Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'On Interpretation', 'Abstract Objects' and 'Models'

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34 ideas

2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 4. Contraries
In "Callias is just/not just/unjust", which of these are contraries? [Aristotle]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 10. Making Future Truths
It is necessary that either a sea-fight occurs tomorrow or it doesn't, though neither option is in itself necessary [Aristotle]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
Statements are true according to how things actually are [Aristotle]
4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 1. Aristotelian Logic
Aristotle's later logic had to treat 'Socrates' as 'everything that is Socrates' [Potter on Aristotle]
Square of Opposition: not both true, or not both false; one-way implication; opposite truth-values [Aristotle]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 1. Modal Logic
Modal Square 1: □P and ¬◊¬P are 'contraries' of □¬P and ¬◊P [Aristotle, by Fitting/Mendelsohn]
Modal Square 2: ¬□¬P and ◊P are 'subcontraries' of ¬□P and ◊¬P [Aristotle, by Fitting/Mendelsohn]
Modal Square 3: □P and ¬◊¬P are 'contradictories' of ¬□P and ◊¬P [Aristotle, by Fitting/Mendelsohn]
Modal Square 4: □¬P and ¬◊P are 'contradictories' of ¬□¬P and ◊P [Aristotle, by Fitting/Mendelsohn]
Modal Square 5: □P and ¬◊¬P are 'subalternatives' of ¬□¬P and ◊P [Aristotle, by Fitting/Mendelsohn]
Modal Square 6: □¬P and ¬◊P are 'subalternatives' of ¬□P and ◊¬P [Aristotle, by Fitting/Mendelsohn]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 1. Bivalence
In talking of future sea-fights, Aristotle rejects bivalence [Aristotle, by Williamson]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 2. Excluded Middle
A prayer is a sentence which is neither true nor false [Aristotle]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / e. Being and nothing
Non-existent things aren't made to exist by thought, because their non-existence is part of the thought [Aristotle]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 5. Reason for Existence
Maybe necessity and non-necessity are the first principles of ontology [Aristotle]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / d. Problems with abstracta
How we refer to abstractions is much less clear than how we refer to other things [Rosen]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 7. Scientific Models
Theoretical models can represent, by mapping onto the data-models [Portides]
In the 'received view' models are formal; the 'semantic view' emphasises representation [Portides, by PG]
Representational success in models depends on success of their explanations [Portides]
The best model of the atomic nucleus is the one which explains the most results [Portides]
'Model' belongs in a family of concepts, with representation, idealisation and abstraction [Portides]
Models are theory-driven, or phenomenological (more empirical and specific) [Portides]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / i. Explanations by mechanism
General theories may be too abstract to actually explain the mechanisms [Portides]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 2. Abstracta by Selection
The Way of Abstraction used to say an abstraction is an idea that was formed by abstracting [Rosen]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 5. Abstracta by Negation
Nowadays abstractions are defined as non-spatial, causally inert things [Rosen]
Chess may be abstract, but it has existed in specific space and time [Rosen]
Sets are said to be abstract and non-spatial, but a set of books can be on a shelf [Rosen]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 6. Abstracta by Conflation
Conflating abstractions with either sets or universals is a big claim, needing a big defence [Rosen]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 7. Abstracta by Equivalence
Functional terms can pick out abstractions by asserting an equivalence relation [Rosen]
Abstraction by equivalence relationships might prove that a train is an abstract entity [Rosen]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 2. Meaning as Mental
For Aristotle meaning and reference are linked to concepts [Aristotle, by Putnam]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 4. Mental Propositions
Spoken sounds vary between people, but are signs of affections of soul, which are the same for all [Aristotle]
19. Language / F. Communication / 3. Denial
It doesn't have to be the case that in opposed views one is true and the other false [Aristotle]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / g. Growing block
Things may be necessary once they occur, but not be unconditionally necessary [Aristotle]