Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Metaphysics', 'fragments/reports' and 'Meditations'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


451 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
Knowledge chosen for its own sake, rather than for results, is wisdom [Aristotle]
Wisdom seeks explanations, causes, and reasons why things are as they are [Aristotle, by Politis]
1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 2. Wise People
It is not much help if a doctor knows about universals but not the immediate particular [Aristotle]
1. Philosophy / B. History of Ideas / 5. Later European Thought
Modern science comes from Descartes' view that knowledge doesn't need moral purity [Descartes, by Foucault]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 1. Philosophy
All philosophy begins from wonder, either at the physical world, or at ideas [Aristotle]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 2. Invocation to Philosophy
If each of us can give some logos about parts of nature, our combined efforts can be impressive [Aristotle]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
Philosophy is a kind of science that deals with principles [Aristotle]
Absolute thinking is the thinking of thinking [Aristotle]
Philosophy has different powers from dialectic, and a different life from sophistry [Aristotle]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 4. Divisions of Philosophy
If only natural substances exist, science is first philosophy - but not if there is an immovable substance [Aristotle]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / c. Philosophy as generalisation
Wisdom is knowledge of principles and causes [Aristotle]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / d. Philosophy as puzzles
Translate as 'humans all desire by nature to understand' (not as 'to know') [Aristotle, by Annas]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 6. Hopes for Philosophy
Even people who go astray in their opinions have contributed something useful [Aristotle]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 2. Logos
Descartes impoverished the classical idea of logos, and it no longer covered human experience [Roochnik on Descartes]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 4. Aims of Reason
Reason says don't assent to uncertain principles, just as much as totally false ones [Descartes]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 7. Status of Reason
It is readily agreed that thinking is the most godlike of things in our experience [Aristotle]
Since Plato all philosophers have followed the herd, except Descartes, stuck in superficial reason [Nietzsche on Descartes]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 3. Non-Contradiction
A thing cannot be both in and not-in the same thing (at a given time) [Aristotle]
The most certain basic principle is that contradictories can't be true at the same time [Aristotle]
Aristotle does not take the principle of non-contradiction for granted [Aristotle, by Politis]
We cannot say that one thing both is and is not a man [Aristotle]
For Aristotle predication is regulated by Non-Contradiction, because underlying stability is essential [Roochnik on Aristotle]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 4. Contraries
There is no middle ground in contradiction, but there is in contrariety [Aristotle]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 5. Opposites
If everything is made of opposites, are the opposed things made of opposites? [Aristotle]
Not everything is composed of opposites; what, for example, is the opposite of matter? [Aristotle]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 1. Definitions
The parts of a definition are isomorphic to the parts of the entity [Aristotle]
The material element may be essential to a definition [Aristotle]
If we define 'man' as 'two-footed animal', why does that make man a unity? [Aristotle]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 3. Types of Definition
You can't define particulars, because accounts have to be generalised [Aristotle]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 4. Real Definition
A definition must be of something primary [Aristotle]
Definitions need the complex features of form, and don't need to mention the category [Aristotle, by Wedin]
Only substance [ousias] admits of definition [Aristotle]
Sometimes parts must be mentioned in definitions of essence, and sometimes not [Aristotle]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 5. Genus and Differentia
'Plane' is the genus of plane figures, and 'solid' of solids, with differentiae picking out types of corner [Aristotle]
Whiteness can only belong to man because an individual like Callias happens to be white [Aristotle]
A definition is of the universal and of the kind [Aristotle]
Definition by division is into genus and differentiae [Aristotle]
If the genus is just its constitutive forms (or matter), then the definition is the account of the differentiae [Aristotle]
If I define you, I have to use terms which are all true of other things too [Aristotle]
Species and genera are largely irrelevant in 'Metaphysics' [Aristotle, by Wedin]
Aristotle's definitions are not unique, but apply to a range of individuals [Aristotle, by Witt]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 6. Definition by Essence
A definition is an account of a what-it-was-to-be-that-thing [Aristotle]
Essence is not all the necessary properties, since these extend beyond the definition [Aristotle, by Witt]
2. Reason / E. Argument / 3. Analogy
Some things cannot be defined, and only an analogy can be given [Aristotle]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 2. Infinite Regress
Not everything can be proven, because that would lead to an infinite regress [Aristotle]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 4. Circularity
It is circular to make truth depend on believing God's existence is true [Arnauld on Descartes]
Descartes is right that in the Christian view only God can guarantee the reliability of senses [Nietzsche on Descartes]
Once it is clear that there is a God who is no deceiver, I conclude that clear and distinct perceptions must be true [Descartes]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 1. Truth
Simple and essential truth seems to be given, with further truth arising in thinking [Aristotle]
