176 ideas
| 19693 | There is practical wisdom (for action), and theoretical wisdom (for deep understanding) [Aristotle, by Whitcomb] |
| 12997 | Analysis is the art of finding the middle term [Leibniz] |
| 13009 | A reason is a known truth which leads to assent to some further truth [Leibniz] |
| 1575 | For Aristotle logos is essentially the ability to talk rationally about questions of value [Roochnik on Aristotle] |
| 1589 | Aristotle is the supreme optimist about the ability of logos to explain nature [Roochnik on Aristotle] |
| 12963 | Opposing reason is opposing truth, since reason is a chain of truths [Leibniz] |
| 19360 | General principles, even if unconscious, are indispensable for thinking [Leibniz] |
| 12983 | A nominal definition is of the qualities, but the real definition is of the essential inner structure [Leibniz] |
| 8200 | Aristotelian definitions aim to give the essential properties of the thing defined [Aristotle, by Quine] |
| 12982 | One essence can be expressed by several definitions [Leibniz] |
| 12976 | If our ideas of a thing are imperfect, the thing can have several unconnected definitions [Leibniz] |
| 12984 | Real definitions, unlike nominal definitions, display possibilities [Leibniz] |
| 4385 | Aristotelian definition involves first stating the genus, then the differentia of the thing [Aristotle, by Urmson] |
| 12980 | Genus and differentia might be swapped, and 'rational animal' become 'animable rational' [Leibniz] |
| 13000 | Truth is correspondence between mental propositions and what they are about [Leibniz] |
| 13282 | Aristotle relativises the notion of wholeness to different measures [Aristotle, by Koslicki] |
| 12992 | Logic teaches us how to order and connect our thoughts [Leibniz] |
| 10056 | At bottom eternal truths are all conditional [Leibniz] |
| 4730 | For Aristotle, the subject-predicate structure of Greek reflected a substance-accident structure of reality [Aristotle, by O'Grady] |
| 12974 | People who can't apply names usually don't understand the thing to which it applies [Leibniz] |
| 6653 | Syntactical methods of proof need only structure, where semantic methods (truth-tables) need truth [Lowe] |
| 13002 | It is always good to reduce the number of axioms [Leibniz] |
| 13008 | Geometry, unlike sensation, lets us glimpse eternal truths and their necessity [Leibniz] |
| 12956 | Only whole numbers are multitudes of units [Leibniz] |
| 12937 | We shouldn't just accept Euclid's axioms, but try to demonstrate them [Leibniz] |
| 12932 | The idea of being must come from our own existence [Leibniz] |
| 12966 | Objects of ideas can be divided into abstract and concrete, and then further subdivided [Leibniz] |
| 12993 | Have five categories - substance, quantity, quality, action/passion, relation - and their combinations [Leibniz] |
| 12989 | Our true divisions of nature match reality, but are probably incomplete [Leibniz] |
| 12959 | We discern active power from our minds, so mind must be involved in all active powers [Leibniz] |
| 12967 | I use the word 'entelechy' for a power, to include endeavour, as well as mere aptitude [Leibniz] |
| 12965 | All occurrence in the depth of a substance is spontaneous 'action' [Leibniz] |
| 12999 | Substances are primary powers; their ways of being are the derivative powers [Leibniz] |
| 5056 | Material or immaterial substances cannot be conceived without their essential activity [Leibniz] |
| 12969 | The active powers which are not essential to the substance are the 'real qualities' [Leibniz] |
| 12941 | There cannot be power without action; the power is a disposition to act [Leibniz] |
| 12990 | Real (non-logical) abstract terms are either essences or accidents [Leibniz] |
| 12939 | Wholly uniform things like space and numbers are mere abstractions [Leibniz] |
| 12979 | The only way we can determine individuals is by keeping hold of them [Leibniz] |
| 12971 | If two individuals could be indistinguishable, there could be no principle of individuation [Leibniz] |
| 13098 | We use things to distinguish places and times, not vice versa [Leibniz] |
| 13075 | No two things are quite the same, so there must be an internal principle of distinction [Leibniz] |
| 12953 | Fluidity is basic, and we divide into bodies according to our needs [Leibniz] |
| 12943 | Individuality is in the bond substance gives between past and future [Leibniz] |
