41 ideas
1708 | In "Callias is just/not just/unjust", which of these are contraries? [Aristotle] |
1703 | It is necessary that either a sea-fight occurs tomorrow or it doesn't, though neither option is in itself necessary [Aristotle] |
1704 | Statements are true according to how things actually are [Aristotle] |
22272 | Aristotle's later logic had to treat 'Socrates' as 'everything that is Socrates' [Potter on Aristotle] |
9405 | Square of Opposition: not both true, or not both false; one-way implication; opposite truth-values [Aristotle] |
9728 | Modal Square 1: □P and ¬◊¬P are 'contraries' of □¬P and ¬◊P [Aristotle, by Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
9729 | Modal Square 2: ¬□¬P and ◊P are 'subcontraries' of ¬□P and ◊¬P [Aristotle, by Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
9730 | Modal Square 3: □P and ¬◊¬P are 'contradictories' of ¬□P and ◊¬P [Aristotle, by Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
9731 | Modal Square 4: □¬P and ¬◊P are 'contradictories' of ¬□¬P and ◊P [Aristotle, by Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
9732 | Modal Square 5: □P and ¬◊¬P are 'subalternatives' of ¬□¬P and ◊P [Aristotle, by Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
9733 | Modal Square 6: □¬P and ¬◊P are 'subalternatives' of ¬□P and ◊¬P [Aristotle, by Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
21593 | In talking of future sea-fights, Aristotle rejects bivalence [Aristotle, by Williamson] |
1701 | A prayer is a sentence which is neither true nor false [Aristotle] |
1706 | Non-existent things aren't made to exist by thought, because their non-existence is part of the thought [Aristotle] |
1707 | Maybe necessity and non-necessity are the first principles of ontology [Aristotle] |
22427 | To explain object qualities, primary qualities must be more than mere sources of experience [McGinn] |
22413 | Being red simply consists in looking red [McGinn] |
22415 | Relativity means differing secondary perceptions are not real disagreements [McGinn] |
22416 | Phenomenalism is correct for secondary qualities, so scepticism is there impossible [McGinn] |
22422 | Maybe all possible sense experience must involve both secondary and primary qualities [McGinn] |
22428 | You understood being red if you know the experience involved; not so with thngs being square [McGinn] |
22414 | You don't need to know how a square thing looks or feels to understand squareness [McGinn] |
22423 | Touch doesn't provide direct experience of primary qualities, because touch feels temperature [McGinn] |
22426 | We can perceive objectively, because primary qualities are not mind-created [McGinn] |
22412 | Lockean secondary qualities (unlike primaries) produce particular sensory experiences [McGinn] |
22421 | Could there be a mind which lacked secondary quality perception? [McGinn] |
22424 | Secondary qualities contain information; their variety would be superfluous otherwise [McGinn] |
22425 | The utility theory says secondary qualities give information useful to human beings [McGinn] |
7629 | We see objects 'directly' by representing them [McGinn] |
22420 | The indexical perspective is subjective, incorrigible and constant [McGinn] |
18410 | Indexical thought is in relation to my self-consciousness [McGinn] |
22417 | Indexicals do not figure in theories of physics, because they are not explanatory causes [McGinn] |
18402 | Indexical concepts are indispensable, as we need them for the power to act [McGinn] |
2337 | For Aristotle meaning and reference are linked to concepts [Aristotle, by Putnam] |
22418 | I can know indexical truths a priori, unlike their non-indexical paraphrases [McGinn] |
13763 | Spoken sounds vary between people, but are signs of affections of soul, which are the same for all [Aristotle] |
1705 | It doesn't have to be the case that in opposed views one is true and the other false [Aristotle] |
20887 | A rape disregards the status of being a person - but so does all assault [Foa] |
20888 | Rape of children is dreadful, but no one thinks children should have a right of consent [Foa] |
20889 | If men should lust and women shouldn't, that makes rape the prevalent sexual model [Foa] |
1702 | Things may be necessary once they occur, but not be unconditionally necessary [Aristotle] |