Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Topics', 'works' and 'Necessity, Essence and Individuation'

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58 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 6. Metaphysics as Conceptual
Metaphysics is clarifying how we speak and think (and possibly improving it) [Sidelle]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 2. Analysis by Division
Begin examination with basics, and subdivide till you can go no further [Aristotle]
1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 1. Aims of Science
Realism is the only philosophy of science that doesn't make the success of science a miracle [Putnam]
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 1. Dialectic
Dialectic starts from generally accepted opinions [Aristotle]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 1. Definitions
There can't be one definition of two things, or two definitions of the same thing [Aristotle]
Definitions are easily destroyed, since they can contain very many assertions [Aristotle]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 5. Genus and Differentia
In definitions the first term to be assigned ought to be the genus [Aristotle]
We describe the essence of a particular thing by means of its differentiae [Aristotle]
The differentia indicate the qualities, but not the essence [Aristotle]
The genera and the differentiae are part of the essence [Aristotle]
Differentia are generic, and belong with genus [Aristotle]
'Genus' is part of the essence shared among several things [Aristotle]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 6. Definition by Essence
The definition is peculiar to one thing, not common to many [Aristotle]
2. Reason / E. Argument / 7. Thought Experiments
We seem to base necessities on thought experiments and imagination [Sidelle]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 2. Aporiai
Puzzles arise when reasoning seems equal on both sides [Aristotle]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / a. Units
Unit is the starting point of number [Aristotle]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
Putnam says anti-realism is a bad explanation of accurate predictions [Putnam, by Okasha]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 3. Proposed Categories
There are ten categories: essence, quantity, quality, relation, place, time, position, state, activity, passivity [Aristotle]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
An individual property has to exist (in past, present or future) [Aristotle]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 3. Types of Properties
An 'accident' is something which may possibly either belong or not belong to a thing [Aristotle]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / d. Dispositions as occurrent
There doesn't seem to be anything in the actual world that can determine modal facts [Sidelle]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
Genus gives the essence better than the differentiae do [Aristotle]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
In the case of a house the parts can exist without the whole, so parts are not the whole [Aristotle]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
Causal reference presupposes essentialism if it refers to modally extended entities [Sidelle]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
Everything that is has one single essence [Aristotle]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / b. Essence not necessities
An 'idion' belongs uniquely to a thing, but is not part of its essence [Aristotle]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / c. Essentials are necessary
Clearly, essential predications express necessary properties [Sidelle]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 8. Essence as Explanatory
Being a deepest explanatory feature is an actual, not a modal property [Sidelle]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
That the essence of water is its microstructure is a convention, not a discovery [Sidelle]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 11. End of an Object
Destruction is dissolution of essence [Aristotle]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 12. Origin as Essential
If two things are the same, they must have the same source and origin [Aristotle]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 3. Relative Identity
We aren't clear about 'same stuff as this', so a principle of individuation is needed to identify it [Sidelle]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 9. Sameness
'Same' is mainly for names or definitions, but also for propria, and for accidents [Aristotle]
Two identical things have the same accidents, they are the same; if the accidents differ, they're different [Aristotle]
Numerical sameness and generic sameness are not the same [Aristotle]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 4. De re / De dicto modality
Evaluation of de dicto modalities does not depend on the identity of its objects [Sidelle]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
Reasoning is when some results follow necessarily from certain claims [Aristotle]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 3. Necessity by Convention
Necessary a posteriori is conventional for necessity and nonmodal for a posteriority [Sidelle, by Sider]
To know empirical necessities, we need empirical facts, plus conventions about which are necessary [Sidelle]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 3. A Posteriori Necessary
The necessary a posteriori is statements either of identity or of essence [Sidelle]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible
Empiricism explores necessities and concept-limits by imagining negations of truths [Sidelle]
Contradictoriness limits what is possible and what is imaginable [Sidelle]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
The individuals and kinds involved in modality are also a matter of convention [Sidelle]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / b. Rigid designation
A thing doesn't need transworld identity prior to rigid reference - that could be a convention of the reference [Sidelle]
'Dthat' operates to make a singular term into a rigid term [Sidelle]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 8. A Priori as Analytic
A priori knowledge is entirely of analytic truths [Sidelle]
14. Science / C. Induction / 1. Induction
Induction is the progress from particulars to universals [Aristotle]
14. Science / C. Induction / 3. Limits of Induction
We say 'so in cases of this kind', but how do you decide what is 'of this kind'? [Aristotle]
18. Thought / C. Content / 5. Twin Earth
That water is essentially H2O in some way concerns how we use 'water' [Sidelle]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
Causal reference seems to get directly at the object, thus leaving its nature open [Sidelle]
19. Language / B. Reference / 5. Speaker's Reference
Because some entities overlap, reference must have analytic individuation principles [Sidelle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
Justice and self-control are better than courage, because they are always useful [Aristotle]
Friendship is preferable to money, since its excess is preferable [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / d. Friendship
We value friendship just for its own sake [Aristotle]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / a. Human distinctiveness
Man is intrinsically a civilized animal [Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 2. Defining Kinds
All water is the same, because of a certain similarity [Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / e. Anti scientific essentialism
Can anything in science reveal the necessity of what it discovers? [Sidelle]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / b. Ontological Proof critique
'Being' and 'oneness' are predicated of everything which exists [Aristotle]