527 ideas
548 | Knowledge chosen for its own sake, rather than for results, is wisdom [Aristotle] |
11228 | Wisdom seeks explanations, causes, and reasons why things are as they are [Aristotle, by Politis] |
21875 | The wisdom of a free man is a meditation on life, not on death [Spinoza] |
17230 | If we are not wholly wise, we should live by good rules and maxims [Spinoza] |
545 | It is not much help if a doctor knows about universals but not the immediate particular [Aristotle] |
549 | All philosophy begins from wonder, either at the physical world, or at ideas [Aristotle] |
1576 | If each of us can give some logos about parts of nature, our combined efforts can be impressive [Aristotle] |
572 | Philosophy has different powers from dialectic, and a different life from sophistry [Aristotle] |
609 | Philosophy is a kind of science that deals with principles [Aristotle] |
624 | Absolute thinking is the thinking of thinking [Aristotle] |
22171 | If only natural substances exist, science is first philosophy - but not if there is an immovable substance [Aristotle] |
11242 | Wisdom is knowledge of principles and causes [Aristotle] |
12038 | Translate as 'humans all desire by nature to understand' (not as 'to know') [Aristotle, by Annas] |
559 | Even people who go astray in their opinions have contributed something useful [Aristotle] |
17200 | We must be careful to keep words distinct from ideas and images [Spinoza] |
4840 | Reason perceives things under a certain form of eternity [Spinoza] |
17194 | Reason only explains what is universal, so it is timeless, under a certain form of eternity [Spinoza] |
17213 | In so far as men live according to reason, they will agree with one another [Spinoza] |
623 | It is readily agreed that thinking is the most godlike of things in our experience [Aristotle] |
2098 | The principle of sufficient reason is needed if we are to proceed from maths to physics [Leibniz] |
2104 | No reason could limit the quantity of matter, so there is no limit [Leibniz] |
4819 | There is necessarily for each existent thing a cause why it should exist [Spinoza] |
3646 | There is always a reason why things are thus rather than otherwise [Leibniz] |
11282 | Aristotle does not take the principle of non-contradiction for granted [Aristotle, by Politis] |
6561 | A thing cannot be both in and not-in the same thing (at a given time) [Aristotle] |
1601 | The most certain basic principle is that contradictories can't be true at the same time [Aristotle] |
11281 | We cannot say that one thing both is and is not a man [Aristotle] |
1602 | For Aristotle predication is regulated by Non-Contradiction, because underlying stability is essential [Roochnik on Aristotle] |
608 | There is no middle ground in contradiction, but there is in contrariety [Aristotle] |
628 | Not everything is composed of opposites; what, for example, is the opposite of matter? [Aristotle] |
627 | If everything is made of opposites, are the opposed things made of opposites? [Aristotle] |
10957 | The material element may be essential to a definition [Aristotle] |
10953 | The parts of a definition are isomorphic to the parts of the entity [Aristotle] |
10960 | If we define 'man' as 'two-footed animal', why does that make man a unity? [Aristotle] |
16094 | You can't define particulars, because accounts have to be generalised [Aristotle] |
10944 | A definition must be of something primary [Aristotle] |
596 | Only substance [ousias] admits of definition [Aristotle] |
16107 | Sometimes parts must be mentioned in definitions of essence, and sometimes not [Aristotle] |
12360 | Definitions need the complex features of form, and don't need to mention the category [Aristotle, by Wedin] |
12352 | Whiteness can only belong to man because an individual like Callias happens to be white [Aristotle] |
11383 | A definition is of the universal and of the kind [Aristotle] |
12355 | 'Plane' is the genus of plane figures, and 'solid' of solids, with differentiae picking out types of corner [Aristotle] |
10961 | Definition by division is into genus and differentiae [Aristotle] |
12353 | Species and genera are largely irrelevant in 'Metaphysics' [Aristotle, by Wedin] |
12356 | If the genus is just its constitutive forms (or matter), then the definition is the account of the differentiae [Aristotle] |
17040 | If I define you, I have to use terms which are all true of other things too [Aristotle] |
12081 | Aristotle's definitions are not unique, but apply to a range of individuals [Aristotle, by Witt] |
11153 | A definition is an account of a what-it-was-to-be-that-thing [Aristotle] |
12080 | Essence is not all the necessary properties, since these extend beyond the definition [Aristotle, by Witt] |
15770 | Some things cannot be defined, and only an analogy can be given [Aristotle] |
574 | Not everything can be proven, because that would lead to an infinite regress [Aristotle] |
10916 | Truth is either intuiting a way of being, or a putting together [Aristotle] |
10914 | Simple and essential truth seems to be given, with further truth arising in thinking [Aristotle] |
21864 | Truth is its own standard [Spinoza] |
10913 | Truth is a matter of asserting correct combinations and separations [Aristotle] |
8018 | Spinoza's life shows that love of truth which he proclaims as the highest value [MacIntyre on Spinoza] |
575 | If one error is worse than another, it must be because it is further from the truth [Aristotle] |
5641 | For Spinoza, 'adequacy' is the intrinsic mark of truth [Spinoza, by Scruton] |
15775 | Truth-thinking does not make it so; it being so is what makes it true [Aristotle] |
10915 | The truth or falsity of a belief will be in terms of something that is always this way not that [Aristotle] |
586 | Falsity says that which is isn't, and that which isn't is; truth says that which is is, and that which isn't isn't [Aristotle] |
19165 | Aristotle's truth formulation concerns referring parts of sentences, not sentences as wholes [Aristotle, by Davidson] |
4816 | A true idea must correspond with its ideate or object [Spinoza] |
573 | The axioms of mathematics are part of philosophy [Aristotle] |
562 | Axioms are the underlying principles of everything, and who but the philosopher can assess their truth? [Aristotle] |
20309 | If our ideas are adequate, what follows from them is also adequate [Spinoza] |