Truth is either intuiting a way of being, or a putting together [Aristotle]
Truth is a matter of asserting correct combinations and separations [Aristotle]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 6. Verisimilitude
If one error is worse than another, it must be because it is further from the truth [Aristotle]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 8. Subjective Truth
My general rule is that everything that I perceive clearly and distinctly is true [Descartes]
Someone may think a thing is 'clear and distinct', but be wrong [Leibniz on Descartes]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 1. For Truthmakers
Truth-thinking does not make it so; it being so is what makes it true [Aristotle]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths
The truth or falsity of a belief will be in terms of something that is always this way not that [Aristotle]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
Falsity says that which is isn't, and that which isn't is; truth says that which is is, and that which isn't isn't [Aristotle]
Aristotle's truth formulation concerns referring parts of sentences, not sentences as wholes [Aristotle, by Davidson]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / e. Axioms of PL
Axioms are the underlying principles of everything, and who but the philosopher can assess their truth? [Aristotle]
The axioms of mathematics are part of philosophy [Aristotle]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 3. If-Thenism
Arithmetic and geometry achieve some certainty without worrying about existence [Descartes]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 1. Bivalence
For Aristotle bivalence is a feature of reality [Aristotle, by Boulter]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 2. Aporiai
Aporia 3: Does one science investigate all being, or does each kind of being have a science? [Aristotle, by Politis]
We must start with our puzzles, and progress by solving them, as they reveal the real difficulty [Aristotle]
Aporia 4: Does metaphysics just investigate pure being, or also the characteristics of being? [Aristotle, by Politis]
Aporia 1: is there one science of explanation, or many? [Aristotle, by Politis]
Aporia 2: Does one science investigate both ultimate and basic principles of being? [Aristotle, by Politis]
Aporia 5: Do other things exist besides what is perceptible by the senses? [Aristotle, by Politis]
Aporia 9: Is there one principle, or one kind of principle? [Aristotle, by Politis]
Aporia 6: Are the basic principles of a thing the kinds to which it belongs, or its components? [Aristotle, by Politis]
Aporia 7: Is a thing's kind the most general one, or the most specific one? [Aristotle, by Politis]
Aporia 8: Are there general kinds, or merely particulars? [Aristotle, by Politis]
Aporia 10: Do perishables and imperishables have the same principle? [Aristotle, by Politis]
Aporia 11: Are primary being and unity distinct, or only in the things that are? [Aristotle, by Politis]
Aporia 12: Do mathematical entities exist independently, or only in objects? [Aristotle, by Politis]
Aporia 13: Are there kinds, as well as particulars and mathematical entities? [Aristotle, by Politis]
Aporia 15: Are the causes of things universals or particulars? [Aristotle, by Politis]
Aporia 14: Are ultimate causes of things potentialities, or must they be actual? [Aristotle, by Politis]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 1. Mathematics
Mathematical precision is only possible in immaterial things [Aristotle]
Mathematics studies the domain of perceptible entities, but its subject-matter is not perceptible [Aristotle]
Surely maths is true even if I am dreaming? [Descartes]
I can learn the concepts of duration and number just from observing my own thoughts [Descartes]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / a. Numbers
Perhaps numbers are substances? [Aristotle]
Pluralities divide into discontinous countables; magnitudes divide into continuous things [Aristotle]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / m. One
The one in number just is the particular [Aristotle]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / a. Units
The unit is stipulated to be indivisible [Aristotle]
If only rectilinear figures existed, then unity would be the triangle [Aristotle]
Units came about when the unequals were equalised [Aristotle]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / c. Counting procedure
Two men do not make one thing, as well as themselves [Aristotle]
When we count, are we adding, or naming numbers? [Aristotle]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / b. Greek arithmetic
Number is plurality measured by unity [Aristotle]
The idea of 'one' is the foundation of number [Aristotle]
Each many is just ones, and is measured by the one [Aristotle]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / a. Structuralism
Mathematics studies abstracted relations, commensurability and proportion [Aristotle]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / a. For mathematical platonism
It is a simple truth that the objects of mathematics have being, of some sort [Aristotle]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / b. Against mathematical platonism
Aristotle removes ontology from mathematics, and replaces the true with the beautiful [Aristotle, by Badiou]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 2. Types of Existence
Some things exist as substances, others as properties of substances [Aristotle]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / a. Nature of Being
There are four kinds of being: incidental, per se, potential and actual, and being as truth [Aristotle, by Wedin]
Being is either what falls in the categories, or what makes propositions true [Aristotle, by Aquinas]
Things are predicated of the basic thing, which isn't predicated of anything else [Aristotle]
There is only being in a certain way, and without that way there is no being [Aristotle]
Being, taken simply as being, is the domain of philosophy [Aristotle]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / f. Primary being
Primary being ('proté ousia') exists in virtue of itself, not in relation to other things [Aristotle, by Politis]