| 11855 | Substances cannot be bare, but have activity as their essence [Leibniz] |
| 12970 | We can imagine two bodies interpenetrating, as two rays of light seem to [Leibniz] |
| 12986 | The essence of baldness is vague and imperfect [Leibniz] |
| 13276 | The unmoved mover and the soul show Aristotelian form as the ultimate mereological atom [Aristotle, by Koslicki] |
| 13277 | The 'form' is the recipe for building wholes of a particular kind [Aristotle, by Koslicki] |
| 12968 | A 'substratum' is just a metaphor for whatever supports several predicates [Leibniz] |
| 12931 | Particular truths are just instances of general truths [Leibniz] |
| 12811 | We can't know individuals, or determine their exact individuality [Leibniz] |
| 12981 | Essence is just the possibility of a thing [Leibniz] |
| 5057 | If you fully understand a subject and its qualities, you see how the second derive from the first [Leibniz] |
| 12987 | For some sorts, a member of it is necessarily a member [Leibniz] |
| 12884 | The same whole ceases to exist if a part is lost [Leibniz] |
| 12975 | We have a distinct idea of gold, to define it, but not a perfect idea, to understand it [Leibniz] |
| 12805 | If two people apply a single term to different resemblances, they refer to two different things [Leibniz] |
| 12806 | Locke needs many instances to show a natural kind, but why not a single instance? [Leibniz, by Jolley] |
| 6618 | A 'substance' is a thing that remains the same when its properties change [Lowe] |
| 12972 | Bodies, like Theseus's ship, are only the same in appearance, and never strictly the same [Leibniz] |
| 5055 | No two things are totally identical [Leibniz] |
| 12978 | A perfect idea of an object shows that the object is possible [Leibniz] |
| 17079 | Proofs of necessity come from the understanding, where they have their source [Leibniz] |
| 5991 | For Aristotle, knowledge is of causes, and is theoretical, practical or productive [Aristotle, by Code] |
| 12960 | We understand things when they are distinct, and we can derive necessities from them [Leibniz] |
| 12998 | Understanding grasps the agreements and disagreements of ideas [Leibniz] |
| 6635 | Causal theories of belief make all beliefs true, and can't explain belief about the future [Lowe] |
| 13006 | Certainty is where practical doubt is insane, or at least blameworthy [Leibniz] |
| 12996 | I know more than I think, since I know I think A then B then C [Leibniz] |
| 13003 | The Cogito doesn't prove existence, because 'I am thinking' already includes 'I am' [Leibniz] |
| 6619 | Perhaps 'I' no more refers than the 'it' in 'it is raining' [Lowe] |
| 6643 | 'Ecological' approaches say we don't infer information, but pick it up directly from reality [Lowe] |
| 11239 | The notion of a priori truth is absent in Aristotle [Aristotle, by Politis] |
| 21253 | Descartes needs to demonstrate how other people can attain his clear and distinct conceptions [Leibniz] |
| 12933 | Arithmetic and geometry are implicitly innate, awaiting revelation [Leibniz] |
| 12991 | Children learn language fast, with little instruction and few definitions [Leibniz] |
| 12929 | All of our thoughts come from within the soul, and not from the senses [Leibniz] |
| 12940 | What is left of the 'blank page' if you remove the ideas? [Leibniz] |
| 19358 | Colour and pain must express the nature of their stimuli, without exact resemblance [Leibniz] |
| 12948 | A pain doesn't resemble the movement of a pin, but it resembles the bodily movement pins cause [Leibniz] |
| 6638 | One must be able to visually recognise a table, as well as knowing its form [Lowe] |
| 6644 | Computationalists object that the 'ecological' approach can't tell us how we get the information [Lowe] |
| 6647 | Comparing shapes is proportional in time to the angle of rotation [Lowe] |
| 6639 | The 'disjunctive' theory of perception says true perceptions and hallucinations need have nothing in common [Lowe] |
| 13005 | Truth arises among sensations from grounding reasons and from regularities [Leibniz] |
| 6640 | A causal theorist can be a direct realist, if all objects of perception are external [Lowe] |
| 6645 | If blindsight shows we don't need perceptual experiences, the causal theory is wrong [Lowe] |
| 6637 | How could one paraphrase very complex sense-data reports adverbially? [Lowe] |