22154 | For Aristotle bivalence is a feature of reality [Aristotle, by Boulter] |
11265 | Aporia 4: Does metaphysics just investigate pure being, or also the characteristics of being? [Aristotle, by Politis] |
11270 | Aporia 9: Is there one principle, or one kind of principle? [Aristotle, by Politis] |
11271 | Aporia 10: Do perishables and imperishables have the same principle? [Aristotle, by Politis] |
11258 | We must start with our puzzles, and progress by solving them, as they reveal the real difficulty [Aristotle] |
11262 | Aporia 1: is there one science of explanation, or many? [Aristotle, by Politis] |
11263 | Aporia 2: Does one science investigate both ultimate and basic principles of being? [Aristotle, by Politis] |
11264 | Aporia 3: Does one science investigate all being, or does each kind of being have a science? [Aristotle, by Politis] |
11266 | Aporia 5: Do other things exist besides what is perceptible by the senses? [Aristotle, by Politis] |
11267 | Aporia 6: Are the basic principles of a thing the kinds to which it belongs, or its components? [Aristotle, by Politis] |
11268 | Aporia 7: Is a thing's kind the most general one, or the most specific one? [Aristotle, by Politis] |
11272 | Aporia 11: Are primary being and unity distinct, or only in the things that are? [Aristotle, by Politis] |
11269 | Aporia 8: Are there general kinds, or merely particulars? [Aristotle, by Politis] |
11273 | Aporia 12: Do mathematical entities exist independently, or only in objects? [Aristotle, by Politis] |
11274 | Aporia 13: Are there kinds, as well as particulars and mathematical entities? [Aristotle, by Politis] |
11276 | Aporia 15: Are the causes of things universals or particulars? [Aristotle, by Politis] |
11275 | Aporia 14: Are ultimate causes of things potentialities, or must they be actual? [Aristotle, by Politis] |
560 | Mathematical precision is only possible in immaterial things [Aristotle] |
9076 | Mathematics studies the domain of perceptible entities, but its subject-matter is not perceptible [Aristotle] |
17185 | Mathematics deals with the essences and properties of forms [Spinoza] |
17222 | The sum of its angles follows from a triangle's nature [Spinoza] |
17197 | The idea of a triangle involves truths about it, so those are part of its essence [Spinoza] |
10958 | Perhaps numbers are substances? [Aristotle] |
13273 | Pluralities divide into discontinous countables; magnitudes divide into continuous things [Aristotle] |
12074 | The one in number just is the particular [Aristotle] |
17844 | The unit is stipulated to be indivisible [Aristotle] |
17845 | If only rectilinear figures existed, then unity would be the triangle [Aristotle] |
17859 | Units came about when the unequals were equalised [Aristotle] |
17861 | Two men do not make one thing, as well as themselves [Aristotle] |
646 | When we count, are we adding, or naming numbers? [Aristotle] |
17850 | Each many is just ones, and is measured by the one [Aristotle] |
17851 | Number is plurality measured by unity [Aristotle] |
17843 | The idea of 'one' is the foundation of number [Aristotle] |
9793 | Mathematics studies abstracted relations, commensurability and proportion [Aristotle] |
13738 | It is a simple truth that the objects of mathematics have being, of some sort [Aristotle] |
12339 | Aristotle removes ontology from mathematics, and replaces the true with the beautiful [Aristotle, by Badiou] |
568 | Some things exist as substances, others as properties of substances [Aristotle] |
17174 | Outside the mind, there are just things and their properties [Spinoza] |
17176 | The more reality a thing has, the more attributes it has [Spinoza] |
15776 | There is only being in a certain way, and without that way there is no being [Aristotle] |
611 | Being, taken simply as being, is the domain of philosophy [Aristotle] |
12348 | There are four kinds of being: incidental, per se, potential and actual, and being as truth [Aristotle, by Wedin] |
11194 | Being is either what falls in the categories, or what makes propositions true [Aristotle, by Aquinas] |
11288 | Things are predicated of the basic thing, which isn't predicated of anything else [Aristotle] |
11234 | The three main candidates for primary being are particular, universal and essence; essence is the answer [Aristotle, by Politis] |
11279 | Primary being is either universals, or the basis of predication, or essence [Aristotle, by Politis] |
11232 | Primary being ('proté ousia') exists in virtue of itself, not in relation to other things [Aristotle, by Politis] |
11293 | Non-primary beings lack essence, or only have a derived essence [Aristotle, by Politis] |
11297 | Primary being is both the essence, and the subject of predication [Aristotle, by Politis] |
566 | If nothing exists except individuals, how can there be a science of infinity? [Aristotle] |
16090 | Being must be understood with reference to one primary sense - the being of substance [Aristotle, by Gill,ML] |
570 | Nothing is added to a man's existence by saying he is 'one', or that 'he exists' [Aristotle] |
11295 | There is no being unless it is determinate and well-defined [Aristotle, by Politis] |
13735 | Aristotle discusses fundamental units of being, rather than existence questions [Aristotle, by Schaffer,J] |
10946 | Existence requires thisness, as quantity or quality [Aristotle] |
16152 | Other types of being all depend on the being of substance [Aristotle] |
12061 | The primary subject seems to be substance, to the fullest extent [Aristotle] |
17179 | There must always be a reason or cause why some triangle does or does not exist [Spinoza] |
16118 | Nature is an active principle of change, like potentiality, but it is intrinsic to things [Aristotle] |
15768 | An actuality is usually thought to be a process [Aristotle] |
17186 | Men say they prefer order, not realising that we imagine the order [Spinoza] |
11154 | Prior things can exist without posterior things, but not vice versa [Aristotle] |
19385 | All simply substances are in harmony, because they all represent the one universe [Leibniz] |
12095 | Knowledge of potential is universal and indefinite; of the actual it is definite and of individuals [Aristotle] |
20127 | Laws of nature are universal, so everything must be understood through those laws [Spinoza] |
11256 | Materialists cannot explain change [Aristotle, by Politis] |