The three main candidates for primary being are particular, universal and essence; essence is the answer [Aristotle, by Politis]
Primary being is either universals, or the basis of predication, or essence [Aristotle, by Politis]
Non-primary beings lack essence, or only have a derived essence [Aristotle, by Politis]
Primary being is both the essence, and the subject of predication [Aristotle, by Politis]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / g. Particular being
If nothing exists except individuals, how can there be a science of infinity? [Aristotle]
Being must be understood with reference to one primary sense - the being of substance [Aristotle, by Gill,ML]
Nothing is added to a man's existence by saying he is 'one', or that 'he exists' [Aristotle]
The primary subject seems to be substance, to the fullest extent [Aristotle]
Existence requires thisness, as quantity or quality [Aristotle]
Other types of being all depend on the being of substance [Aristotle]
There is no being unless it is determinate and well-defined [Aristotle, by Politis]
Aristotle discusses fundamental units of being, rather than existence questions [Aristotle, by Schaffer,J]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 1. Nature of Change
Nature is an active principle of change, like potentiality, but it is intrinsic to things [Aristotle]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 2. Processes
An actuality is usually thought to be a process [Aristotle]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 4. Ontological Dependence
Prior things can exist without posterior things, but not vice versa [Aristotle]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality
Knowledge of potential is universal and indefinite; of the actual it is definite and of individuals [Aristotle]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 6. Physicalism
Materialists cannot explain change [Aristotle, by Politis]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 3. Proposed Categories
The immediate divisions of that which is are genera, each with its science [Aristotle]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
There cannot be uninstantiated properties [Aristotle, by Macdonald,C]
Properties are just the ways in which forms are realised at various times [Aristotle, by Frede,M]
The 'propriae' or 'necessary accidents' of a thing are separate, and derived from the essence [Aristotle, by Koslicki]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 2. Need for Properties
For two things to differ in some respect, they must both possess that respect [Aristotle]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 5. Natural Properties
For Aristotle, there are only as many properties as actually exist [Aristotle, by Jacquette]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 8. Properties as Modes
Whiteness can be explained without man, but femaleness cannot be explained without animal [Aristotle]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
If we only saw bronze circles, would bronze be part of the concept of a circle? [Aristotle]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 1. Powers
Potentiality is a principle of change, in another thing, or as another thing [Aristotle]
Active 'dunamis' is best translated as 'power' or 'ability' (rather than 'potentiality') [Aristotle, by Gill,ML]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic
The main characteristic of the source of change is activity [energeia] [Aristotle, by Politis]
Actualities are arranged by priority, going back to what initiates process [Aristotle]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 4. Powers as Essence
Giving the function of a house defines its actuality [Aristotle]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 5. Powers and Properties
Potentiality in geometry is metaphorical [Aristotle]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / d. Dispositions as occurrent
The Megarans say something is only capable of something when it is actually doing it [Aristotle]
Megaran actualism is just scepticism about the qualities of things [Aristotle]
Megaran actualists prevent anything from happening, by denying a capacity for it to happen! [Aristotle]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
Substance is not a universal, as the former is particular but a universal is shared [Aristotle]
Universals are indeterminate and only known in potential, because they are general [Aristotle, by Witt]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 2. Need for Universals
The acquisition of scientific knowledge is impossible without universals [Aristotle]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 3. Instantiated Universals
No universals exist separately from particulars [Aristotle]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / a. Platonic Forms
Forms are said to be substances to which nothing is prior [Aristotle]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / b. Partaking
How can the Forms both be the substance of things and exist separately from them? [Aristotle]
If you accept Forms, you must accept the more powerful principle of 'participating' in them [Aristotle]
If partaking explains unity, what causes participating, and what is participating? [Aristotle]
There is a confusion because Forms are said to be universal, but also some Forms are separable and particular [Aristotle]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / c. Self-predication
Forms have to be their own paradigms, which seems to fuse the paradigm and the copy [Aristotle]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / d. Forms critiques
All attempts to prove the Forms are either invalid, or prove Forms where there aren't supposed to be any [Aristotle]
Are there forms for everything, or for negations, or for destroyed things? [Aristotle]
If men exist by participating in two forms (Animal and Biped), they are plural, not unities [Aristotle]
Aristotle is not asserting facts about the location of properties, but about their ontological status [Aristotle, by Moreland]
The Forms have to be potentialities, not actual knowledge or movement [Aristotle]
Predications only pick out kinds of things, not things in themselves [Aristotle]
There is no point at all in the theory of Forms unless it contains a principle that produces movement [Aristotle]
What possible contribution can the Forms make to perceptible entities? [Aristotle]
