89 ideas
1695 | Without extensive examination firm statements are hard, but studying the difficulties is profitable [Aristotle] |
16325 | Analysis rests on natural language, but its ideal is a framework which revises language [Halbach] |
1698 | Both sides of contraries need not exist (as health without sickness, white without black) [Aristotle] |
1697 | The contrary of good is bad, but the contrary of bad is either good or another evil [Aristotle] |
16292 | An explicit definition enables the elimination of what is defined [Halbach] |
16307 | Don't trust analogies; they are no more than a guideline [Halbach] |
11034 | The differentiae of genera which are different are themselves different in kind [Aristotle] |
16330 | Truth-value 'gluts' allow two truth values together; 'gaps' give a partial conception of truth [Halbach] |
16339 | Truth axioms prove objects exist, so truth doesn't seem to be a logical notion [Halbach] |
16324 | Any definition of truth requires a metalanguage [Halbach] |
16293 | Traditional definitions of truth often make it more obscure, rather than less [Halbach] |
16301 | If people have big doubts about truth, a definition might give it more credibility [Halbach] |
18367 | A true existence statement has its truth caused by the existence of the thing [Aristotle] |
16297 | Semantic theories avoid Tarski's Theorem by sticking to a sublanguage [Halbach] |
16337 | Disquotational truth theories are short of deductive power [Halbach] |
16322 | CT proves PA consistent, which PA can't do on its own, so CT is not conservative over PA [Halbach] |
16294 | Axiomatic truth doesn't presuppose a truth-definition, though it could admit it at a later stage [Halbach] |
16326 | The main semantic theories of truth are Kripke's theory, and revisions semantics [Halbach] |
16311 | To axiomatise Tarski's truth definition, we need a binary predicate for his 'satisfaction' [Halbach] |
16318 | Compositional Truth CT has the truth of a sentence depending of the semantic values of its constituents [Halbach] |
16299 | Gödel numbering means a theory of truth can use Peano Arithmetic as its base theory [Halbach] |
16340 | Truth axioms need a base theory, because that is where truth issues arise [Halbach] |
16305 | We know a complete axiomatisation of truth is not feasible [Halbach] |
16313 | A theory is 'conservative' if it adds no new theorems to its base theory [Halbach, by PG] |
16315 | The Tarski Biconditional theory TB is Peano Arithmetic, plus truth, plus all Tarski bi-conditionals [Halbach] |
16314 | Theories of truth are 'typed' (truth can't apply to sentences containing 'true'), or 'type-free' [Halbach] |
16327 | Friedman-Sheard is type-free Compositional Truth, with two inference rules for truth [Halbach] |
16329 | Kripke-Feferman theory KF axiomatises Kripke fixed-points, with Strong Kleene logic with gluts [Halbach] |
16332 | The KF theory is useful, but it is not a theory containing its own truth predicate [Halbach] |
16331 | The KF is much stronger deductively than FS, which relies on classical truth [Halbach] |
16319 | Compositional Truth CT proves generalisations, so is preferred in discussions of deflationism [Halbach] |
16320 | Some say deflationism is axioms which are conservative over the base theory [Halbach] |
16338 | Deflationism says truth is a disquotation device to express generalisations, adding no new knowledge [Halbach] |
16317 | The main problem for deflationists is they can express generalisations, but not prove them [Halbach] |
16316 | Deflationists say truth is just for expressing infinite conjunctions or generalisations [Halbach] |
16335 | In Strong Kleene logic a disjunction just needs one disjunct to be true [Halbach] |
16334 | In Weak Kleene logic there are 'gaps', neither true nor false if one component lacks a truth value [Halbach] |
16309 | Every attempt at formal rigour uses some set theory [Halbach] |
16333 | The underestimated costs of giving up classical logic are found in mathematical reasoning [Halbach] |
11033 | Predications of predicates are predications of their subjects [Aristotle] |
16310 | A theory is some formulae and all of their consequences [Halbach] |
16342 | You cannot just say all of Peano arithmetic is true, as 'true' isn't part of the system [Halbach] |
16341 | Normally we only endorse a theory if we believe it to be sound [Halbach] |
16344 | Soundness must involve truth; the soundness of PA certainly needs it [Halbach] |
16347 | Many new paradoxes may await us when we study interactions between frameworks [Halbach] |