12347 | The immediate divisions of that which is are genera, each with its science [Aristotle] |
21346 | The ratio between two lines can't be a feature of one, and cannot be in both [Leibniz] |
7935 | There cannot be uninstantiated properties [Aristotle, by Macdonald,C] |
16161 | Properties are just the ways in which forms are realised at various times [Aristotle, by Frede,M] |
15109 | The 'propriae' or 'necessary accidents' of a thing are separate, and derived from the essence [Aristotle, by Koslicki] |
17849 | For two things to differ in some respect, they must both possess that respect [Aristotle] |
17170 | An 'attribute' is what the intellect takes as constituting an essence [Spinoza] |
7686 | For Aristotle, there are only as many properties as actually exist [Aristotle, by Jacquette] |
10947 | Whiteness can be explained without man, but femaleness cannot be explained without animal [Aristotle] |
17171 | A 'mode' is an aspect of a substance, and conceived through that substance [Spinoza] |
10956 | If we only saw bronze circles, would bronze be part of the concept of a circle? [Aristotle] |
16113 | Potentiality is a principle of change, in another thing, or as another thing [Aristotle] |
16114 | Active 'dunamis' is best translated as 'power' or 'ability' (rather than 'potentiality') [Aristotle, by Gill,ML] |
15773 | Actualities are arranged by priority, going back to what initiates process [Aristotle] |
11387 | The main characteristic of the source of change is activity [energeia] [Aristotle, by Politis] |
17195 | Things persevere through a force which derives from God [Spinoza] |
16753 | Giving the function of a house defines its actuality [Aristotle] |
17206 | The essence of a thing is its effort to persevere [Spinoza] |
15780 | Potentiality in geometry is metaphorical [Aristotle] |
11938 | The Megarans say something is only capable of something when it is actually doing it [Aristotle] |
15766 | Megaran actualism is just scepticism about the qualities of things [Aristotle] |
15767 | Megaran actualists prevent anything from happening, by denying a capacity for it to happen! [Aristotle] |
11379 | Substance is not a universal, as the former is particular but a universal is shared [Aristotle] |
12096 | Universals are indeterminate and only known in potential, because they are general [Aristotle, by Witt] |
649 | The acquisition of scientific knowledge is impossible without universals [Aristotle] |
12094 | No universals exist separately from particulars [Aristotle] |
10948 | Forms are said to be substances to which nothing is prior [Aristotle] |
16110 | If partaking explains unity, what causes participating, and what is participating? [Aristotle] |
633 | If you accept Forms, you must accept the more powerful principle of 'participating' in them [Aristotle] |
643 | How can the Forms both be the substance of things and exist separately from them? [Aristotle] |
647 | There is a confusion because Forms are said to be universal, but also some Forms are separable and particular [Aristotle] |
9483 | Forms have to be their own paradigms, which seems to fuse the paradigm and the copy [Aristotle] |
642 | What possible contribution can the Forms make to perceptible entities? [Aristotle] |
16145 | Predications only pick out kinds of things, not things in themselves [Aristotle] |
16108 | If men exist by participating in two forms (Animal and Biped), they are plural, not unities [Aristotle] |
605 | The Forms have to be potentialities, not actual knowledge or movement [Aristotle] |
618 | There is no point at all in the theory of Forms unless it contains a principle that produces movement [Aristotle] |
640 | All attempts to prove the Forms are either invalid, or prove Forms where there aren't supposed to be any [Aristotle] |
641 | Are there forms for everything, or for negations, or for destroyed things? [Aristotle] |
4470 | Aristotle is not asserting facts about the location of properties, but about their ontological status [Aristotle, by Moreland] |
645 | If two is part of three then numbers aren't Forms, because they would all be intermingled [Aristotle] |
17192 | The 'universal' term 'man' is just imagining whatever is the same in a multitude of men [Spinoza] |
16158 | Form and matter may not make up a concrete particular, because there are also accidents like weight [Aristotle, by Frede,M] |
16086 | Objects lacking matter are intrinsic unities [Aristotle] |
10945 | Some philosophers say that in some qualified way non-existent things 'are' [Aristotle] |
11247 | To know a thing is to know its primary cause or explanation [Aristotle] |
12062 | Aristotle's form improves on being non-predicable as a way to identify a 'this' [Aristotle, by Wiggins] |
16160 | For Aristotle, things are not made individual by some essential distinguishing mark [Aristotle, by Frede,M] |
16156 | Individuals within a species differ in their matter, form and motivating cause [Aristotle] |
16163 | Aristotle says that the form is what makes an entity what it is [Aristotle, by Frede,M] |
590 | Things are one numerically in matter, formally in their account, generically in predicates, and by analogy in relations [Aristotle] |
10949 | Primary things just are what-it-is-to-be-that-thing [Aristotle] |
603 | How is man a unity of animal and biped, especially if the Forms of animal and of biped exist? [Aristotle] |
17838 | Things may be naturally unified because they involve an indivisible process [Aristotle] |
17840 | A unity may just be a particular, a numerically indivisible thing [Aristotle] |
17841 | The formal cause may be what unifies a substance [Aristotle] |
13272 | Things are one to the extent that they are indivisible [Aristotle] |
17842 | Indivisibility is the cause of unity, either in movement, or in the account or thought [Aristotle] |
17860 | Things are unified by contact, mixture and position [Aristotle] |
17188 | A thing is unified if its parts produce a single effect [Spinoza] |
17839 | Some things are unified by their account, which rests on a unified thought about the thing [Aristotle] |
12076 | Substance is prior in being separate, in definition, and in knowledge [Aristotle, by Witt] |
11284 | It is wrong to translate 'ousia' as 'substance' [Aristotle, by Politis] |
592 | The baffling question of what exists is asking about the nature of substance [Aristotle] |
