowe] |
8269 | Points are limits of parts of space, so parts of space cannot be aggregates of them [Lowe] |
12278 | 'Being' and 'oneness' are predicated of everything which exists [Aristotle] |