16336 | The liar paradox applies truth to a negated truth (but the conditional will serve equally) [Halbach] |
11044 | One is prior to two, because its existence is implied by two [Aristotle] |
11042 | Parts of a line join at a point, so it is continuous [Aristotle] |
16321 | The compactness theorem can prove nonstandard models of PA [Halbach] |
16343 | The global reflection principle seems to express the soundness of Peano Arithmetic [Halbach] |
11041 | Some quantities are discrete, like number, and others continuous, like lines, time and space [Aristotle] |
9992 | The 'extension of a concept' in general may be quantitatively completely indeterminate [Cantor] |
16312 | To reduce PA to ZF, we represent the non-negative integers with von Neumann ordinals [Halbach] |
16308 | Set theory was liberated early from types, and recent truth-theories are exploring type-free [Halbach] |
11286 | Primary being must be more than mere indeterminate ultimate subject of predication [Politis on Aristotle] |
1700 | There are six kinds of change: generation, destruction, increase, diminution, alteration, change of place [Aristotle] |
16345 | That Peano arithmetic is interpretable in ZF set theory is taken by philosophers as a reduction [Halbach] |
18366 | Of interdependent things, the prior one causes the other's existence [Aristotle] |
1699 | A thing is prior to another if it implies its existence [Aristotle] |
3311 | The categories (substance, quality, quantity, relation, action, passion, place, time) peter out inconsequentially [Benardete,JA on Aristotle] |
11035 | There are ten basic categories for thinking about things [Aristotle] |
13121 | Substance,Quantity,Quality,Relation,Place,Time,Being-in-a-position,Having,Doing,Being affected [Aristotle, by Westerhoff] |
16116 | Aristotle derived categories as answers to basic questions about nature, size, quality, location etc. [Aristotle, by Gill,ML] |
21345 | Aristotle said relations are not substances, so (if they exist) they must be accidents [Aristotle, by Heil] |
16155 | Aristotle promoted the importance of properties and objects (rather than general and particular) [Aristotle, by Frede,M] |
11032 | Some things said 'of' a subject are not 'in' the subject [Aristotle] |
11038 | We call them secondary 'substances' because they reveal the primary substances [Aristotle] |
16739 | Four species of quality: states, capacities, affects, and forms [Aristotle, by Pasnau] |
11037 | Colour must be in an individual body, or it is not embodied [Aristotle] |
16154 | Aristotle gave up his earlier notion of individuals, because it relied on universals [Aristotle, by Frede,M] |
12351 | Genus and species are substances, because only they reveal the primary substance [Aristotle, by Wedin] |
1694 | Substances have no opposites, and don't come in degrees (including if the substance is a man) [Aristotle] |
16091 | Is primary substance just an ultimate subject, or some aspect of a complex body? [Aristotle, by Gill,ML] |
11280 | Primary being is 'that which lies under', or 'particular substance' [Aristotle, by Politis] |
11040 | A single substance can receive contrary properties [Aristotle] |
16140 | Secondary substances do have subjects, so they are not ultimate in the ontology [Aristotle, by Frede,M] |
10965 | In earlier Aristotle the substances were particulars, not kinds [Aristotle, by Lawson-Tancred] |
11036 | A 'primary' substance is in each subject, with species or genera as 'secondary' substances [Aristotle] |
8287 | Earlier Aristotle had objects as primary substances, but later he switched to substantial form [Aristotle, by Lowe] |
12350 | Things are called 'substances' because they are subjects for everything else [Aristotle] |
11039 | A primary substance reveals a 'this', which is an individual unit [Aristotle] |
12361 | Primary substances are ontological in 'Categories', and explanatory in 'Metaphysics' [Aristotle, by Wedin] |
3315 | Aristotle denigrates the category of relation, but for modern absolutists self-relation is basic [Benardete,JA on Aristotle] |
16346 | Maybe necessity is a predicate, not the usual operator, to make it more like truth [Halbach] |
12349 | Only what can be said of many things is a predicable [Aristotle, by Wedin] |
11837 | Some predicates signify qualification of a substance, others the substance itself [Aristotle] |
16298 | We need propositions to ascribe the same beliefs to people with different languages [Halbach] |
11043 | It is not possible for fire to be cold or snow black [Aristotle] |
1696 | Change goes from possession to loss (as in baldness), but not the other way round [Aristotle] |