59 ideas
| 21955 | My dogmatic slumber was first interrupted by David Hume [Kant] |
| 16931 | Metaphysics is generating a priori knowledge by intuition and concepts, leading to the synthetic [Kant] |
| 1708 | In "Callias is just/not just/unjust", which of these are contraries? [Aristotle] |
| 1703 | It is necessary that either a sea-fight occurs tomorrow or it doesn't, though neither option is in itself necessary [Aristotle] |
| 1704 | Statements are true according to how things actually are [Aristotle] |
| 22272 | Aristotle's later logic had to treat 'Socrates' as 'everything that is Socrates' [Potter on Aristotle] |
| 9405 | Square of Opposition: not both true, or not both false; one-way implication; opposite truth-values [Aristotle] |
| 9728 | Modal Square 1: □P and ¬◊¬P are 'contraries' of □¬P and ¬◊P [Aristotle, by Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
| 9729 | Modal Square 2: ¬□¬P and ◊P are 'subcontraries' of ¬□P and ◊¬P [Aristotle, by Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
| 9730 | Modal Square 3: □P and ¬◊¬P are 'contradictories' of ¬□P and ◊¬P [Aristotle, by Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
| 9731 | Modal Square 4: □¬P and ¬◊P are 'contradictories' of ¬□¬P and ◊P [Aristotle, by Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
| 9732 | Modal Square 5: □P and ¬◊¬P are 'subalternatives' of ¬□¬P and ◊P [Aristotle, by Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
| 9733 | Modal Square 6: □¬P and ¬◊P are 'subalternatives' of ¬□P and ◊¬P [Aristotle, by Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
| 21593 | In talking of future sea-fights, Aristotle rejects bivalence [Aristotle, by Williamson] |
| 1701 | A prayer is a sentence which is neither true nor false [Aristotle] |
| 16918 | Mathematics cannot proceed just by the analysis of concepts [Kant] |
| 16930 | Geometry is not analytic, because a line's being 'straight' is a quality [Kant] |
| 16919 | Geometry rests on our intuition of space [Kant] |
| 16920 | Numbers are formed by addition of units in time [Kant] |
| 16929 | 7+5 = 12 is not analytic, because no analysis of 7+5 will reveal the concept of 12 [Kant] |
| 16910 | Mathematics can only start from an a priori intuition which is not empirical but pure [Kant] |
| 16917 | All necessary mathematical judgements are based on intuitions of space and time [Kant] |
| 16928 | Mathematics cannot be empirical because it is necessary, and that has to be a priori [Kant] |
| 1706 | Non-existent things aren't made to exist by thought, because their non-existence is part of the thought [Aristotle] |
| 1707 | Maybe necessity and non-necessity are the first principles of ontology [Aristotle] |
| 12132 | Indiscernibility is a necessary and sufficient condition for identity [Brody] |
| 15834 | Brody bases sortal essentialism on properties required throughout something's existence [Brody, by Mackie,P] |
| 11833 | The substance, once the predicates are removed, remains unknown to us [Kant] |
| 12140 | Modern emphasis is on properties had essentially; traditional emphasis is on sort-defining properties [Brody] |
| 11895 | A sortal essence is a property which once possessed always possessed [Brody, by Mackie,P] |
| 12141 | Maybe essential properties are those which determine a natural kind? [Brody] |
| 12137 | De re essentialism standardly says all possible objects identical with a have a's essential properties [Brody] |
| 12142 | Essentially, a has P, always had P, must have had P, and has never had a future without P [Brody] |
| 12143 | An object having a property essentially is equivalent to its having it necessarily [Brody] |
| 12144 | Essentialism is justified if the essential properties of things explain their other properties [Brody] |
| 12139 | Mereological essentialism says that every part that ensures the existence is essential [Brody] |
| 12135 | Interrupted objects have two first moments of existence, which could be two beginnings [Brody] |
| 12130 | a and b share all properties; so they share being-identical-with-a; so a = b [Brody] |
| 12138 | Identity across possible worlds is prior to rigid designation [Brody] |
| 21957 | 'Transcendental' concerns how we know, rather than what we know [Kant] |
| 16923 | I admit there are bodies outside us [Kant] |
| 21441 | 'Transcendental' is not beyond experience, but a prerequisite of experience [Kant] |
| 16916 | A priori synthetic knowledge is only of appearances, not of things in themselves [Kant] |
| 16915 | A priori intuitions can only concern the objects of our senses [Kant] |
| 16914 | A priori intuition of objects is only possible by containing the form of my sensibility [Kant] |
| 21447 | I can make no sense of the red experience being similar to the quality in the object [Kant] |
| 16924 | I count the primary features of things (as well as the secondary ones) as mere appearances [Kant] |
| 16913 | I can't intuit a present thing in itself, because the properties can't enter my representations [Kant] |
| 16925 | Appearance gives truth, as long as it is only used within experience [Kant] |
| 16911 | Intuition is a representation that depends on the presence of the object [Kant] |
| 16912 | Some concepts can be made a priori, which are general thoughts of objects, like quantity or cause [Kant] |
| 2337 | For Aristotle meaning and reference are linked to concepts [Aristotle, by Putnam] |
| 13763 | Spoken sounds vary between people, but are signs of affections of soul, which are the same for all [Aristotle] |
| 16926 | Analytic judgements say clearly what was in the concept of the subject [Kant] |
| 16927 | Analytic judgement rests on contradiction, since the predicate cannot be denied of the subject [Kant] |
| 1705 | It doesn't have to be the case that in opposed views one is true and the other false [Aristotle] |
| 16922 | Space must have three dimensions, because only three lines can meet at right angles [Kant] |
| 16921 | If all empirical sensation of bodies is removed, space and time are still left [Kant] |
| 1702 | Things may be necessary once they occur, but not be unconditionally necessary [Aristotle] |