If two is part of three then numbers aren't Forms, because they would all be intermingled [Aristotle]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
Form and matter may not make up a concrete particular, because there are also accidents like weight [Aristotle, by Frede,M]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / a. Nature of abstracta
Objects lacking matter are intrinsic unities [Aristotle]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 4. Impossible objects
Some philosophers say that in some qualified way non-existent things 'are' [Aristotle]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
To know a thing is to know its primary cause or explanation [Aristotle]
Aristotle's form improves on being non-predicable as a way to identify a 'this' [Aristotle, by Wiggins]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
For Aristotle, things are not made individual by some essential distinguishing mark [Aristotle, by Frede,M]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
Individuals within a species differ in their matter, form and motivating cause [Aristotle]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / a. Intrinsic unification
Things are one numerically in matter, formally in their account, generically in predicates, and by analogy in relations [Aristotle]
How is man a unity of animal and biped, especially if the Forms of animal and of biped exist? [Aristotle]
Primary things just are what-it-is-to-be-that-thing [Aristotle]
Things may be naturally unified because they involve an indivisible process [Aristotle]
The formal cause may be what unifies a substance [Aristotle]
Aristotle says that the form is what makes an entity what it is [Aristotle, by Frede,M]
A unity may just be a particular, a numerically indivisible thing [Aristotle]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / b. Unifying aggregates
Things are unified by contact, mixture and position [Aristotle]
Things are one to the extent that they are indivisible [Aristotle]
Indivisibility is the cause of unity, either in movement, or in the account or thought [Aristotle]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / c. Unity as conceptual
Some things are unified by their account, which rests on a unified thought about the thing [Aristotle]
If I can separate two things in my understanding, then God can separate them in reality [Descartes]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance
If substance is the basis of reality, then philosophy aims to understand substance [Aristotle]
The Pre-Socratics were studying the principles, elements and causes of substance [Aristotle]
Substance is prior in being separate, in definition, and in knowledge [Aristotle, by Witt]
It is wrong to translate 'ousia' as 'substance' [Aristotle, by Politis]
'Ousia' is 'primary being' not 'primary substance' [Aristotle, by Politis]
The baffling question of what exists is asking about the nature of substance [Aristotle]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / b. Need for substance
We may have to postulate unobservable and unknowable substances [Aristotle]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / c. Types of substance
Elements and physical objects are substances, but ideas and mathematics are not so clear [Aristotle]
Mature Aristotle sees organisms as the paradigm substances [Aristotle, by Pasnau]
Is a primary substance a foundation of existence, or the last stage of understanding? [Aristotle, by Gill,ML]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / d. Substance defined
It is matter that turns out to be substance [ousia] [Aristotle]
Substance [ousia] is the subject of predication and cause [aitia?] of something's existence [Aristotle]
Essence (fixed by definition) is also 'ousia', so 'ousia' is both ultimate subject, and a this-thing [Aristotle]
A substance is what-it-is-to-be, or the universal, or the genus, or the subject of saying [Aristotle]
Matter is not substance, because substance needs separability and thisness [Aristotle]
The substance is the form dwelling in the object [Aristotle]
Substance is unified and universals are diverse, so universals are not substance [Aristotle, by Witt]
A thing's substance is its primary cause of being [Aristotle]
None of the universals can be a substance [Aristotle]
In Aristotle, 'proté ousia' is 'primary being', and 'to hupokeimenon' is 'that which lies under' (or 'substance') [Aristotle, by Politis]
Substance is distinct being because of its unity [Aristotle, by Witt]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / e. Substance critique
Substance cannot be conceived or explained to others [Gassendi on Descartes]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
The statue is not called 'stone' but 'stoney' [Aristotle]
Statues depend on their bronze, but bronze doesn't depend on statues [Aristotle, by Gill,ML]
Primary matter and form make a unity, one in potentiality, the other in actuality [Aristotle]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / a. Hylomorphism
The form of a thing is its essence and its primary being [Aristotle]
Plato says changing things have no essence; Aristotle disagrees [Aristotle, by Politis]
In 'Metaphysics' Z substantial primacy (as form) is explanatory rather than ontological [Aristotle, by Wedin]
In 'Metaphysics' substantial forms take over from objects as primary [Aristotle, by Frede,M]
Essences are not properties (since those can't cause individual substances) [Aristotle, by Witt]
Essential form is neither accidental nor necessary to matter, so it appears not to be a property [Aristotle, by Witt]
Aristotle's cosmos is ordered by form, and disordered by matter [Aristotle, by Gill,ML]
Aristotle moved from realism to nominalism about substances [Aristotle, by Frede,M]
A substance is a proper subject because the matter is a property of the form, not vice versa [Aristotle, by Gill,ML]
Aristotle doesn't think essential properties are those which must belong to a thing [Aristotle, by Kung]
Forms of sensible substances include unrealised possibilities, so are not fully actual [Aristotle, by Frede,M]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / b. Form as principle
Some forms, such as the Prime Mover, are held by Aristotle to exist without matter [Aristotle, by Gill,ML]
