Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'works', 'Works (refs to 8 vol Colli and Montinari)' and 'Parts'

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119 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
There is practical wisdom (for action), and theoretical wisdom (for deep understanding) [Aristotle, by Whitcomb]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 1. Philosophy
Nietzsche thinks philosophy makes us more profound, but not better [Nietzsche, by Ansell Pearson]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
How many mediocre thinkers are occupied with influential problems! [Nietzsche]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 6. Metaphysics as Conceptual
Nietzsche has a metaphysics, as well as perspectives - the ontology is the perspectives [Nietzsche, by Richardson]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 1. Nature of Analysis
Analytic philosophers may prefer formal systems because natural language is such mess [Simons]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 2. Logos
For Aristotle logos is essentially the ability to talk rationally about questions of value [Roochnik on Aristotle]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 4. Aims of Reason
Aristotle is the supreme optimist about the ability of logos to explain nature [Roochnik on Aristotle]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 7. Status of Reason
Reason is just another organic drive, developing late, and fighting for equality [Nietzsche]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 4. Real Definition
Aristotelian definitions aim to give the essential properties of the thing defined [Aristotle, by Quine]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 5. Genus and Differentia
Aristotelian definition involves first stating the genus, then the differentia of the thing [Aristotle, by Urmson]
4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 1. Mereology
Aristotle relativises the notion of wholeness to different measures [Aristotle, by Koslicki]
Complement: the rest of the Universe apart from some individual, written x-bar [Simons]
Classical mereology doesn't apply well to the objects around us [Simons]
A 'part' has different meanings for individuals, classes, and masses [Simons]
Criticisms of mereology: parts? transitivity? sums? identity? four-dimensional? [Simons]
4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 2. Terminology of Mereology
Disjoint: two individuals are disjoint iff they do not overlap, written 'x | y' [Simons]
Proper or improper part: x < y, 'x is (a) part of y' [Simons]
Overlap: two parts overlap iff they have a part in common, expressed as 'x o y' [Simons]
Product: the product of two individuals is the sum of all of their overlaps, written 'x · y' [Simons]
Sum: the sum of individuals is what is overlapped if either of them are, written 'x + y' [Simons]
Difference: the difference of individuals is the remainder of an overlap, written 'x - y' [Simons]
General sum: the sum of objects satisfying some predicate, written σx(Fx) [Simons]
Atom: an individual with no proper parts, written 'At x' [Simons]
General product: the nucleus of all objects satisfying a predicate, written πx(Fx) [Simons]
Universe: the mereological sum of all objects whatever, written 'U' [Simons]
Dissective: stuff is dissective if parts of the stuff are always the stuff [Simons]
4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 3. Axioms of Mereology
Classical mereology doesn't handle temporal or modal notions very well [Simons]
The part-relation is transitive and asymmetric (and thus irreflexive) [Simons]
Each wheel is part of a car, but the four wheels are not a further part [Simons]
Two standard formalisations of part-whole theory are the Calculus of Individuals, and Mereology [Simons]
4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 4. Groups
The same members may form two groups [Simons]
A 'group' is a collection with a condition which constitutes their being united [Simons]
'The wolves' are the matter of 'the pack'; the latter is a group, with different identity conditions [Simons]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
For Aristotle, the subject-predicate structure of Greek reflected a substance-accident structure of reality [Aristotle, by O'Grady]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
Philosophy is stuck on the Fregean view that an individual is anything with a proper name [Simons]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 6. Plural Quantification
Some natural languages don't distinguish between singular and plural [Simons]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 1. Nature of Change
Four-dimensional ontology has no change, since that needs an object, and time to pass [Simons]
There are real relational changes, as well as bogus 'Cambridge changes' [Simons]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 2. Processes
I don't believe in processes [Simons]
Fans of process ontology cheat, since river-stages refer to 'rivers' [Simons]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 3. Moments
Moments are things like smiles or skids, which are founded on other things [Simons]
Moving disturbances are are moments which continuously change their basis [Simons]
A smiling is an event with causes, but the smile is a continuant without causes [Simons]
A wave is maintained by a process, but it isn't a process [Simons]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / a. Nature of events