| 23312 | Aristotle is a rationalist, but reason is slowly acquired through perception and experience [Aristotle, by Frede,M] |
| 4302 | You may experience a universal truth, but only reason can tell you that it is always true [Leibniz] |
| 12947 | We only believe in sensible things when reason helps the senses [Leibniz] |
| 12930 | The senses are confused, and necessities come from distinct intellectual ideas [Leibniz] |
| 13001 | Our sensation of green is a confused idea, like objects blurred by movement [Leibniz] |
| 16111 | Aristotle wants to fit common intuitions, and therefore uses language as a guide [Aristotle, by Gill,ML] |
| 6667 | There are memories of facts, memories of practical skills, and autobiographical memory [Lowe] |
| 12949 | Light takes time to reach us, so objects we see may now not exist [Leibniz] |
| 6642 | Psychologists say illusions only occur in unnatural and passive situations [Lowe] |
| 16971 | Plato says sciences are unified around Forms; Aristotle says they're unified around substance [Aristotle, by Moravcsik] |
| 5053 | The instances confirming a general truth are never enough to establish its necessity [Leibniz] |
| 11243 | Aristotelian explanations are facts, while modern explanations depend on human conceptions [Aristotle, by Politis] |
| 3320 | Aristotle's standard analysis of species and genus involves specifying things in terms of something more general [Aristotle, by Benardete,JA] |
| 12000 | Aristotle regularly says that essential properties explain other significant properties [Aristotle, by Kung] |
| 12977 | We will only connect our various definitions of gold when we understand it more deeply [Leibniz] |
| 6641 | Externalists say minds depend on environment for their very existence and identity [Lowe] |
| 6617 | The main questions are: is mind distinct from body, and does it have unique properties? [Lowe] |
| 5054 | Animal thought is a shadow of reasoning, connecting sequences of images by imagination [Leibniz] |
| 6626 | 'Phenomenal' consciousness is of qualities; 'apperceptive' consciousness includes beliefs and desires [Lowe] |
| 12944 | It is a serious mistake to think that we are aware of all of our perceptions [Leibniz] |
| 6646 | The brain may have two systems for vision, with only the older one intact in blindsight [Lowe] |
| 12951 | Abstraction attends to the general, not the particular, and involves universal truths [Leibniz] |
| 19364 | Volition automatically endeavours to move towards what it sees as good (and away from bad) [Leibniz] |
| 6665 | Persons are selves - subjects of experience, with reflexive self-knowledge [Lowe] |
| 6670 | If my brain could survive on its own, I cannot be identical with my whole body [Lowe] |
| 6671 | It seems impossible to get generally applicable mental concepts from self-observation [Lowe] |
| 12942 | Memory doesn't make identity; a man who relearned everything would still be the same man [Leibniz] |
| 12973 | We know our own identity by psychological continuity, even if there are some gaps [Leibniz] |
| 6666 | All human languages have an equivalent of the word 'I' [Lowe] |
| 19368 | The will determines action, by what is seen as good, but it does not necessitate it [Leibniz] |
| 6625 | If qualia are causally inert, how can we even know about them? [Lowe] |
| 6621 | You can only identify behaviour by ascribing belief, so the behaviour can't explain the belief [Lowe] |
| 6654 | A computer program is equivalent to the person AND the manual [Lowe] |
| 6629 | Functionalism commits us to bizarre possibilities, such as 'zombies' [Lowe] |
| 6623 | Functionalism can't distinguish our experiences in spectrum inversion [Lowe] |
| 6628 | Functionalism only discusses relational properties of mental states, not intrinsic properties [Lowe] |
| 6622 | Non-reductive physicalism accepts token-token identity (not type-type) and asserts 'supervenience' of mind and brain [Lowe] |
| 6634 | Physicalists must believe in narrow content (because thoughts are merely the brain states) [Lowe] |
| 6630 | Eliminativism is incoherent if it eliminates reason and truth as well as propositional attitudes [Lowe] |
| 6648 | Some behaviourists believe thought is just suppressed speech [Lowe] |
| 12935 | Every feeling is the perception of a truth [Leibniz] |
| 6651 | People are wildly inaccurate in estimating probabilities about an observed event [Lowe] |
