Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Prior Analytics', 'Contemporary theories of Knowledge (2nd)' and 'works'

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39 ideas

4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 1. Aristotelian Logic
22271 Aristotle was the first to use schematic letters in logic [Aristotle, by Potter]
11060 Aristotelian syllogisms are three-part, subject-predicate, existentially committed, with laws of thought [Aristotle, by Hanna]
18909 Aristotelian sentences are made up by one of four 'formative' connectors [Aristotle, by Engelbretsen]
8080 Aristotelian identified 256 possible syllogisms, saying that 19 are valid [Aristotle, by Devlin]
13912 Aristotle replaced Plato's noun-verb form with unions of pairs of terms by one of four 'copulae' [Aristotle, by Engelbretsen/Sayward]
8071 Aristotle listed nineteen valid syllogisms (though a few of them were wrong) [Aristotle, by Devlin]
4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 2. Syllogistic Logic
13819 Aristotle's said some Fs are G or some Fs are not G, forgetting that there might be no Fs [Bostock on Aristotle]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 4. Alethic Modal Logic
9403 There are three different deductions for actual terms, necessary terms and possible terms [Aristotle]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 3. Deductive Consequence |-
11148 Deduction is when we suppose one thing, and another necessarily follows [Aristotle]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
18896 Aristotle places terms at opposite ends, joined by a quantified copula [Aristotle, by Sommers]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 7. Predicates in Logic
3300 Aristotle's logic is based on the subject/predicate distinction, which leads him to substances and properties [Aristotle, by Benardete,JA]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 1. Quantification
11149 Affirming/denying sentences are universal, particular, or indeterminate [Aristotle]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 3. Objectual Quantification
8079 Aristotelian logic has two quantifiers of the subject ('all' and 'some') [Aristotle, by Devlin]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / k. Infinitesimals
18086 Weierstrass eliminated talk of infinitesimals [Weierstrass, by Kitcher]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / l. Limits
18092 Weierstrass made limits central, but the existence of limits still needed to be proved [Weierstrass, by Bostock]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 4. De re / De dicto modality
14641 A deduction is necessary if the major (but not the minor) premise is also necessary [Aristotle]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
6346 The main epistemological theories are foundationalist, coherence, probabilistic and reliabilist [Pollock/Cruz]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 1. Certainty
6351 Most people now agree that our reasoning proceeds defeasibly, rather than deductively [Pollock/Cruz]
6374 To believe maximum truths, believe everything; to have infallible beliefs, believe nothing [Pollock/Cruz]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 1. Perceptual Realism / b. Direct realism
6355 Direct realism says justification is partly a function of pure perceptual states, not of beliefs [Pollock/Cruz]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 2. Phenomenalism
6359 Phenomenalism offered conclusive perceptual knowledge, but conclusive reasons no longer seem essential [Pollock/Cruz]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 1. Perception
6366 Perception causes beliefs in us, without inference or justification [Pollock/Cruz]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 6. Inference in Perception
6362 Sense evidence is not beliefs, because they are about objective properties, not about appearances [Pollock/Cruz]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / a. Justification issues
6371 Bayesian epistemology is Bayes' Theorem plus the 'simple rule' (believe P if it is probable) [Pollock/Cruz]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / a. Pro-internalism
6373 Internalism says if anything external varies, the justifiability of the belief does not vary [Pollock/Cruz]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / b. Basic beliefs
6353 People rarely have any basic beliefs, and never enough for good foundations [Pollock/Cruz]
6361 Foundationalism requires self-justification, not incorrigibility [Pollock/Cruz]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / d. Rational foundations
6357 Reason cannot be an ultimate foundation, because rational justification requires prior beliefs [Pollock/Cruz]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / f. Foundationalism critique
6363 Foundationalism is wrong, because either all beliefs are prima facie justified, or none are [Pollock/Cruz]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification
6365 Negative coherence theories do not require reasons, so have no regress problem [Pollock/Cruz]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / c. Coherentism critique
6354 Coherence theories fail, because they can't accommodate perception as the basis of knowledge [Pollock/Cruz]
6367 Coherence theories isolate justification from the world [Pollock/Cruz]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification
6370 Externalism comes as 'probabilism' (probability of truth) and 'reliabilism' (probability of good cognitive process) [Pollock/Cruz]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 2. Causal Justification
6358 One belief may cause another, without being the basis for the second belief [Pollock/Cruz]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
6364 We can't start our beliefs from scratch, because we wouldn't know where to start [Pollock/Cruz]
14. Science / C. Induction / 1. Induction
6352 Enumerative induction gives a universal judgement, while statistical induction gives a proportion [Pollock/Cruz]
14. Science / C. Induction / 6. Bayes's Theorem
6372 Since every tautology has a probability of 1, should we believe all tautologies? [Pollock/Cruz]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / a. Best explanation
6360 Scientific confirmation is best viewed as inference to the best explanation [Pollock/Cruz]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 5. Generalisation by mind
18911 Linguistic terms form a hierarchy, with higher terms predicable of increasing numbers of things [Aristotle, by Engelbretsen]