A true substance is constituted by some nature, which is a principle [Aristotle]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / d. Form as unifier
Things are a unity because there is no clash between potential matter and actual shape/form [Aristotle]
Aristotle's solution to the problem of unity is that form is an active cause or potentiality or nature [Aristotle, by Gill,ML]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 3. Matter of an Object
Every distinct thing has matter, as long as it isn't an essence or a Form [Aristotle]
In Aristotle, bronze only becomes 'matter' when it is potentially a statue [Aristotle, by Gill,ML]
Aristotle's conception of matter applies to non-physical objects as well as physical objects [Aristotle, by Fine,K]
Aristotle's matter is something that could be the inner origin of a natural being's behaviour [Aristotle, by Witt]
Matter is secondary, because it is potential, determined by the actuality of form [Aristotle, by Witt]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 5. Composition of an Object
Is there a house over and above its bricks? [Aristotle]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 7. Substratum
It is unclear whether Aristotle believes in a propertyless subject, his 'ultimate matter' [Aristotle, by Lawson-Tancred]
A substrate is either a 'this' supporting qualities, or 'matter' supporting actuality [Aristotle]
A subject can't be nothing, so it must qualify as separate, and as having a distinct identity [Aristotle, by Gill,ML]
If we remove surface qualities from wax, we have an extended, flexible, changeable thing [Descartes]
Something must pre-exist any new production [Aristotle]
If you extract all features of the object, what is left over? [Aristotle]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / a. Parts of objects
The contents of an explanatory formula are parts of the whole [Aristotle]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / b. Sums of parts
A 'whole' (rather than a mere 'sum') requires an internal order which distinguishes it [Aristotle]
If a syllable is more than its elements, is the extra bit also an element? [Aristotle]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
A syllable is something different from its component vowels and consonants [Aristotle]
Wholes are continuous, rigid, uniform, similar, same kind, similar matter [Aristotle, by Simons]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 1. Essences of Objects
Aristotelian essence underlies behaviour, or underlies definition, or is the source of existence [Aristotle, by Aquinas]
Aristotelian essence is retained with identity through change, and bases our scientific knowledge [Aristotle, by Copi]
Aristotle says changing, material things (and not just universals) have an essence [Aristotle, by Politis]
Are essences actually universals? [Aristotle, by Politis]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
Aristotelian essences are causal, not classificatory [Aristotle, by Witt]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
The essence of a single thing is the essence of a particular [Aristotle]
Particulars are not definable, because they fluctuate [Aristotle]
Essence is the cause of individual substance, and creates its unity [Aristotle, by Witt]
Individual essences are not universals, since those can't be substances, or cause them [Aristotle, by Witt]
Aristotelian essence is not universal properties, but individual essence [Aristotle, by Witt]
Aristotle does not accept individual essences; essential properties are always general [Aristotle, by Kung]
Aristotle's essence explains the existence of an individual substance, not its properties [Aristotle, by Witt]
Aristotle takes essence and form as a particular, not (as some claim) as a universal, the species [Aristotle, by Politis]
To be a subject a thing must be specifiable, with some essential properties [Aristotle, by Gill,ML]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 4. Essence as Definition
If definition is of universals, many individuals have no definition, and hence no essence [Aristotle, by Witt]
Descartes gives an essence by an encapsulating formula [Descartes, by Almog]
Things have an essence if their explanation is a definition [Aristotle]
A thing's essence is what is mentioned in its definition [Aristotle, by Lawson-Tancred]
Essence is what is stated in the definition [Aristotle, by Politis]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
The Aristotelian view is that the essential properties are those that sort an object [Aristotle, by Marcus (Barcan)]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
A thing's essence is its intrinsic nature [Aristotle]
An essence causes both its own unity and its kind [Aristotle]
Having an essence is the criterion of being a substance [Aristotle, by Lawson-Tancred]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / c. Essentials are necessary
Aristotle doesn't see essential truths or essential properties as necessary [Aristotle, by Koslicki]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 8. Essence as Explanatory
Metaphysics is the science of ultimate explanation, or of pure existence, or of primary existence [Aristotle, by Politis]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
It is absurd that a this and a substance should be composed of a quality [Aristotle]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 10. Essence as Species
Generalities like man and horse are not substances, but universal composites of account and matter [Aristotle]
Genera are not substances, and do not exist apart from the ingredient species [Aristotle]
'Categories' answers 'what?' with species, genus, differerentia; 'Met.' Z.17 seeks causal essence [Aristotle, by Wedin]
Standardly, Aristotelian essences are taken to be universals of the species [Aristotle, by Witt]
In 'Met.' he says genera can't be substances or qualities, so aren't in the ontology [Aristotle, by Frede,M]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 11. Essence of Artefacts
Things are more unified if the unity comes from their own nature, not from external force [Aristotle]
The hallmark of an artefact is that its active source of maintenance is external [Aristotle, by Gill,ML]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 14. Knowledge of Essences
Aristotle claims that the individual is epistemologically prior to the universal [Aristotle, by Witt]
