Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'On Interpretation', 'fragments/reports' and 'Negation'

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34 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 9. Limits of Reason
Inconsistency doesn't prevent us reasoning about some system [Mares]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 4. Contraries
In "Callias is just/not just/unjust", which of these are contraries? [Aristotle]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 10. Making Future Truths
It is necessary that either a sea-fight occurs tomorrow or it doesn't, though neither option is in itself necessary [Aristotle]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
Statements are true according to how things actually are [Aristotle]
4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 1. Aristotelian Logic
Aristotle's later logic had to treat 'Socrates' as 'everything that is Socrates' [Potter on Aristotle]
Square of Opposition: not both true, or not both false; one-way implication; opposite truth-values [Aristotle]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 1. Modal Logic
Modal Square 1: □P and ¬◊¬P are 'contraries' of □¬P and ¬◊P [Aristotle, by Fitting/Mendelsohn]
Modal Square 2: ¬□¬P and ◊P are 'subcontraries' of ¬□P and ◊¬P [Aristotle, by Fitting/Mendelsohn]
Modal Square 3: □P and ¬◊¬P are 'contradictories' of ¬□P and ◊¬P [Aristotle, by Fitting/Mendelsohn]
Modal Square 4: □¬P and ¬◊P are 'contradictories' of ¬□¬P and ◊P [Aristotle, by Fitting/Mendelsohn]
Modal Square 5: □P and ¬◊¬P are 'subalternatives' of ¬□¬P and ◊P [Aristotle, by Fitting/Mendelsohn]
Modal Square 6: □¬P and ¬◊P are 'subalternatives' of ¬□P and ◊¬P [Aristotle, by Fitting/Mendelsohn]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 2. Intuitionist Logic
Intuitionist logic looks best as natural deduction [Mares]
Intuitionism as natural deduction has no rule for negation [Mares]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 3. Many-Valued Logic
Three-valued logic is useful for a theory of presupposition [Mares]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 6. Classical Logic
Material implication (and classical logic) considers nothing but truth values for implications [Mares]
In classical logic the connectives can be related elegantly, as in De Morgan's laws [Mares]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 1. Bivalence
In talking of future sea-fights, Aristotle rejects bivalence [Aristotle, by Williamson]
Excluded middle standardly implies bivalence; attacks use non-contradiction, De M 3, or double negation [Mares]
Standard disjunction and negation force us to accept the principle of bivalence [Mares]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 2. Excluded Middle
A prayer is a sentence which is neither true nor false [Aristotle]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / a. Logical connectives
The connectives are studied either through model theory or through proof theory [Mares]
5. Theory of Logic / H. Proof Systems / 4. Natural Deduction
Many-valued logics lack a natural deduction system [Mares]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 1. Semantics of Logic
Situation semantics for logics: not possible worlds, but information in situations [Mares]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 2. Consistency
Consistency is semantic, but non-contradiction is syntactic [Mares]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / b. Intuitionism
For intuitionists there are not numbers and sets, but processes of counting and collecting [Mares]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / e. Being and nothing
Non-existent things aren't made to exist by thought, because their non-existence is part of the thought [Aristotle]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 5. Reason for Existence
Maybe necessity and non-necessity are the first principles of ontology [Aristotle]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 8. Transcendental Necessity
Everything happens by reason and necessity [Leucippus]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 2. Meaning as Mental
For Aristotle meaning and reference are linked to concepts [Aristotle, by Putnam]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 2. Semantics
In 'situation semantics' our main concepts are abstracted from situations [Mares]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 4. Mental Propositions
Spoken sounds vary between people, but are signs of affections of soul, which are the same for all [Aristotle]
19. Language / F. Communication / 3. Denial
It doesn't have to be the case that in opposed views one is true and the other false [Aristotle]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / g. Growing block
Things may be necessary once they occur, but not be unconditionally necessary [Aristotle]