569 | If substance is the basis of reality, then philosophy aims to understand substance [Aristotle] |
615 | The Pre-Socratics were studying the principles, elements and causes of substance [Aristotle] |
11231 | 'Ousia' is 'primary being' not 'primary substance' [Aristotle, by Politis] |
599 | We may have to postulate unobservable and unknowable substances [Aristotle] |
5639 | Spinoza implies that thought is impossible without the notion of substance [Spinoza, by Scruton] |
16778 | Mature Aristotle sees organisms as the paradigm substances [Aristotle, by Pasnau] |
600 | Elements and physical objects are substances, but ideas and mathematics are not so clear [Aristotle] |
16084 | Is a primary substance a foundation of existence, or the last stage of understanding? [Aristotle, by Gill,ML] |
11299 | Substance [ousia] is the subject of predication and cause [aitia?] of something's existence [Aristotle] |
595 | It is matter that turns out to be substance [ousia] [Aristotle] |
12060 | Essence (fixed by definition) is also 'ousia', so 'ousia' is both ultimate subject, and a this-thing [Aristotle] |
10941 | A substance is what-it-is-to-be, or the universal, or the genus, or the subject of saying [Aristotle] |
11290 | Matter is not substance, because substance needs separability and thisness [Aristotle] |
10959 | The substance is the form dwelling in the object [Aristotle] |
12093 | Substance is unified and universals are diverse, so universals are not substance [Aristotle, by Witt] |
12362 | A thing's substance is its primary cause of being [Aristotle] |
607 | None of the universals can be a substance [Aristotle] |
21857 | Substance is the power of self-actualisation [Spinoza, by Lord] |
11233 | In Aristotle, 'proté ousia' is 'primary being', and 'to hupokeimenon' is 'that which lies under' (or 'substance') [Aristotle, by Politis] |
12079 | Substance is distinct being because of its unity [Aristotle, by Witt] |
4813 | Substance is that of which an independent conception can be formed [Spinoza] |
10951 | The statue is not called 'stone' but 'stoney' [Aristotle] |
16085 | Primary matter and form make a unity, one in potentiality, the other in actuality [Aristotle] |
16096 | Statues depend on their bronze, but bronze doesn't depend on statues [Aristotle, by Gill,ML] |
12345 | In 'Metaphysics' Z substantial primacy (as form) is explanatory rather than ontological [Aristotle, by Wedin] |
11285 | The form of a thing is its essence and its primary being [Aristotle] |
16147 | In 'Metaphysics' substantial forms take over from objects as primary [Aristotle, by Frede,M] |
12071 | Essences are not properties (since those can't cause individual substances) [Aristotle, by Witt] |
11251 | Plato says changing things have no essence; Aristotle disagrees [Aristotle, by Politis] |
12084 | Essential form is neither accidental nor necessary to matter, so it appears not to be a property [Aristotle, by Witt] |
16119 | Aristotle's cosmos is ordered by form, and disordered by matter [Aristotle, by Gill,ML] |
16148 | Aristotle moved from realism to nominalism about substances [Aristotle, by Frede,M] |
16112 | A substance is a proper subject because the matter is a property of the form, not vice versa [Aristotle, by Gill,ML] |
12002 | Aristotle doesn't think essential properties are those which must belong to a thing [Aristotle, by Kung] |
16164 | Forms of sensible substances include unrealised possibilities, so are not fully actual [Aristotle, by Frede,M] |
16095 | Some forms, such as the Prime Mover, are held by Aristotle to exist without matter [Aristotle, by Gill,ML] |
15853 | A true substance is constituted by some nature, which is a principle [Aristotle] |
16109 | Things are a unity because there is no clash between potential matter and actual shape/form [Aristotle] |
16088 | Aristotle's solution to the problem of unity is that form is an active cause or potentiality or nature [Aristotle, by Gill,ML] |
12301 | Every distinct thing has matter, as long as it isn't an essence or a Form [Aristotle] |
16092 | In Aristotle, bronze only becomes 'matter' when it is potentially a statue [Aristotle, by Gill,ML] |
12300 | Aristotle's conception of matter applies to non-physical objects as well as physical objects [Aristotle, by Fine,K] |
12077 | Aristotle's matter is something that could be the inner origin of a natural being's behaviour [Aristotle, by Witt] |
12103 | Matter is secondary, because it is potential, determined by the actuality of form [Aristotle, by Witt] |
597 | Is there a house over and above its bricks? [Aristotle] |
10942 | If you extract all features of the object, what is left over? [Aristotle] |
16575 | Something must pre-exist any new production [Aristotle] |
10962 | It is unclear whether Aristotle believes in a propertyless subject, his 'ultimate matter' [Aristotle, by Lawson-Tancred] |
16142 | A substrate is either a 'this' supporting qualities, or 'matter' supporting actuality [Aristotle] |
16103 | A subject can't be nothing, so it must qualify as separate, and as having a distinct identity [Aristotle, by Gill,ML] |
13274 | The contents of an explanatory formula are parts of the whole [Aristotle] |
15852 | A 'whole' (rather than a mere 'sum') requires an internal order which distinguishes it [Aristotle] |
15840 | If a syllable is more than its elements, is the extra bit also an element? [Aristotle] |
16136 | A syllable is something different from its component vowels and consonants [Aristotle] |
12878 | Wholes are continuous, rigid, uniform, similar, same kind, similar matter [Aristotle, by Simons] |
11199 | Aristotelian essence underlies behaviour, or underlies definition, or is the source of existence [Aristotle, by Aquinas] |
11294 | Aristotle says changing, material things (and not just universals) have an essence [Aristotle, by Politis] |
11298 | Are essences actually universals? [Aristotle, by Politis] |
4828 | The essence of a thing is what is required for it to exist or be conceived [Spinoza] |
12304 | Aristotelian essence is retained with identity through change, and bases our scientific knowledge [Aristotle, by Copi] |
12099 | Aristotelian essences are causal, not classificatory [Aristotle, by Witt] |
12311 | Particulars are not definable, because they fluctuate [Aristotle] |
17846 | The essence of a single thing is the essence of a particular [Aristotle] |
