Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'On Interpretation', 'The Theory of Transfinite Numbers' and 'Word and Object'

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50 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 4. Metaphysics as Science
6891 Quine's naturalistic and empirical view is based entirely on first-order logic and set theory [Quine, by Mautner]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 6. Metaphysics as Conceptual
6310 Enquiry needs a conceptual scheme, so we should retain the best available [Quine]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 4. Contraries
1708 In "Callias is just/not just/unjust", which of these are contraries? [Aristotle]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 10. Making Future Truths
1703 It is necessary that either a sea-fight occurs tomorrow or it doesn't, though neither option is in itself necessary [Aristotle]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
1704 Statements are true according to how things actually are [Aristotle]
4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 1. Aristotelian Logic
22272 Aristotle's later logic had to treat 'Socrates' as 'everything that is Socrates' [Potter on Aristotle]
9405 Square of Opposition: not both true, or not both false; one-way implication; opposite truth-values [Aristotle]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 1. Modal Logic
9728 Modal Square 1: □P and ¬◊¬P are 'contraries' of □¬P and ¬◊P [Aristotle, by Fitting/Mendelsohn]
9729 Modal Square 2: ¬□¬P and ◊P are 'subcontraries' of ¬□P and ◊¬P [Aristotle, by Fitting/Mendelsohn]
9730 Modal Square 3: □P and ¬◊¬P are 'contradictories' of ¬□P and ◊¬P [Aristotle, by Fitting/Mendelsohn]
9731 Modal Square 4: □¬P and ¬◊P are 'contradictories' of ¬□¬P and ◊P [Aristotle, by Fitting/Mendelsohn]
9732 Modal Square 5: □P and ¬◊¬P are 'subalternatives' of ¬□¬P and ◊P [Aristotle, by Fitting/Mendelsohn]
9733 Modal Square 6: □¬P and ¬◊P are 'subalternatives' of ¬□P and ◊¬P [Aristotle, by Fitting/Mendelsohn]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
9616 A set is a collection into a whole of distinct objects of our intuition or thought [Cantor]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 1. Bivalence
21593 In talking of future sea-fights, Aristotle rejects bivalence [Aristotle, by Williamson]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 2. Excluded Middle
1701 A prayer is a sentence which is neither true nor false [Aristotle]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 6. Plural Quantification
12798 Plurals can in principle be paraphrased away altogether [Quine]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / e. Ordinal numbers
17905 Any progression will do nicely for numbers; they can all then be used to measure multiplicity [Quine]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / f. Uncountable infinities
15896 Cantor needed Power Set for the reals, but then couldn't count the new collections [Cantor, by Lavine]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / b. Indispensability of mathematics
9556 Nearly all of mathematics has to quantify over abstract objects [Quine]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / e. Being and nothing
1706 Non-existent things aren't made to exist by thought, because their non-existence is part of the thought [Aristotle]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 5. Reason for Existence
1707 Maybe necessity and non-necessity are the first principles of ontology [Aristotle]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 4. Category Realism
16462 The quest for ultimate categories is the quest for a simple clear pattern of notation [Quine]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / a. Dispositions
15723 Either dispositions rest on structures, or we keep saying 'all things being equal' [Quine]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / d. Dispositions as occurrent
15490 Explain unmanifested dispositions as structural similarities to objects which have manifested them [Quine, by Martin,CB]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 5. Class Nominalism
8504 Quine aims to deal with properties by the use of eternal open sentences, or classes [Quine, by Devitt]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
8464 Physical objects in space-time are just events or processes, no matter how disconnected [Quine]
7924 The notion of a physical object is by far the most useful one for science [Quine]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
8482 Mathematicians must be rational but not two-legged, cyclists the opposite. So a mathematical cyclist? [Quine]
12136 Cyclist are not actually essentially two-legged [Brody on Quine]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 2. Defining Identity
17594 We can paraphrase 'x=y' as a sequence of the form 'if Fx then Fy' [Quine]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / c. Truth-function conditionals
15725 Normal conditionals have a truth-value gap when the antecedent is false. [Quine]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / e. Supposition conditionals
15722 Conditionals are pointless if the truth value of the antecedent is known [Quine]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 9. Counterfactuals
15719 We feign belief in counterfactual antecedents, and assess how convincing the consequent is [Quine]
15721 Counterfactuals are plausible when dispositions are involved, as they imply structures [Quine]
15720 What stays the same in assessing a counterfactual antecedent depends on context [Quine]
15724 Counterfactuals have no place in a strict account of science [Quine]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory
4630 Two theories can be internally consistent and match all the facts, yet be inconsistent with one another [Quine, by Baggini /Fosl]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 3. Eliminativism
3131 Quine expresses the instrumental version of eliminativism [Quine, by Rey]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 2. Meaning as Mental
2337 For Aristotle meaning and reference are linked to concepts [Aristotle, by Putnam]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 4. Mental Propositions
13763 Spoken sounds vary between people, but are signs of affections of soul, which are the same for all [Aristotle]
19. Language / F. Communication / 3. Denial
1705 It doesn't have to be the case that in opposed views one is true and the other false [Aristotle]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / b. Indeterminate translation
3988 Indeterminacy of translation also implies indeterminacy in interpreting people's mental states [Dennett on Quine]
6311 The firmer the links between sentences and stimuli, the less translations can diverge [Quine]
6312 We can never precisely pin down how to translate the native word 'Gavagai' [Quine]
6313 Stimulus synonymy of 'Gavagai' and 'Rabbit' does not even guarantee they are coextensive [Quine]
6317 Dispositions to speech behaviour, and actual speech, are never enough to fix any one translation [Quine]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / c. Principle of charity
6315 We should be suspicious of a translation which implies that a people have very strange beliefs [Quine]
6314 Weird translations are always possible, but they improve if we impose our own logic on them [Quine]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / g. Growing block
1702 Things may be necessary once they occur, but not be unconditionally necessary [Aristotle]