58 ideas
| 12274 | Begin examination with basics, and subdivide till you can go no further [Aristotle] |
| 11147 | Naturalistic philosophers oppose analysis, preferring explanation to a priori intuition [Margolis/Laurence] |
| 12260 | Dialectic starts from generally accepted opinions [Aristotle] |
| 12291 | There can't be one definition of two things, or two definitions of the same thing [Aristotle] |
| 12292 | Definitions are easily destroyed, since they can contain very many assertions [Aristotle] |
| 12272 | We describe the essence of a particular thing by means of its differentiae [Aristotle] |
| 12279 | The differentia indicate the qualities, but not the essence [Aristotle] |
| 12283 | In definitions the first term to be assigned ought to be the genus [Aristotle] |
| 12289 | The genera and the differentiae are part of the essence [Aristotle] |
| 12261 | Differentia are generic, and belong with genus [Aristotle] |
| 12263 | 'Genus' is part of the essence shared among several things [Aristotle] |
| 12285 | The definition is peculiar to one thing, not common to many [Aristotle] |
| 10800 | The values of variables can't determine existence, because they are just expressions [Ryle, by Quine] |
| 11261 | Puzzles arise when reasoning seems equal on both sides [Aristotle] |
| 12273 | Unit is the starting point of number [Aristotle] |
| 12267 | There are ten categories: essence, quantity, quality, relation, place, time, position, state, activity, passivity [Aristotle] |
| 12282 | An individual property has to exist (in past, present or future) [Aristotle] |
| 12264 | An 'accident' is something which may possibly either belong or not belong to a thing [Aristotle] |
| 12280 | Genus gives the essence better than the differentiae do [Aristotle] |
| 13269 | In the case of a house the parts can exist without the whole, so parts are not the whole [Aristotle] |
| 12284 | Everything that is has one single essence [Aristotle] |
| 12262 | An 'idion' belongs uniquely to a thing, but is not part of its essence [Aristotle] |
| 12290 | Destruction is dissolution of essence [Aristotle] |
| 12286 | If two things are the same, they must have the same source and origin [Aristotle] |
| 12266 | 'Same' is mainly for names or definitions, but also for propria, and for accidents [Aristotle] |
| 12287 | Two identical things have the same accidents, they are the same; if the accidents differ, they're different [Aristotle] |
| 12288 | Numerical sameness and generic sameness are not the same [Aristotle] |
| 12259 | Reasoning is when some results follow necessarily from certain claims [Aristotle] |
| 11141 | Modern empiricism tends to emphasise psychological connections, not semantic relations [Margolis/Laurence] |
| 12271 | Induction is the progress from particulars to universals [Aristotle] |
| 12293 | We say 'so in cases of this kind', but how do you decide what is 'of this kind'? [Aristotle] |
| 11142 | Body-type seems to affect a mind's cognition and conceptual scheme [Margolis/Laurence] |
| 11121 | Language of thought has subject/predicate form and includes logical devices [Margolis/Laurence] |
| 11120 | Concepts are either representations, or abilities, or Fregean senses [Margolis/Laurence] |
| 11122 | A computer may have propositional attitudes without representations [Margolis/Laurence] |
| 11124 | Do mental representations just lead to a vicious regress of explanations [Margolis/Laurence] |
| 11123 | Maybe the concept CAT is just the ability to discriminate and infer about cats [Margolis/Laurence] |
| 11125 | The abilities view cannot explain the productivity of thought, or mental processes [Margolis/Laurence] |
| 11140 | Concept-structure explains typicality, categories, development, reference and composition [Margolis/Laurence] |
| 11128 | Classically, concepts give necessary and sufficient conditions for falling under them [Margolis/Laurence] |
| 11130 | Typicality challenges the classical view; we see better fruit-prototypes in apples than in plums [Margolis/Laurence] |
| 11129 | The classical theory explains acquisition, categorization and reference [Margolis/Laurence] |
| 11131 | It may be that our concepts (such as 'knowledge') have no definitional structure [Margolis/Laurence] |
| 11132 | The prototype theory is probabilistic, picking something out if it has sufficient of the properties [Margolis/Laurence] |
| 11133 | Prototype theory categorises by computing the number of shared constituents [Margolis/Laurence] |
| 11134 | People don't just categorise by apparent similarities [Margolis/Laurence] |
| 11135 | Complex concepts have emergent properties not in the ingredient prototypes [Margolis/Laurence] |
| 11136 | Many complex concepts obviously have no prototype [Margolis/Laurence] |
| 11137 | The theory theory of concepts says they are parts of theories, defined by their roles [Margolis/Laurence] |
| 11138 | The theory theory is holistic, so how can people have identical concepts? [Margolis/Laurence] |
| 11139 | Maybe concepts have no structure, and determined by relations to the world, not to other concepts [Margolis/Laurence] |
| 11146 | People can formulate new concepts which are only named later [Margolis/Laurence] |
| 12277 | Friendship is preferable to money, since its excess is preferable [Aristotle] |
| 12276 | Justice and self-control are better than courage, because they are always useful [Aristotle] |
| 12275 | We value friendship just for its own sake [Aristotle] |
| 12281 | Man is intrinsically a civilized animal [Aristotle] |
| 12265 | All water is the same, because of a certain similarity [Aristotle] |
| 12278 | 'Being' and 'oneness' are predicated of everything which exists [Aristotle] |