Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'works', 'Frege Philosophy of Language (2nd ed)' and 'Second Treatise of Government'

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98 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
There is practical wisdom (for action), and theoretical wisdom (for deep understanding) [Aristotle, by Whitcomb]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 2. Logos
For Aristotle logos is essentially the ability to talk rationally about questions of value [Roochnik on Aristotle]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 4. Aims of Reason
Aristotle is the supreme optimist about the ability of logos to explain nature [Roochnik on Aristotle]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 5. Objectivity
What matters in mathematics is its objectivity, not the existence of the objects [Dummett]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 4. Real Definition
Aristotelian definitions aim to give the essential properties of the thing defined [Aristotle, by Quine]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 5. Genus and Differentia
Aristotelian definition involves first stating the genus, then the differentia of the thing [Aristotle, by Urmson]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 2. Mechanics of Set Theory / c. Basic theorems of ST
The ordered pairs <x,y> can be reduced to the class of sets of the form {{x},{x,y}} [Dummett]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / j. Axiom of Choice IX
To associate a cardinal with each set, we need the Axiom of Choice to find a representative [Dummett]
4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 1. Mereology
Aristotle relativises the notion of wholeness to different measures [Aristotle, by Koslicki]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
For Aristotle, the subject-predicate structure of Greek reflected a substance-accident structure of reality [Aristotle, by O'Grady]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / g. Incompleteness of Arithmetic
Intuitionists find the Incompleteness Theorem unsurprising, since proof is intuitive, not formal [Dummett]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / b. Intuitionism
Intuitionism says that totality of numbers is only potential, but is still determinate [Dummett]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 7. Abstract/Concrete / a. Abstract/concrete
Ostension is possible for concreta; abstracta can only be referred to via other objects [Dummett, by Hale]
The concrete/abstract distinction seems crude: in which category is the Mistral? [Dummett]
We don't need a sharp concrete/abstract distinction [Dummett]
We can't say that light is concrete but radio waves abstract [Dummett]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment
The context principle for names rules out a special philosophical sense for 'existence' [Dummett]
The objects we recognise the world as containing depends on the structure of our language [Dummett]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
We can understand universals by studying predication [Dummett]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / a. Nominalism
'Nominalism' used to mean denial of universals, but now means denial of abstract objects [Dummett]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
Concrete objects such as sounds and smells may not be possible objects of ostension [Dummett]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / a. Nature of abstracta
Abstract objects may not cause changes, but they can be the subject of change [Dummett]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / b. Need for abstracta
If we can intuitively apprehend abstract objects, this makes them observable and causally active [Dummett]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / c. Modern abstracta
Abstract objects must have names that fall within the range of some functional expression [Dummett]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / d. Problems with abstracta
If a genuine singular term needs a criterion of identity, we must exclude abstract nouns [Dummett, by Hale]
Abstract objects can never be confronted, and need verbal phrases for reference [Dummett]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 3. Objects in Thought
There is a modern philosophical notion of 'object', first introduced by Frege [Dummett]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / a. Hylomorphism
The unmoved mover and the soul show Aristotelian form as the ultimate mereological atom [Aristotle, by Koslicki]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / d. Form as unifier
The 'form' is the recipe for building wholes of a particular kind [Aristotle, by Koslicki]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
For Aristotle, knowledge is of causes, and is theoretical, practical or productive [Aristotle, by Code]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 1. Nature of the A Priori
The notion of a priori truth is absent in Aristotle [Aristotle, by Politis]
12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
Aristotle is a rationalist, but reason is slowly acquired through perception and experience [Aristotle, by Frede,M]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 2. Intuition
Aristotle wants to fit common intuitions, and therefore uses language as a guide [Aristotle, by Gill,ML]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory
Plato says sciences are unified around Forms; Aristotle says they're unified around substance [Aristotle, by Moravcsik]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / a. Explanation
Aristotelian explanations are facts, while modern explanations depend on human conceptions [Aristotle, by Politis]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
Aristotle's standard analysis of species and genus involves specifying things in terms of something more general [Aristotle, by Benardete,JA]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / k. Explanations by essence
Aristotle regularly says that essential properties explain other significant properties [Aristotle, by Kung]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / c. Animal rationality
Aristotle and the Stoics denied rationality to animals, while Platonists affirmed it [Aristotle, by Sorabji]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / c. Fregean concepts
Concepts only have a 'functional character', because they map to truth values, not objects [Dummett, by Davidson]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 7. Abstracta by Equivalence
Since abstract objects cannot be picked out, we must rely on identity statements [Dummett]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
A realistic view of reference is possible for concrete objects, but not for abstract objects [Dummett, by Hale]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 2. Analytic Truths