Actual knowledge is of the individual, and potential knowledge of the universal [Aristotle, by Witt]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 2. Objects that Change
For animate things, only the form, not the matter or properties, must persist through change [Aristotle, by Frede,M]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 12. Origin as Essential
How a thing is generated does not explain its essence [Aristotle, by Politis]
Aristotle wants definition, not identity, so origin is not essential to him [Aristotle, by Witt]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
Two things with the same primary being and essence are one thing [Aristotle]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 4. Type Identity
Things such as two different quadrangles are alike but not wholly the same [Aristotle]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 5. Self-Identity
We can't understand self-identity without a prior grasp of the object [Aristotle]
You are one with yourself in form and matter [Aristotle]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 2. Nature of Necessity
Necessity makes alternatives impossible [Aristotle]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
A thing has a feature necessarily if its denial brings a contradiction [Aristotle]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
Anything which is possible either exists or will come into existence [Aristotle]
Possibility is when the necessity of the contrary is false [Aristotle]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 4. Potentiality
A 'potentiality' is a principle of change or process in a thing [Aristotle]
Potentialities are always for action, but are conditional on circumstances [Aristotle]
We recognise potentiality from actuality [Aristotle]
Things are destroyed not by their powers, but by their lack of them [Aristotle]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 6. Necessity from Essence
Some things have external causes of their necessity; others (the simple) generate necessities [Aristotle]
Aristotle's says necessary truths are distinct and derive from essential truths [Aristotle, by Koslicki]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 1. A Priori Necessary
We know by thought that what is done cannot be undone [Descartes]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / b. Conceivable but impossible
Pythagoras' Theorem doesn't cease to be part of the essence of triangles just because we doubt it [Arnauld on Descartes]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
The ability to teach is a mark of true knowledge [Aristotle]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / d. Cause of beliefs
Belief is not an intellectual state or act, because propositions are affirmed or denied by the will [Descartes, by Zagzebski]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 6. Knowing How
Things are produced from skill if the form of them is in the mind [Aristotle]
Experience knows particulars, but only skill knows universals [Aristotle]
It takes skill to know causes, not experience [Aristotle]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 1. Certainty
Descartes tried to model reason on maths instead of 'logos' [Roochnik on Descartes]
Labelling slightly doubtful things as false is irrational [Roochnik on Descartes]
Maybe there is only one certain fact, which is that nothing is certain [Descartes]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 4. The Cogito
Descartes transformed 'God is thinkable, so he exists' into 'I think, so I exist' [Descartes, by Feuerbach]
In the Meditations version of the Cogito he says "I am; I exist", which avoids presenting it as an argument [Descartes, by Baggini /Fosl]
If I don't think, there is no reason to think that I exist [Descartes]
Modern philosophy set the self-conscious ego in place of God [Descartes, by Feuerbach]
"I think therefore I am" is the absolute truth of consciousness [Sartre on Descartes]
I must even exist if I am being deceived by something [Descartes]
"I am, I exist" is necessarily true every time I utter it or conceive it in my mind [Descartes]
The Cogito is a transcendental argument, not a piece of a priori knowledge [Rey on Descartes]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 5. Cogito Critique
The Cogito proves subjective experience is basic, but makes false claims about the Self [Russell on Descartes]
Maybe 'I' am not the thinker, but something produced by thought [Nietzsche on Descartes]
The Cogito only works if you already understand what thought and existence are [Mersenne on Descartes]
It is a precondition of the use of the word 'I' that I exist [Ayer on Descartes]
The thing which experiences may be momentary, and change with the next experience [Russell on Descartes]
'I think' assumes I exist, that thinking is known and caused, and that I am doing it [Nietzsche on Descartes]
A thought doesn't imply other thoughts, or enough thoughts to make up a self [Ayer on Descartes]
That I perform an activity (thinking) doesn't prove what type of thing I am [Hobbes on Descartes]
Autistic children seem to use the 'I' concept without seeing themselves as thinkers [Segal on Descartes]
The Cogito assumes a priori the existence of substance, when actually it is a grammatical custom [Nietzsche on Descartes]
How can we infer that all thinking involves self-consciousness, just from my own case? [Kant on Descartes]
My self is not an inference from 'I think', but a presupposition of it [Kant on Descartes]
We cannot give any information a priori about the nature of the 'thing that thinks' [Kant on Descartes]
The fact that I am a subject is not enough evidence to show that I am a substantial object [Kant on Descartes]
Descartes' claim to know his existence before his essence is misleading or absurd [Descartes, by Lowe]
Modern self-consciousness is a doubtful abstraction; only senses and feelings are certain [Feuerbach on Descartes]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 2. Phenomenalism
My perceiving of things may be false, but my seeming to perceive them cannot be false [Descartes]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 4. Solipsism
I myself could be the author of all these self-delusions [Descartes]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 4. A Priori as Necessities
