78 ideas
| 14888 | Wisdom prevents us from being ruled by the moment [Nietzsche] |
| 14863 | Unlike science, true wisdom involves good taste [Nietzsche] |
| 14890 | Suffering is the meaning of existence [Nietzsche] |
| 14861 | Philosophy ennobles the world, by producing an artistic conception of our knowledge [Nietzsche] |
| 14885 | The first aim of a philosopher is a life, not some works [Nietzsche] |
| 14887 | You should only develop a philosophy if you are willing to live by it [Nietzsche] |
| 14889 | Philosophy is pointless if it does not advocate, and live, a new way of life [Nietzsche] |
| 14862 | Philosophy is more valuable than much of science, because of its beauty [Nietzsche] |
| 14878 | It would better if there was no thought [Nietzsche] |
| 14881 | Why do people want philosophers? [Nietzsche] |
| 14876 | Philosophy is always secondary, because it cannot support a popular culture [Nietzsche] |
| 14860 | Kant has undermined our belief in metaphysics [Nietzsche] |
| 14859 | If philosophy controls science, then it has to determine its scope, and its value [Nietzsche] |
| 3099 | Inference is never a conscious process [Harman] |
| 3077 | Reasoning might be defined in terms of its functional role, which is to produce knowledge [Harman] |
| 3092 | If you believe that some of your beliefs are false, then at least one of your beliefs IS false [Harman] |
| 1708 | In "Callias is just/not just/unjust", which of these are contraries? [Aristotle] |
| 1703 | It is necessary that either a sea-fight occurs tomorrow or it doesn't, though neither option is in itself necessary [Aristotle] |
| 1704 | Statements are true according to how things actually are [Aristotle] |
| 22272 | Aristotle's later logic had to treat 'Socrates' as 'everything that is Socrates' [Potter on Aristotle] |
| 9405 | Square of Opposition: not both true, or not both false; one-way implication; opposite truth-values [Aristotle] |
| 9728 | Modal Square 1: □P and ¬◊¬P are 'contraries' of □¬P and ¬◊P [Aristotle, by Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
| 9729 | Modal Square 2: ¬□¬P and ◊P are 'subcontraries' of ¬□P and ◊¬P [Aristotle, by Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
| 9730 | Modal Square 3: □P and ¬◊¬P are 'contradictories' of ¬□P and ◊¬P [Aristotle, by Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
| 9731 | Modal Square 4: □¬P and ¬◊P are 'contradictories' of ¬□¬P and ◊P [Aristotle, by Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
| 9732 | Modal Square 5: □P and ¬◊¬P are 'subalternatives' of ¬□¬P and ◊P [Aristotle, by Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
| 9733 | Modal Square 6: □¬P and ¬◊P are 'subalternatives' of ¬□P and ◊¬P [Aristotle, by Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
| 3093 | Any two states are logically linked, by being entailed by their conjunction [Harman] |
| 14880 | Logic is just slavery to language [Nietzsche] |
| 3098 | Deductive logic is the only logic there is [Harman] |
| 3094 | You don't have to accept the conclusion of a valid argument [Harman] |
| 21593 | In talking of future sea-fights, Aristotle rejects bivalence [Aristotle, by Williamson] |
| 1701 | A prayer is a sentence which is neither true nor false [Aristotle] |
| 3080 | Logical form is the part of a sentence structure which involves logical elements [Harman] |
| 3081 | A theory of truth in a language must involve a theory of logical form [Harman] |
| 3084 | Our underlying predicates represent words in the language, not universal concepts [Harman] |
| 1706 | Non-existent things aren't made to exist by thought, because their non-existence is part of the thought [Aristotle] |
| 1707 | Maybe necessity and non-necessity are the first principles of ontology [Aristotle] |
| 14869 | If some sort of experience is at the root of matter, then human knowledge is close to its essence [Nietzsche] |
| 14875 | Belief matters more than knowledge, and only begins when knowledge ceases [Nietzsche] |
| 3100 | You have to reaffirm all your beliefs when you make a logical inference [Harman] |
| 14866 | It always remains possible that the world just is the way it appears [Nietzsche] |
| 3089 | Only lack of imagination makes us think that 'cats are animals' is analytic [Harman] |
| 3088 | Analyticity is postulated because we can't imagine some things being true, but we may just lack imagination [Harman] |
| 3101 | Memories are not just preserved, they are constantly reinferred [Harman] |
| 3074 | People's reasons for belief are rarely conscious [Harman] |
| 3097 | We don't distinguish between accepting, and accepting as evidence [Harman] |
| 6369 | In negative coherence theories, beliefs are prima facie justified, and don't need initial reasons [Harman, by Pollock/Cruz] |
| 3096 | Coherence avoids scepticism, because it doesn't rely on unprovable foundations [Harman] |
| 14872 | Our knowledge is illogical, because it rests on false identities between things [Nietzsche] |
| 14879 | The most extreme scepticism is when you even give up logic [Nietzsche] |
| 3095 | Induction is an attempt to increase the coherence of our explanations [Harman] |
| 14873 | If we find a hypothesis that explains many things, we conclude that it explains everything [Nietzsche] |
| 14868 | Our primary faculty is perception of structure, as when looking in a mirror [Nietzsche] |
| 14870 | We experience causation between willing and acting, and thereby explain conjunctions of changes [Nietzsche] |
| 3073 | We see ourselves in the world as a map [Harman] |
| 14867 | It is just madness to think that the mind is supernatural (or even divine!) [Nietzsche] |
| 3076 | Defining dispositions is circular [Harman] |
| 3075 | Could a cloud have a headache if its particles formed into the right pattern? [Harman] |
| 3086 | Are there any meanings apart from in a language? [Harman] |
| 3078 | Speech acts, communication, representation and truth form a single theory [Harman] |
| 2337 | For Aristotle meaning and reference are linked to concepts [Aristotle, by Putnam] |
| 3090 | There is only similarity in meaning, never sameness in meaning [Harman] |
| 3082 | Ambiguity is when different underlying truth-conditional structures have the same surface form [Harman] |
| 3079 | Truth in a language is explained by how the structural elements of a sentence contribute to its truth conditions [Harman] |
| 3085 | Sentences are different from propositions, since two sentences can express one proposition [Harman] |
| 13763 | Spoken sounds vary between people, but are signs of affections of soul, which are the same for all [Aristotle] |
| 3087 | The analytic/synthetic distinction is a silly division of thought into encyclopaedia and dictionary [Harman] |
| 1705 | It doesn't have to be the case that in opposed views one is true and the other false [Aristotle] |
| 3083 | Many predicates totally resist translation, so a universal underlying structure to languages is unlikely [Harman] |
| 14884 | The shortest path to happiness is forgetfulness, the path of animals (but of little value) [Nietzsche] |
| 14886 | Education is contrary to human nature [Nietzsche] |
| 14883 | We should evaluate the past morally [Nietzsche] |
| 14882 | Protest against vivisection - living things should not become objects of scientific investigation [Nietzsche] |
| 14865 | We do not know the nature of one single causality [Nietzsche] |
| 14871 | Laws of nature are merely complex networks of relations [Nietzsche] |
| 1702 | Things may be necessary once they occur, but not be unconditionally necessary [Aristotle] |
| 14864 | The Greeks lack a normative theology: each person has their own poetic view of things [Nietzsche] |