59 ideas
12274 | Begin examination with basics, and subdivide till you can go no further [Aristotle] |
12260 | Dialectic starts from generally accepted opinions [Aristotle] |
12291 | There can't be one definition of two things, or two definitions of the same thing [Aristotle] |
12292 | Definitions are easily destroyed, since they can contain very many assertions [Aristotle] |
12272 | We describe the essence of a particular thing by means of its differentiae [Aristotle] |
12279 | The differentia indicate the qualities, but not the essence [Aristotle] |
12283 | In definitions the first term to be assigned ought to be the genus [Aristotle] |
12289 | The genera and the differentiae are part of the essence [Aristotle] |
12261 | Differentia are generic, and belong with genus [Aristotle] |
12263 | 'Genus' is part of the essence shared among several things [Aristotle] |
12285 | The definition is peculiar to one thing, not common to many [Aristotle] |
11261 | Puzzles arise when reasoning seems equal on both sides [Aristotle] |
12273 | Unit is the starting point of number [Aristotle] |
6472 | Continuity is a sufficient criterion for the identity of a rock, but not for part of a smooth fluid [Russell] |
12267 | There are ten categories: essence, quantity, quality, relation, place, time, position, state, activity, passivity [Aristotle] |
12282 | An individual property has to exist (in past, present or future) [Aristotle] |
12264 | An 'accident' is something which may possibly either belong or not belong to a thing [Aristotle] |
6473 | Physical things are series of appearances whose matter obeys physical laws [Russell] |
12280 | Genus gives the essence better than the differentiae do [Aristotle] |
6465 | We need not deny substance, but there seems no reason to assert it [Russell] |
6471 | The assumption by physicists of permanent substance is not metaphysically legitimate [Russell] |
13269 | In the case of a house the parts can exist without the whole, so parts are not the whole [Aristotle] |
12284 | Everything that is has one single essence [Aristotle] |
12262 | An 'idion' belongs uniquely to a thing, but is not part of its essence [Aristotle] |
12290 | Destruction is dissolution of essence [Aristotle] |
12286 | If two things are the same, they must have the same source and origin [Aristotle] |
12266 | 'Same' is mainly for names or definitions, but also for propria, and for accidents [Aristotle] |
12287 | Two identical things have the same accidents, they are the same; if the accidents differ, they're different [Aristotle] |
12288 | Numerical sameness and generic sameness are not the same [Aristotle] |
12259 | Reasoning is when some results follow necessarily from certain claims [Aristotle] |
6466 | Where possible, logical constructions are to be substituted for inferred entities [Russell] |
6467 | No sensibile is ever a datum to two people at once [Russell] |
6483 | Russell held that we are aware of states of our own brain [Russell, by Robinson,H] |
8244 | Sense-data are qualities devoid of subjectivity, which are the basis of science [Russell, by Deleuze/Guattari] |
6462 | Sense-data are not mental, but are part of the subject-matter of physics [Russell] |
6463 | Sense-data are objects, and do not contain the subject as part, the way beliefs do [Russell] |
6464 | Sense-data are usually objects within the body, but are not part of the subject [Russell] |
6459 | We do not know whether sense-data exist as objects when they are not data [Russell] |
6460 | 'Sensibilia' are identical to sense-data, without actually being data for any mind [Russell] |
6461 | Ungiven sense-data can no more exist than unmarried husbands [Russell] |
6458 | Individuating sense-data is difficult, because they divide when closely attended to [Russell] |
6469 | Sense-data may be subjective, if closing our eyes can change them [Russell] |
12271 | Induction is the progress from particulars to universals [Aristotle] |
12293 | We say 'so in cases of this kind', but how do you decide what is 'of this kind'? [Aristotle] |
21833 | Research suggest that we overrate conscious experience [Flanagan] |
21834 | Sensations may be identical to brain events, but complex mental events don't seem to be [Flanagan] |
21837 | Morality is normative because it identifies best practices among the normal practices [Flanagan] |
21830 | For Darwinians, altruism is either contracts or genetics [Flanagan] |
21835 | We need Eudaimonics - the empirical study of how we should flourish [Flanagan] |
12277 | Friendship is preferable to money, since its excess is preferable [Aristotle] |
12276 | Justice and self-control are better than courage, because they are always useful [Aristotle] |
12275 | We value friendship just for its own sake [Aristotle] |
12281 | Man is intrinsically a civilized animal [Aristotle] |
21831 | Alienation is not finding what one wants, or being unable to achieve it [Flanagan] |
12265 | All water is the same, because of a certain similarity [Aristotle] |
6470 | Matter is the limit of appearances as distance from the object diminishes [Russell] |
6468 | There is 'private space', and there is also the 'space of perspectives' [Russell] |
12278 | 'Being' and 'oneness' are predicated of everything which exists [Aristotle] |
21832 | Buddhists reject God and the self, and accept suffering as key, and liberation through wisdom [Flanagan] |