A triangle has a separate non-invented nature, shown by my ability to prove facts about it [Descartes]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / c. Primary qualities
For Descartes, objects have one primary quality, which is geometrical [Descartes, by Robinson,H]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 5. Interpretation
Why does pain make us sad? [Descartes]
12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
Dogs can make the same judgements as us about variable things [Gassendi on Descartes]
We perceive objects by intellect, not by senses or imagination [Descartes]
The wax is not perceived by the senses, but by the mind alone [Descartes]
We don't 'see' men in heavy clothes, we judge them to be men [Descartes]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 4. Pro-Empiricism
All men long to understand, as shown by their delight in the senses [Aristotle]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / a. Foundationalism
To achieve good science we must rebuild from the foundations [Descartes]
Only one certainty is needed for progress (like a lever's fulcrum) [Descartes]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / e. Pro-foundations
The starting point of a proof is not a proof [Aristotle]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
Even if my body and objects are imaginary, there may be simpler things which are true [Descartes]
Descartes can't begin again, because sceptics doubt cognitive processes as well as beliefs [Pollock/Cruz on Descartes]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 3. Illusion Scepticism
If pain is felt in a lost limb, I cannot be certain that a felt pain exists in my real limbs [Descartes]
We correct sense errors with other senses, not intellect [Mersenne on Descartes]
The senses can only report, so perception errors are in the judgment [Gassendi on Descartes]
It is prudent never to trust your senses if they have deceived you even once [Descartes]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 4. Demon Scepticism
God may have created nothing, but made his creation appear to me as it does now [Descartes]
To achieve full scepticism, I imagine a devil who deceives me about the external world and my own body and senses [Descartes]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 5. Dream Scepticism
Dreams aren't a serious problem. No one starts walking round Athens next morning, having dreamt that they were there! [Aristotle]
Waking actions are joined by memory to all our other actions, unlike actions of which we dream [Descartes]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
I can only sense an object if it is present, and can't fail to sense it when it is [Descartes]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 3. Subjectivism
If relativism is individual, how can something look sweet and not taste it, or look different to our two eyes? [Aristotle]
If truth is relative it is relational, and concerns appearances relative to a situation [Aristotle]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 6. Relativism Critique
If the majority had diseased taste, and only a few were healthy, relativists would have to prefer the former [Aristotle]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 2. Demonstration
There cannot be a science of accidentals, but only of general truths [Aristotle]
Demonstrations about particulars must be about everything of that type [Aristotle]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / a. Explanation
Universal principles are not primary beings, but particular principles are not universally knowable [Aristotle]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / b. Aims of explanation
Understanding moves from the less to the more intelligible [Aristotle]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
Aristotelian explanations mainly divide things into natural kinds [Aristotle, by Politis]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / k. Explanations by essence
We know something when we fully know what it is, not just its quality, quantity or location [Aristotle]
Real enquiries seek causes, and causes are essences [Aristotle]
We know a thing when we grasp its essence [Aristotle]
The explanation is what gives matter its state, which is the form, which is the substance [Aristotle]
Essential properties explain in conjunction with properties shared by the same kind [Aristotle, by Kung]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 3. Mental Causation
Can the pineal gland be moved more slowly or quickly by the mind than by animal spirits? [Spinoza on Descartes]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / c. Knowing other minds
We discovers others as well as ourselves in the Cogito [Sartre on Descartes]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 5. Unity of Mind
Faculties of the mind aren't parts, as one mind uses them [Descartes]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / a. Nature of qualia
Descartes put thought at the centre of the mind problem, but we put sensation [Rey on Descartes]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 1. Faculties
Descartes mentions many cognitive faculties, but reduces them to will and intellect [Descartes, by Schmid]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 2. Imagination
Imagination and sensation are non-essential to mind [Descartes]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 5. Generalisation by mind
Skill comes from a general assumption obtained from thinking about similar things [Aristotle]
Aristotle distinguishes two different sorts of generality - kinds, and properties [Aristotle, by Frede,M]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 6. Idealisation
Science is more accurate when it is prior and simpler, especially without magnitude or movement [Aristotle]
16. Persons / A. Concept of a Person / 1. Existence of Persons
Some cause must unite the separate temporal sections of a person [Descartes]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 1. Identity and the Self
Is Socrates the same person when standing and when seated? [Aristotle]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 7. Self and Thinking
Since I only observe myself to be thinking, I conclude that that is my essence [Descartes]
I can exist without imagination and sensing, but they can't exist without me [Descartes]
