Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'On Interpretation', 'The Analects (Lunyu)' and 'Walking the Tightrope of Reason'

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49 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
Philosophy may never find foundations, and may undermine our lives in the process [Fogelin]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
Rationality is threatened by fear of inconsistency, illusions of absolutes or relativism, and doubt [Fogelin]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 9. Limits of Reason
Humans may never be able to attain a world view which is both rich and consistent [Fogelin]
A game can be played, despite having inconsistent rules [Fogelin]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 1. Laws of Thought
The law of noncontradiction is traditionally the most basic principle of rationality [Fogelin]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 3. Non-Contradiction
The law of noncontradiction makes the distinction between asserting something and denying it [Fogelin]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 4. Contraries
In "Callias is just/not just/unjust", which of these are contraries? [Aristotle]
2. Reason / E. Argument / 3. Analogy
Legal reasoning is analogical, not deductive [Fogelin]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 10. Making Future Truths
It is necessary that either a sea-fight occurs tomorrow or it doesn't, though neither option is in itself necessary [Aristotle]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
Statements are true according to how things actually are [Aristotle]
4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 1. Aristotelian Logic
Aristotle's later logic had to treat 'Socrates' as 'everything that is Socrates' [Potter on Aristotle]
Square of Opposition: not both true, or not both false; one-way implication; opposite truth-values [Aristotle]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 1. Modal Logic
Modal Square 1: □P and ¬◊¬P are 'contraries' of □¬P and ¬◊P [Aristotle, by Fitting/Mendelsohn]
Modal Square 2: ¬□¬P and ◊P are 'subcontraries' of ¬□P and ◊¬P [Aristotle, by Fitting/Mendelsohn]
Modal Square 3: □P and ¬◊¬P are 'contradictories' of ¬□P and ◊¬P [Aristotle, by Fitting/Mendelsohn]
Modal Square 4: □¬P and ¬◊P are 'contradictories' of ¬□¬P and ◊P [Aristotle, by Fitting/Mendelsohn]
Modal Square 5: □P and ¬◊¬P are 'subalternatives' of ¬□¬P and ◊P [Aristotle, by Fitting/Mendelsohn]
Modal Square 6: □¬P and ¬◊P are 'subalternatives' of ¬□P and ◊¬P [Aristotle, by Fitting/Mendelsohn]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 1. Bivalence
In talking of future sea-fights, Aristotle rejects bivalence [Aristotle, by Williamson]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 2. Excluded Middle
A prayer is a sentence which is neither true nor false [Aristotle]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / e. Being and nothing
Non-existent things aren't made to exist by thought, because their non-existence is part of the thought [Aristotle]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 5. Reason for Existence
Maybe necessity and non-necessity are the first principles of ontology [Aristotle]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 3. Necessity by Convention
Conventions can only work if they are based on something non-conventional [Fogelin]
12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
My view is 'circumspect rationalism' - that only our intellect can comprehend the world [Fogelin]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / c. Defeasibility
Knowledge is legitimate only if all relevant defeaters have been eliminated [Fogelin]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification
For coherentists, circularity is acceptable if the circle is large, rich and coherent [Fogelin]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 6. Contextual Justification / a. Contextualism
A rule of justification might be: don't raise the level of scrutiny without a good reason [Fogelin]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 2. Types of Scepticism
Scepticism is cartesian (sceptical scenarios), or Humean (future), or Pyrrhonian (suspend belief) [Fogelin]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
Scepticism deals in remote possibilities that are ineliminable and set the standard very high [Fogelin]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 1. Relativism
Radical perspectivism replaces Kant's necessary scheme with many different schemes [Fogelin]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / b. Human rationality
We are also irrational, with a unique ability to believe in bizarre self-created fictions [Fogelin]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 2. Meaning as Mental
For Aristotle meaning and reference are linked to concepts [Aristotle, by Putnam]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 4. Mental Propositions
Spoken sounds vary between people, but are signs of affections of soul, which are the same for all [Aristotle]
19. Language / F. Communication / 1. Rhetoric
People who control others with fluent language often end up being hated [Kongzi (Confucius)]
19. Language / F. Communication / 3. Denial
It doesn't have to be the case that in opposed views one is true and the other false [Aristotle]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 3. Taste
Critics must be causally entangled with their subject matter [Fogelin]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 4. Beauty
The word 'beautiful', when deprived of context, is nearly contentless [Fogelin]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 5. Objectivism in Art
Saying 'It's all a matter to taste' ignores the properties of the object discussed [Fogelin]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / h. Against ethics
All men prefer outward appearance to true excellence [Kongzi (Confucius)]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
Humans are similar, but social conventions drive us apart (sages and idiots being the exceptions) [Kongzi (Confucius)]
Cynics are committed to morality, but disappointed or disgusted by human failings [Fogelin]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 2. Golden Rule
Do not do to others what you would not desire yourself [Kongzi (Confucius)]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / f. The Mean
Excess and deficiency are equally at fault [Kongzi (Confucius)]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
The virtues of the best people are humility, maganimity, sincerity, diligence, and graciousness [Kongzi (Confucius)]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 2. Leaders / d. Elites
Men of the highest calibre avoid political life completely [Kongzi (Confucius)]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 3. Conservatism
Confucianism assumes that all good developments have happened, and there is only one Way [Norden on Kongzi (Confucius)]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 3. Punishment / a. Right to punish
Deterrence, prevention, rehabilitation and retribution can come into conflict in punishments [Fogelin]
Retributivists say a crime can be 'paid for'; deterrentists still worry about potential victims [Fogelin]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / g. Growing block
Things may be necessary once they occur, but not be unconditionally necessary [Aristotle]