The notion of analytic truth is absent in Aristotle [Aristotle, by Politis]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
Aristotle never actually says that man is a rational animal [Aristotle, by Fogelin]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / b. The natural life
All countries are in a mutual state of nature [Locke]
We are not created for solitude, but are driven into society by our needs [Locke]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 3. Natural Values / a. Natural freedom
In nature men can dispose of possessions and their persons in any way that is possible [Locke]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 3. Natural Values / b. Natural equality
There is no subjection in nature, and all creatures of the same species are equal [Locke]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 3. Natural Values / c. Natural rights
The rational law of nature says we are all equal and independent, and should show mutual respect [Locke]
The animals and fruits of the earth belong to mankind [Locke]
There is a natural right to inheritance within a family [Locke]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 1. Purpose of a State
Politics is the right to make enforceable laws to protect property and the state, for the common good [Locke]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / c. Social contract
The Second Treatise explores the consequences of the contractual view of the state [Locke, by Scruton]
A society only begins if there is consent of all the individuals to join it [Locke]
If anyone enjoys the benefits of government (even using a road) they give tacit assent to its laws [Locke]
A politic society is created from a state of nature by a unanimous agreement [Locke]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / d. General will
A single will creates the legislature, which is duty-bound to preserve that will [Locke]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 4. Citizenship
Anyone who enjoys the benefits of a state has given tacit consent to be part of it [Locke]
You can only become an actual member of a commonwealth by an express promise [Locke]
Children are not born into citizenship of a state [Locke]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 2. Leaders / b. Monarchy
Absolute monarchy is inconsistent with civil society [Locke]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 2. Leaders / c. Despotism
The idea that absolute power improves mankind is confuted by history [Locke]
Despotism is arbitrary power to kill, based neither on natural equality, nor any social contract [Locke]
People stripped of their property are legitimately subject to despotism [Locke]
Legitimate prisoners of war are subject to despotism, because that continues the state of war [Locke]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 3. Government / b. Legislature
Even the legislature must be preceded by a law which gives it power to make laws [Locke]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 3. Government / c. Executive
The executive must not be the legislature, or they may exempt themselves from laws [Locke]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 4. Changing the State / c. Revolution
Any obstruction to the operation of the legislature can be removed forcibly by the people [Locke]
Rebelling against an illegitimate power is no sin [Locke]
If legislators confiscate property, or enslave people, they are no longer owed obedience [Locke]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / a. Nature of democracy
The people have supreme power, to depose a legislature which has breached their trust [Locke]
Unanimous consent makes a united community, which is then ruled by the majority [Locke]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 1. Slavery
A master forfeits ownership of slaves he abandons [Locke]
Slaves captured in a just war have no right to property, so are not part of civil society [Locke]
If you try to enslave me, you have declared war on me [Locke]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 6. Political freedom
Freedom is not absence of laws, but living under laws arrived at by consent [Locke]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 4. Economic equality
All value depends on the labour involved [Locke]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 3. Alienating rights
We all own our bodies, and the work we do is our own [Locke]
There is only a civil society if the members give up all of their natural executive rights [Locke]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 4. Property rights
A man owns land if he cultivates it, to the limits of what he needs [Locke]
Locke (and Marx) held that ownership of objects is a natural relation, based on the labour put into it [Locke, by Fogelin]
Locke says 'mixing of labour' entitles you to land, as well as nuts and berries [Wolff,J on Locke]
A man's labour gives ownership rights - as long as there are fair shares for all [Locke]
If a man mixes his labour with something in Nature, he thereby comes to own it [Locke]
Fountain water is everyone's, but a drawn pitcher of water has an owner [Locke]
Gathering natural fruits gives ownership; the consent of other people is irrelevant [Locke]
Mixing labour with a thing bestows ownership - as long as the thing is not wasted [Locke]
Soldiers can be commanded to die, but not to hand over their money [Locke]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 2. The Law / a. Legal system
The aim of law is not restraint, but to make freedom possible [Locke]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 2. The Law / c. Natural law
It is only by a law of Nature that we can justify punishing foreigners [Locke]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 3. Punishment / a. Right to punish
Reparation and restraint are the only justifications for punishment [Locke]
Self-defence is natural, but not the punishment of superiors by inferiors [Locke]
Punishment should make crime a bad bargain, leading to repentance and deterrence [Locke]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 4. Taxation
The consent of the people is essential for any tax [Locke]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / a. Aims of education
It is the mark of an educated mind to be able to entertain an idea without accepting it [Aristotle]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / b. Education principles
Aristotle said the educated were superior to the uneducated as the living are to the dead [Aristotle, by Diog. Laertius]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 5. Infinite in Nature
There are potential infinities (never running out), but actual infinity is incoherent [Aristotle, by Friend]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / a. Greek matter
Aristotle's matter can become any other kind of matter [Aristotle, by Wiggins]
29. Religion / A. Polytheistic Religion / 2. Greek Polytheism
The concepts of gods arose from observing the soul, and the cosmos [Aristotle, by Sext.Empiricus]