| 6652 | 'Base rate neglect' makes people favour the evidence over its background [Lowe] |
| 23300 | Aristotle and the Stoics denied rationality to animals, while Platonists affirmed it [Aristotle, by Sorabji] |
| 6655 | The 'Frame Problem' is how to program the appropriate application of general knowledge [Lowe] |
| 6657 | Computers can't be rational, because they lack motivation and curiosity [Lowe] |
| 6656 | The Turing test is too behaviourist, and too verbal in its methods [Lowe] |
| 6636 | The naturalistic views of how content is created are the causal theory and the teleological theory [Lowe] |
| 12938 | An idea is an independent inner object, which expresses the qualities of things [Leibniz] |
| 12950 | We must distinguish images from exact defined ideas [Leibniz] |
| 12945 | Thoughts correspond to sensations, but ideas are independent of thoughts [Leibniz] |
| 19357 | The idea of green seems simple, but it must be compounded of the ideas of blue and yellow [Leibniz] |
| 6633 | Twin Earth cases imply that even beliefs about kinds of stuff are indexical [Lowe] |
| 12995 | The name 'gold' means what we know of gold, and also further facts about it which only others know [Leibniz] |
| 12807 | The word 'gold' means a hidden constitution known to experts, and not just its appearances [Leibniz] |
| 6632 | The same proposition provides contents for the that-clause of an utterance and a belief [Lowe] |
| 6631 | If propositions are abstract entities, how can minds depend on their causal powers? [Lowe] |
| 11240 | The notion of analytic truth is absent in Aristotle [Aristotle, by Politis] |
| 6659 | The three main theories of action involve the will, or belief-plus-desire, or an agent [Lowe] |
| 6661 | Libet gives empirical support for the will, as a kind of 'executive' mental operation [Lowe] |
| 12946 | The idea of the will includes the understanding [Leibniz] |
| 6662 | We feel belief and desire as reasons for choice, not causes of choice [Lowe] |
| 6663 | People's actions are explained either by their motives, or their reasons, or the causes [Lowe] |
| 12964 | If would be absurd not to disagree with someone's taste if it was a taste for poisons [Leibniz] |
| 6559 | Aristotle never actually says that man is a rational animal [Aristotle, by Fogelin] |
| 12958 | Love is pleasure in the perfection, well-being or happiness of its object [Leibniz] |
| 12957 | The good is the virtuous, the pleasing, or the useful [Leibniz] |
| 12962 | Pleasure is a sense of perfection [Leibniz] |
| 12934 | We can't want everyone to have more than their share, so a further standard is needed [Leibniz] |
| 12936 | There are natural rewards and punishments, like illness after over-indulgence [Leibniz] |
| 11150 | It is the mark of an educated mind to be able to entertain an idea without accepting it [Aristotle] |
| 3037 | Aristotle said the educated were superior to the uneducated as the living are to the dead [Aristotle, by Diog. Laertius] |
| 8660 | There are potential infinities (never running out), but actual infinity is incoherent [Aristotle, by Friend] |
| 12058 | Aristotle's matter can become any other kind of matter [Aristotle, by Wiggins] |
| 11856 | Qualities should be predictable from the nature of the subject [Leibniz] |
| 12994 | Gold has a real essence, unknown to us, which produces its properties [Leibniz] |
| 12808 | Part of our idea of gold is its real essence, which is not known to us in detail [Leibniz] |
| 12985 | Maybe motion is definable as 'change of place' [Leibniz] |
| 12952 | Space is an order among actual and possible things [Leibniz] |
| 12955 | If there were duration without change, we could never establish its length [Leibniz] |
| 12954 | God's essence is the source of possibilities, and his will the source of existents [Leibniz] |
| 12988 | The universe contains everything possible for its perfect harmony [Leibniz] |
| 1414 | A perfection is a simple quality, which is positive and absolute, and has no limit [Leibniz] |
| 21252 | Perfections must have overlapping parts if their incompatibility is to be proved [Leibniz] |
| 19328 | Without the principle of sufficient reason, God's existence could not be demonstrated [Leibniz] |
| 22729 | The concepts of gods arose from observing the soul, and the cosmos [Aristotle, by Sext.Empiricus] |
| 5058 | Animals have thought and sensation, and indestructible immaterial souls [Leibniz] |