I do not think there is a general identity condition for events [Simons]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / b. Events as primitive
Relativity has an ontology of things and events, not on space-time diagrams [Simons]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 4. Ontological Dependence
Independent objects can exist apart, and maybe even entirely alone [Simons]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 8. Stuff / a. Pure stuff
Mass nouns admit 'much' and 'a little', and resist 'many' and 'few'. [Simons]
Mass terms (unlike plurals) are used with indifference to whether they can exist in units [Simons]
Gold is not its atoms, because the atoms must be all gold, but gold contains neutrons [Simons]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 8. Stuff / b. Mixtures
Mixtures disappear if nearly all of the mixture is one ingredient [Simons]
A mixture can have different qualities from its ingredients. [Simons]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 5. Naturalism
First see nature as non-human, then fit ourselves into this view of nature [Nietzsche]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 1. Powers
Storms are wonderful expressions of free powers! [Nietzsche]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
To individuate something we must pick it out, but also know its limits of variation [Simons]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
Sortal nouns for continuants tell you their continuance- and cessation-conditions [Simons]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / a. Intrinsic unification
A whole requires some unique relation which binds together all of the parts [Simons]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / b. Cat and its tail
Tibbles isn't Tib-plus-tail, because Tibbles can survive its loss, but the sum can't [Simons]
Does Tibbles remain the same cat when it loses its tail? [Simons]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / d. Coincident objects
Without extensional mereology two objects can occupy the same position [Simons]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / a. Hylomorphism
The unmoved mover and the soul show Aristotelian form as the ultimate mereological atom [Aristotle, by Koslicki]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / d. Form as unifier
The 'form' is the recipe for building wholes of a particular kind [Aristotle, by Koslicki]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 5. Composition of an Object
Composition is asymmetric and transitive [Simons]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 6. Constitution of an Object
A hand constitutes a fist (when clenched), but a fist is not composed of an augmented hand [Simons]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / a. Parts of objects
We say 'b is part of a', 'b is a part of a', 'b are a part of a', or 'b are parts of a'. [Simons]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / b. Sums of parts
'Mereological extensionality' says objects with the same parts are identical [Simons]
Classical mereology says there are 'sums', for whose existence there is no other evidence [Simons]
If there are c atoms, this gives 2^c - 1 individuals, so there can't be just 2 or 12 individuals [Simons]
Sums are more plausible for pluralities and masses than they are for individuals [Simons]
Sums of things in different categories are found within philosophy. [Simons]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
The wholeness of a melody seems conventional, but of an explosion it seems natural [Simons]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
We begin with concepts of kinds, from individuals; but that is not the essence of individuals [Nietzsche]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
Objects have their essential properties because of the kind of objects they are [Simons]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / b. Essence not necessities
We must distinguish the de dicto 'must' of propositions from the de re 'must' of essence [Simons]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 11. Essence of Artefacts
Original parts are the best candidates for being essential to artefacts [Simons]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 12. Essential Parts
An essential part of an essential part is an essential part of the whole [Simons]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 4. Four-Dimensionalism
Four dimensional-objects are stranger than most people think [Simons]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 7. Intermittent Objects
Intermittent objects would be respectable if they occurred in nature, as well as in artefacts [Simons]
Objects like chess games, with gaps in them, are thereby less unified [Simons]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 9. Ship of Theseus
An entrepreneur and a museum curator would each be happy with their ship at the end [Simons]
The 'best candidate' theories mistakenly assume there is one answer to 'Which is the real ship?' [Simons]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 12. Origin as Essential
The zygote is an essential initial part, for a sexually reproduced organism [Simons]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
The limits of change for an individual depend on the kind of individual [Simons]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
For Aristotle, knowledge is of causes, and is theoretical, practical or productive [Aristotle, by Code]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 1. Nature of the A Priori