12070 | Individual essences are not universals, since those can't be substances, or cause them [Aristotle, by Witt] |
12069 | Essence is the cause of individual substance, and creates its unity [Aristotle, by Witt] |
12088 | Aristotelian essence is not universal properties, but individual essence [Aristotle, by Witt] |
11998 | Aristotle does not accept individual essences; essential properties are always general [Aristotle, by Kung] |
12083 | Aristotle's essence explains the existence of an individual substance, not its properties [Aristotle, by Witt] |
11382 | Aristotle takes essence and form as a particular, not (as some claim) as a universal, the species [Aristotle, by Politis] |
16097 | To be a subject a thing must be specifiable, with some essential properties [Aristotle, by Gill,ML] |
11287 | Essence is what is stated in the definition [Aristotle, by Politis] |
11292 | Things have an essence if their explanation is a definition [Aristotle] |
12091 | If definition is of universals, many individuals have no definition, and hence no essence [Aristotle, by Witt] |
10963 | A thing's essence is what is mentioned in its definition [Aristotle, by Lawson-Tancred] |
11188 | The Aristotelian view is that the essential properties are those that sort an object [Aristotle, by Marcus (Barcan)] |
12098 | An essence causes both its own unity and its kind [Aristotle] |
17187 | Essence gives existence and conception to things, and is inseparable from them [Spinoza] |
11291 | A thing's essence is its intrinsic nature [Aristotle] |
10964 | Having an essence is the criterion of being a substance [Aristotle, by Lawson-Tancred] |
17191 | Nothing is essential if it is in every part, and is common to everything [Spinoza] |
15107 | Aristotle doesn't see essential truths or essential properties as necessary [Aristotle, by Koslicki] |
17184 | All natures of things produce some effect [Spinoza] |
11244 | Metaphysics is the science of ultimate explanation, or of pure existence, or of primary existence [Aristotle, by Politis] |
16143 | It is absurd that a this and a substance should be composed of a quality [Aristotle] |
16106 | Generalities like man and horse are not substances, but universal composites of account and matter [Aristotle] |
16144 | Genera are not substances, and do not exist apart from the ingredient species [Aristotle] |
12359 | 'Categories' answers 'what?' with species, genus, differerentia; 'Met.' Z.17 seeks causal essence [Aristotle, by Wedin] |
12068 | Standardly, Aristotelian essences are taken to be universals of the species [Aristotle, by Witt] |
16141 | In 'Met.' he says genera can't be substances or qualities, so aren't in the ontology [Aristotle, by Frede,M] |
16508 | Things are more unified if the unity comes from their own nature, not from external force [Aristotle] |
16117 | The hallmark of an artefact is that its active source of maintenance is external [Aristotle, by Gill,ML] |
12092 | Aristotle claims that the individual is epistemologically prior to the universal [Aristotle, by Witt] |
12090 | Actual knowledge is of the individual, and potential knowledge of the universal [Aristotle, by Witt] |
16159 | For animate things, only the form, not the matter or properties, must persist through change [Aristotle, by Frede,M] |
17205 | Only an external cause can destroy something [Spinoza] |
11378 | How a thing is generated does not explain its essence [Aristotle, by Politis] |
12101 | Aristotle wants definition, not identity, so origin is not essential to him [Aristotle, by Witt] |
11380 | Two things with the same primary being and essence are one thing [Aristotle] |
17848 | Things such as two different quadrangles are alike but not wholly the same [Aristotle] |
16134 | We can't understand self-identity without a prior grasp of the object [Aristotle] |
17847 | You are one with yourself in form and matter [Aristotle] |
17175 | There cannot be two substances with the same attributes [Spinoza] |
17173 | Two substances can't be the same if they have different attributes [Spinoza] |
12611 | Necessity makes alternatives impossible [Aristotle] |
17852 | A thing has a feature necessarily if its denial brings a contradiction [Aristotle] |
17183 | Things are impossible if they imply contradiction, or their production lacks an external cause [Spinoza] |
15779 | Possibility is when the necessity of the contrary is false [Aristotle] |
15769 | Anything which is possible either exists or will come into existence [Aristotle] |
15774 | We recognise potentiality from actuality [Aristotle] |
15777 | A 'potentiality' is a principle of change or process in a thing [Aristotle] |
14544 | Potentialities are always for action, but are conditional on circumstances [Aristotle] |
15778 | Things are destroyed not by their powers, but by their lack of them [Aristotle] |
4299 | Contingency is an illusion, resulting from our inadequate understanding [Spinoza, by Cottingham] |
4839 | Reason naturally regards things as necessary, and only imagination considers them contingent [Spinoza] |
4824 | We only call things 'contingent' in relation to the imperfection of our knowledge [Spinoza] |
4822 | Divine nature makes all existence and operations necessary, and nothing is contingent [Spinoza] |
17182 | Necessity is in reference to essence or to cause [Spinoza] |
12612 | Some things have external causes of their necessity; others (the simple) generate necessities [Aristotle] |
15108 | Aristotle's says necessary truths are distinct and derive from essential truths [Aristotle, by Koslicki] |
4818 | People who are ignorant of true causes imagine anything can change into anything else [Spinoza] |
20310 | Error does not result from imagining, but from lacking the evidence of impossibility [Spinoza] |
17208 | A horse would be destroyed if it were changed into a man or an insect [Spinoza] |
17209 | A thing is contingent if nothing in its essence determines whether or not it exists [Spinoza] |
5640 | Spinoza's three levels of knowledge are perception/imagination, then principles, then intuitions [Spinoza, by Scruton] |
547 | The ability to teach is a mark of true knowledge [Aristotle] |
17211 | Understanding is the sole aim of reason, and the only profit for the mind [Spinoza] |
21801 | Unlike Descartes' atomism, Spinoza held a holistic view of belief [Spinoza, by Schmid] |
