Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Prior Analytics', 'Syntactic Structure' and 'The Central Questions of Philosophy'

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30 ideas

2. Reason / E. Argument / 3. Analogy
You can't infer that because you have a hidden birth-mark, everybody else does [Ayer]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 8. Category Mistake / c. Category mistake as semantic
Chomsky established the view that category mistakes are well-formed but meaningless [Chomsky, by Magidor]
4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 1. Aristotelian Logic
Aristotle was the first to use schematic letters in logic [Aristotle, by Potter]
Aristotelian syllogisms are three-part, subject-predicate, existentially committed, with laws of thought [Aristotle, by Hanna]
Aristotelian sentences are made up by one of four 'formative' connectors [Aristotle, by Engelbretsen]
Aristotelian identified 256 possible syllogisms, saying that 19 are valid [Aristotle, by Devlin]
Aristotle replaced Plato's noun-verb form with unions of pairs of terms by one of four 'copulae' [Aristotle, by Engelbretsen/Sayward]
Aristotle listed nineteen valid syllogisms (though a few of them were wrong) [Aristotle, by Devlin]
4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 2. Syllogistic Logic
Aristotle's said some Fs are G or some Fs are not G, forgetting that there might be no Fs [Bostock on Aristotle]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 4. Alethic Modal Logic
There are three different deductions for actual terms, necessary terms and possible terms [Aristotle]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 3. Deductive Consequence |-
Deduction is when we suppose one thing, and another necessarily follows [Aristotle]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
Aristotle places terms at opposite ends, joined by a quantified copula [Aristotle, by Sommers]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 7. Predicates in Logic
Aristotle's logic is based on the subject/predicate distinction, which leads him to substances and properties [Aristotle, by Benardete,JA]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 1. Quantification
Affirming/denying sentences are universal, particular, or indeterminate [Aristotle]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 3. Objectual Quantification
Aristotelian logic has two quantifiers of the subject ('all' and 'some') [Aristotle, by Devlin]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / b. Commitment of quantifiers
It is currently held that quantifying over something implies belief in its existence [Ayer]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
We see properties necessary for a kind (in the definition), but not for an individual [Ayer]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 4. De re / De dicto modality
A deduction is necessary if the major (but not the minor) premise is also necessary [Aristotle]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / c. Knowing other minds
The theory of other minds has no rival [Ayer]
Originally I combined a mentalistic view of introspection with a behaviouristic view of other minds [Ayer]
Physicalism undercuts the other mind problem, by equating experience with 'public' brain events [Ayer]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 5. Generalisation by mind
Linguistic terms form a hierarchy, with higher terms predicable of increasing numbers of things [Aristotle, by Engelbretsen]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 5. Self as Associations
Is something an 'experience' because it relates to other experiences, or because it relates to a subject? [Ayer]
Qualia must be united by a subject, because they lead to concepts and judgements [Ayer]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 7. Self and Body / a. Self needs body
Bodily identity and memory work together to establish personal identity [Ayer]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 2. Knowing the Self
Self-consciousness is not basic, because experiences are not instrinsically marked with ownership [Ayer]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / c. Inadequacy of mental continuity
Temporal gaps in the consciousness of a spirit could not be bridged by memories [Ayer]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
Why shouldn't we say brain depends on mind? Better explanation! [Ayer]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 1. Syntax
Syntax is independent of semantics; sentences can be well formed but meaningless [Chomsky, by Magidor]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 6. Propositions Critique
Talk of propositions is just shorthand for talking about equivalent sentences [Ayer]