The notion of a priori truth is absent in Aristotle [Aristotle, by Politis]
12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
Aristotle is a rationalist, but reason is slowly acquired through perception and experience [Aristotle, by Frede,M]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 2. Intuition
Aristotle wants to fit common intuitions, and therefore uses language as a guide [Aristotle, by Gill,ML]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory
Plato says sciences are unified around Forms; Aristotle says they're unified around substance [Aristotle, by Moravcsik]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / a. Explanation
Aristotelian explanations are facts, while modern explanations depend on human conceptions [Aristotle, by Politis]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
Aristotle's standard analysis of species and genus involves specifying things in terms of something more general [Aristotle, by Benardete,JA]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / k. Explanations by essence
Aristotle regularly says that essential properties explain other significant properties [Aristotle, by Kung]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / c. Animal rationality
Aristotle and the Stoics denied rationality to animals, while Platonists affirmed it [Aristotle, by Sorabji]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 2. Analytic Truths
The notion of analytic truth is absent in Aristotle [Aristotle, by Politis]
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 1. Action Theory
Nietzsche classified actions by the nature of the agent, not the nature of the act [Nietzsche, by Foot]
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 2. Duration of an Action
With activities if you are doing it you've done it, with performances you must finish to have done it [Simons]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 4. Responsibility for Actions
Nietzsche failed to see that moral actions can be voluntary without free will [Foot on Nietzsche]
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 8. The Arts / a. Music
One false note doesn't make it a performance of a different work [Simons]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
Aristotle never actually says that man is a rational animal [Aristotle, by Fogelin]
Each person has a fixed constitution, which makes them a particular type of person [Nietzsche, by Leiter]
Nietzsche could only revalue human values for a different species [Nietzsche, by Foot]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / f. Übermensch
The superman is a monstrous oddity, not a serious idea [MacIntyre on Nietzsche]
Nietzsche's higher type of man is much more important than the idealised 'superman' [Nietzsche, by Leiter]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / g. Will to power
The 'will to power' is basically applied to drives and forces, not to people [Nietzsche, by Richardson]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
Friendly chats undermine my philosophy; wanting to be right at the expense of love is folly [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / c. Particularism
Moral generalisation is wrong, because we should evaluate individual acts [Nietzsche, by Foot]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / d. Virtue theory critique
Nietzsche thought our psychology means there can't be universal human virtues [Nietzsche, by Foot]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 1. Existentialism
Nietzsche tried to lead a thought-provoking life [Safranski on Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 2. Nihilism
Initially nihilism was cosmic, but later Nietzsche saw it as a cultural matter [Nietzsche, by Ansell Pearson]
Nietzsche urges that nihilism be active, and will nothing itself [Nietzsche, by Zizek]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 4. Boredom
Flight from boredom leads to art [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 7. Existential Action
Nietzsche was fascinated by a will that can turn against itself [Nietzsche, by Safranski]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 1. Purpose of a State
Individual development is more important than the state, but a community is necessary [Nietzsche]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 4. Citizenship
Nietzsche thinks we should join a society, in order to criticise, heal and renew it [Nietzsche, by Richardson]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 5. Culture
Every culture loses its identity and power if it lacks a major myth [Nietzsche]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / a. Aims of education
It is the mark of an educated mind to be able to entertain an idea without accepting it [Aristotle]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / b. Education principles
Aristotle said the educated were superior to the uneducated as the living are to the dead [Aristotle, by Diog. Laertius]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 5. Infinite in Nature
There are potential infinities (never running out), but actual infinity is incoherent [Aristotle, by Friend]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / a. Greek matter
Aristotle's matter can become any other kind of matter [Aristotle, by Wiggins]
29. Religion / A. Polytheistic Religion / 2. Greek Polytheism
The concepts of gods arose from observing the soul, and the cosmos [Aristotle, by Sext.Empiricus]