546 | It takes skill to know causes, not experience [Aristotle] |
10950 | Things are produced from skill if the form of them is in the mind [Aristotle] |
544 | Experience knows particulars, but only skill knows universals [Aristotle] |
21863 | You only know you are certain of something when you actually are certain of it [Spinoza] |
17199 | A man who assents without doubt to a falsehood is not certain, but lacks a cause to make him waver [Spinoza] |
17193 | True ideas intrinsically involve the highest degree of certainty [Spinoza] |
5638 | 'I think' is useless, because it is contingent, and limited to the first person [Spinoza, by Scruton] |
4831 | If the body is affected by an external object, the mind can't help believing that the object exists [Spinoza] |
4865 | The eyes of the mind are proofs [Spinoza] |
20306 | Once we have experienced two feelings together, one will always give rise to the other [Spinoza] |
543 | All men long to understand, as shown by their delight in the senses [Aristotle] |
4835 | Anyone who knows, must know that they know, and even know that they know that they know.. [Spinoza] |
583 | The starting point of a proof is not a proof [Aristotle] |
20308 | Encounters with things confuse the mind, and internal comparisons bring clarity [Spinoza] |
581 | Dreams aren't a serious problem. No one starts walking round Athens next morning, having dreamt that they were there! [Aristotle] |
585 | If relativism is individual, how can something look sweet and not taste it, or look different to our two eyes? [Aristotle] |
584 | If truth is relative it is relational, and concerns appearances relative to a situation [Aristotle] |
576 | If the majority had diseased taste, and only a few were healthy, relativists would have to prefer the former [Aristotle] |
12309 | There cannot be a science of accidentals, but only of general truths [Aristotle] |
11386 | Demonstrations about particulars must be about everything of that type [Aristotle] |
11385 | Universal principles are not primary beings, but particular principles are not universally knowable [Aristotle] |
11289 | Understanding moves from the less to the more intelligible [Aristotle] |
11246 | Aristotelian explanations mainly divide things into natural kinds [Aristotle, by Politis] |
4312 | To understand a phenomenon, we must understand why it is necessary, not merely contingent [Spinoza, by Cottingham] |
16135 | Real enquiries seek causes, and causes are essences [Aristotle] |
11384 | We know something when we fully know what it is, not just its quality, quantity or location [Aristotle] |
16105 | We know a thing when we grasp its essence [Aristotle] |
11296 | The explanation is what gives matter its state, which is the form, which is the substance [Aristotle] |
11999 | Essential properties explain in conjunction with properties shared by the same kind [Aristotle, by Kung] |
4833 | The human mind is the very idea or knowledge of the human body [Spinoza] |
16198 | Knowledge is the essence of the mind [Spinoza] |
17196 | The will is not a desire, but the faculty of affirming what is true or false [Spinoza] |
17198 | Will and intellect are the same thing [Spinoza] |
17201 | The will is finite, but the intellect is infinite [Spinoza] |
21805 | Spinoza held that the mind is just a bundle of ideas [Spinoza, by Schmid] |
17204 | Animals are often observed to be wiser than people [Spinoza] |
17212 | To understand is the absolute virtue of the mind [Spinoza] |
21804 | Faculties are either fictions, or the abstract universals of ideas [Spinoza] |
9088 | Skill comes from a general assumption obtained from thinking about similar things [Aristotle] |
16153 | Aristotle distinguishes two different sorts of generality - kinds, and properties [Aristotle, by Frede,M] |
9791 | Science is more accurate when it is prior and simpler, especially without magnitude or movement [Aristotle] |
4832 | If the body is affected by two things together, the imagining of one will conjure up the other [Spinoza] |
21869 | Our own force of persevering is nothing in comparison with external forces [Spinoza] |
20307 | As far as possible, everything tries to persevere [Spinoza] |
21803 | The conatus (striving) of mind and body together is appetite, which is the essence of man [Spinoza] |
4836 | The mind only knows itself by means of ideas of the modification of the body [Spinoza] |
21861 | Self-knowledge needs perception of the affections of the body [Spinoza] |
571 | Is Socrates the same person when standing and when seated? [Aristotle] |
17216 | The poet who forgot his own tragedies was no longer the same man [Spinoza] |
4814 | A thing is free if it acts by necessity of its own nature, and the act is determined by itself alone [Spinoza] |
21802 | An act of will can only occur if it has been caused, which implies a regress of causes [Spinoza] |
4837 | 'Free will' is a misunderstanding arising from awareness of our actions, but ignorance of their causes [Spinoza] |
4843 | Would we die if we lacked free will, and were poised between equal foods? Yes! [Spinoza] |
4844 | The mind is not free to remember or forget anything [Spinoza] |
4311 | We think we are free because we don't know the causes of our desires and choices [Spinoza] |
7828 | The actual world is the only one God could have created [Spinoza] |
21860 | Ideas and things have identical connections and order [Spinoza] |
4308 | Mind and body are one thing, seen sometimes as thought and sometimes as extension [Spinoza] |
4846 | We are incapable of formulating an idea which excludes the existence of our body [Spinoza] |
4834 | Mind and body are the same thing, sometimes seen as thought, and sometimes as extension [Spinoza] |
23951 | Emotion is a modification of bodily energy, controlling our actions [Spinoza] |
23990 | The three primary emotions are pleasure, pain, and desire [Spinoza, by Goldie] |
4849 | The three primary emotions are pleasure, pain and desire [Spinoza] |
17203 | Minds are subject to passions if they have inadequate ideas [Spinoza] |
4864 | An emotion is only bad if it hinders us from thinking [Spinoza] |
7832 | Stoics want to suppress emotions, but Spinoza overcomes them with higher emotions [Spinoza, by Stewart,M] |
4863 | An emotion comes more under our control in proportion to how well it is known to us [Spinoza] |
23311 | Aristotle sees reason as much more specific than our more everyday concept of it [Aristotle, by Frede,M] |
23310 | Animals live by sensations, and some have good memories, but they don't connect experiences [Aristotle] |
4841 | People make calculation mistakes by misjudging the figures, not calculating them wrongly [Spinoza] |
11245 | Many memories make up a single experience [Aristotle] |
20311 | An idea involves affirmation or negation [Spinoza] |
21807 | Ideas are powerful entities, which can produce further ideas [Spinoza, by Schmid] |
4830 | An 'idea' is a mental conception which is actively formed by the mind in thinking [Spinoza] |
4842 | Ideas are not images formed in the brain, but are the conceptions of thought [Spinoza] |
10954 | It is unclear whether acute angles are prior to right angles, or fingers to men [Aristotle] |
9792 | Mathematicians study quantity and continuity, and remove the perceptible features of things [Aristotle] |
9077 | Mathematicians suppose inseparable aspects to be separable, and study them in isolation [Aristotle] |
9075 | If health happened to be white, the science of health would not study whiteness [Aristotle] |
4309 | Spinoza argues that in reality the will and the intellect are 'one and the same' [Spinoza, by Cottingham] |
4838 | Claiming that actions depend on the will is meaningless; no one knows what the will is [Spinoza] |
20305 | Whenever we act, then desire is our very essence [Spinoza] |
21868 | We love or hate people more strongly because we think they are free [Spinoza] |
17202 | We are the source of an action if only our nature can explain the action [Spinoza] |
21865 | We act when it follows from our nature, and is understood in that way [Spinoza] |
636 | Beauty involves the Forms of order, symmetry and limit, which can be handled mathematically [Aristotle] |
635 | The good is found in actions, but beauty can exist without movement [Aristotle] |
21873 | Men only agree in nature if they are guided by reason [Spinoza] |
21872 | We seek our own advantage, and virtue is doing this rationally [Spinoza] |
8019 | Along with his pantheism, Spinoza equates ethics with the study of human nature [Spinoza, by MacIntyre] |
17189 | The essence of man is modifications of the nature of God [Spinoza] |
17207 | By 'good' I mean what brings us ever closer to our model of human nature [Spinoza] |
17229 | If infancy in humans was very rare, we would consider it a pitiful natural defect [Spinoza] |
4845 | We don't want things because they are good; we judge things to be good because we want them [Spinoza] |
15772 | A thing's active function is its end [Aristotle] |
4848 | Love is nothing else but pleasure accompanied by the idea of an external cause [Spinoza] |
17217 | Love is joy with an external cause [Spinoza] |
7833 | Spinoza names self-interest as the sole source of value [Spinoza, by Stewart,M] |
17224 | If our ideas were wholly adequate, we would have no concept of evil [Spinoza] |
629 | Is the good a purpose, a source of movement, or a pure form? [Aristotle] |
21870 | Music is good for a melancholic, bad for a mourner, and indifferent to the deaf [Spinoza] |
4860 | Man's highest happiness consists of perfecting his understanding, or reason [Spinoza] |
4847 | Pleasure is a passive state in which the mind increases in perfection [Spinoza] |
4859 | Pleasure is only bad in so far as it hinders a man's capability for action [Spinoza] |
17220 | Self-satisfaction is the highest thing for which we can hope [Spinoza] |
4851 | Reason demands nothing contrary to nature, and so it demands self-love [Spinoza] |
4852 | Both virtue and happiness are based on the preservation of one's own being [Spinoza] |
591 | Excellence is a sort of completion [Aristotle] |
625 | Is excellence separate from things, or part of them, or both? [Aristotle] |
17210 | All virtue is founded on self-preservation [Spinoza] |
21871 | The more we strive for our own advantage, the more virtuous we are [Spinoza] |
17214 | To act virtuously is to act rationally [Spinoza] |
4856 | To live according to reason is to live according to the laws of human nature [Spinoza] |
17221 | A man ignorant of himself is ignorant of all of the virtues [Spinoza] |
17225 | In a free man, choosing flight can show as much strength of mind as fighting [Spinoza] |
17218 | People who live according to reason should avoid pity [Spinoza] |
17219 | A person unmoved by either reason or pity to help others is rightly called 'inhuman' [Spinoza] |
4857 | Pity is a bad and useless thing, as it is a pain, and rational people perform good deeds without it [Spinoza] |
17223 | Pity is not a virtue, but at least it shows a desire to live uprightly [Spinoza] |
621 | Contemplation is a supreme pleasure and excellence [Aristotle] |
17228 | Rational people judge money by needs, and live contented with very little [Spinoza] |
4853 | Rational people are self-interested, but also desire the same goods for other people [Spinoza] |
4858 | A rational person will want others to have the goods he seeks for himself [Spinoza] |
4855 | If people are obedient to reason, they will live in harmony [Spinoza] |
21874 | The ideal for human preservation is unanimity among people [Spinoza] |
8020 | Only self-knowledge can liberate us [Spinoza, by MacIntyre] |
7412 | Spinoza extended Hobbes's natural rights to cover all possible desires and actions [Spinoza, by Tuck] |
17227 | Slavery is a disgraceful crime [Spinoza] |
11241 | Wise men aren't instructed; they instruct [Aristotle] |
17226 | The best use of talent is to teach other people to live rationally [Spinoza] |
4854 | It is impossible that the necessity of a person's nature should produce a desire for non-existence [Spinoza] |
17215 | Animals feel, but that doesn't mean we can't use them for our pleasure and profit [Spinoza] |
17190 | We can easily think of nature as one individual [Spinoza] |
632 | Why are some things destructible and others not? [Aristotle] |
626 | Everything is arranged around a single purpose [Aristotle] |
4826 | Nature has no particular goal in view, and final causes are mere human figments [Spinoza] |
1587 | Spinoza strongly attacked teleology, which is the lifeblood of classical logos [Roochnik on Spinoza] |
1588 | For Spinoza eyes don't act for purposes, but follow mechanical necessity [Roochnik on Spinoza] |
12731 | Final causes are figments of human imagination [Spinoza] |
17858 | Pythagoreans say the whole universe is made of numbers [Aristotle] |
4821 | An infinite line can be marked in feet or inches, so one infinity is twelve times the other [Spinoza] |
16590 | Matter is neither a particular thing nor a member of a determinate category [Aristotle] |
10955 | Matter is perceptible (like bronze) or intelligible (like mathematical objects) [Aristotle] |
601 | Substance must exist, because something must endure during change between opposites [Aristotle] |
12299 | Aristotle had a hierarchical conception of matter [Aristotle, by Fine,K] |
12001 | Aristotle says matter is a lesser substance, rather than wholly denying that it is a substance [Aristotle, by Kung] |
15771 | Primary matter is what characterises other stuffs, and it has no distinct identity [Aristotle] |
12868 | Ultimate matter is discredited, as Aristotle merged substratum of change with bearer of properties [Simons on Aristotle] |
16099 | The traditional view of Aristotle is God (actual form) at top and prime matter (potential matter) at bottom [Aristotle, by Gill,ML] |
15954 | Aristotle may only have believed in prime matter because his elements were immutable [Aristotle, by Alexander,P] |
17177 | In nature there is just one infinite substance [Spinoza] |
616 | It doesn't explain the world to say it was originally all one. How did it acquire diversity? [Aristotle] |
16098 | I claim that Aristotle's foundation is the four elements, and not wholly potential prime matter [Aristotle, by Gill,ML] |
2106 | The only simple things are monads, with no parts or extension [Leibniz] |
2102 | Atomism is irrational because it suggests that two atoms can be indistinguishable [Leibniz] |
2105 | Things are infinitely subdivisible and contain new worlds, which atoms would make impossible [Leibniz] |
10952 | Unusual kinds like mule are just a combination of two kinds [Aristotle] |
4850 | A final cause is simply a human desire [Spinoza] |
561 | Is there cause outside matter, and can it be separated, and is it one or many? [Aristotle] |
588 | We exercise to be fit, but need fitness to exercise [Aristotle] |
634 | Pure Forms and numbers can't cause anything, and especially not movement [Aristotle] |
4815 | From a definite cause an effect necessarily follows [Spinoza] |
14543 | When a power and its object meet in the right conditions, an action necessarily follows [Aristotle] |
20965 | Leibniz upheld conservations of momentum and energy [Leibniz, by Papineau] |
2103 | The idea that the universe could be moved forward with no other change is just a fantasy [Leibniz] |
2100 | Space and time are purely relative [Leibniz] |
2107 | No time exists except instants, and instants are not even a part of time, so time does not exist [Leibniz] |
2101 | If everything in the universe happened a year earlier, there would be no discernible difference [Leibniz] |
617 | It is hard to see how either time or movement could come into existence or be destroyed [Aristotle] |
613 | Even if the world is caused by fate, mind and nature are still prior causes [Aristotle] |
619 | Something which both moves and is moved is intermediate, so it follows that there must be an unmoved mover [Aristotle] |
620 | The first mover is necessary, and because it is necessary it is good [Aristotle] |
7835 | The key question for Spinoza is: is his God really a God? [Stewart,M on Spinoza] |
622 | There must a source of movement which is eternal, indivisible and without magnitude [Aristotle] |
7571 | Spinoza's God is not a person [Spinoza, by Jolley] |
4314 | God is wholly without passions, and strictly speaking does not love anyone [Spinoza, by Cottingham] |
12928 | Spinoza's God is just power and necessity, without perfection or wisdom [Leibniz on Spinoza] |
7609 | God is the sum and principle of all eternal laws [Spinoza, by Armstrong,K] |
17172 | God is a substance with infinite attributes [Spinoza] |
19435 | God is not loveable for producing without choice and by necessity; God is loveable for his goodness [Leibniz on Spinoza] |
17231 | God feels no emotions, of joy or sorrow [Spinoza] |
21859 | God has no purpose, because God lacks nothing [Spinoza] |
4823 | God does not act according to the freedom of the will [Spinoza] |
7603 | God is not a creator (involving time and change) and is not concerned with the inferior universe [Aristotle, by Armstrong,K] |
22894 | If time were absolute that would make God's existence dependent on it [Leibniz, by Bardon] |
4825 | To say that God promotes what is good is false, as it sets up a goal beyond God [Spinoza] |
16165 | For Aristotle God is defined in an axiom, for which there is no proof [Aristotle, by Frede,M] |
17169 | Some things makes me conceive of it as a thing whose essence requires its existence [Spinoza] |
21856 | Spinoza says a substance of infinite attributes cannot fail to exist [Spinoza, by Lord] |
17178 | Denial of God is denial that his essence involves existence, which is absurd [Spinoza] |
21858 | God is being as such, and you cannot conceive of the non-existence of being [Spinoza, by Lord] |
4820 | God must necessarily exist, because no reason can be given for his non-existence [Spinoza] |
4817 | If a thing can be conceived as non-existing, its essence does not involve existence [Spinoza] |
2099 | The existence of God, and all metaphysics, follows from the Principle of Sufficient Reason [Leibniz] |
610 | The world can't be arranged at all if there is nothing eternal and separate [Aristotle] |
4827 | Priests reject as heretics anyone who tries to understand miracles in a natural way [Spinoza] |
17180 | Everything is in God, and nothing exists or is thinkable without God [Spinoza] |
17181 | God is the efficient cause of essences, as well as of existences [Spinoza] |
12757 | That God is the substance of all things is an ill-reputed doctrine [Leibniz on Spinoza] |
4829 | The human mind is part of the infinite intellect of God [Spinoza] |
7836 | In Spinoza, one could substitute 'nature' or 'substance' for the word 'God' throughout [Spinoza, by Stewart,M] |
12097 | There are as many eternal unmovable substances as there are movements of the stars [Aristotle] |
21876 | After death, something eternal remains of the mind [Spinoza] |
7831 | Spinoza's theory of mind implies that there is no immortality [Spinoza, by Stewart,M] |