For Descartes a person's essence is the mind because objects are perceived by mind, not senses [Descartes, by Feuerbach]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 1. Nature of Free Will
Our 'will' just consists of the feeling that when we are motivated to do something, there are no external pressures [Descartes]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 4. For Free Will
My capacity to make choices with my free will extends as far as any faculty ever could [Descartes]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 1. Dualism
The mind is a non-extended thing which thinks [Descartes]
Mind is not extended, unlike the body [Descartes]
Descartes is a substance AND property dualist [Descartes, by Kim]
The mind is utterly indivisible [Descartes]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 2. Interactionism
Interaction between mental and physical seems to violate the principle of conservation of energy [Rowlands on Descartes]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 8. Dualism of Mind Critique
The 'thinking thing' may be the physical basis of the mind [Hobbes on Descartes]
Knowing different aspects of brain/mind doesn't make them different [Rorty on Descartes]
Descartes gives no clear criterion for individuating mental substances [Cottingham on Descartes]
Does Descartes have a clear conception of how mind unites with body? [Spinoza on Descartes]
Even Descartes may concede that mental supervenes on neuroanatomical [Lycan on Descartes]
Superman's strength is indubitable, Clark Kent's is doubtful, so they are not the same? [Maslin on Descartes]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 2. Propositional Attitudes
In some thoughts I grasp a subject, but also I will or fear or affirm or deny it [Descartes]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / b. Human rationality
Aristotle sees reason as much more specific than our more everyday concept of it [Aristotle, by Frede,M]
Descartes created the modern view of rationality, as an internal feature instead of an external vision [Descartes, by Taylor,C]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / c. Animal rationality
Animals live by sensations, and some have good memories, but they don't connect experiences [Aristotle]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 6. Judgement / b. Error
I make errors because my will extends beyond my understanding [Descartes]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 5. Mental Files
Many memories make up a single experience [Aristotle]
18. Thought / C. Content / 2. Ideas
True ideas are images, such as of a man, a chimera, or God [Descartes]
18. Thought / C. Content / 10. Causal Semantics
All ideas are adventitious, and come from the senses [Gassendi on Descartes]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / c. Nativist concepts
The ideas of God and of my self are innate in me [Descartes]
I can think of innumerable shapes I have never experienced [Descartes]
The idea of a supremely perfect being is within me, like the basic concepts of mathematics [Descartes]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / i. Conceptual priority
It is unclear whether acute angles are prior to right angles, or fingers to men [Aristotle]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 3. Abstracta by Ignoring
Mathematicians study quantity and continuity, and remove the perceptible features of things [Aristotle]
Mathematicians suppose inseparable aspects to be separable, and study them in isolation [Aristotle]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 8. Abstractionism Critique
If health happened to be white, the science of health would not study whiteness [Aristotle]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / d. Weakness of will
Some reasonings are stronger than we are [Philolaus]
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 2. Art as Form
Beauty involves the Forms of order, symmetry and limit, which can be handled mathematically [Aristotle]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 7. Art and Morality
The good is found in actions, but beauty can exist without movement [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / b. Successful function
A thing's active function is its end [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / a. Form of the Good
Is the good a purpose, a source of movement, or a pure form? [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / a. Nature of virtue
Excellence is a sort of completion [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / b. Basis of virtue
Is excellence separate from things, or part of them, or both? [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / g. Contemplation
Contemplation is a supreme pleasure and excellence [Aristotle]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / c. Teaching
Wise men aren't instructed; they instruct [Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 1. Nature
Why are some things destructible and others not? [Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / a. Final purpose
Everything is arranged around a single purpose [Aristotle]
Many causes are quite baffling, so it is absurd to deduce causes from final purposes [Descartes]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 4. Mathematical Nature
Pythagoreans say the whole universe is made of numbers [Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / a. Greek matter
Aristotle had a hierarchical conception of matter [Aristotle, by Fine,K]
Substance must exist, because something must endure during change between opposites [Aristotle]
Matter is perceptible (like bronze) or intelligible (like mathematical objects) [Aristotle]
Matter is neither a particular thing nor a member of a determinate category [Aristotle]
Aristotle says matter is a lesser substance, rather than wholly denying that it is a substance [Aristotle, by Kung]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / b. Prime matter
Ultimate matter is discredited, as Aristotle merged substratum of change with bearer of properties [Simons on Aristotle]
Aristotle may only have believed in prime matter because his elements were immutable [Aristotle, by Alexander,P]
The traditional view of Aristotle is God (actual form) at top and prime matter (potential matter) at bottom [Aristotle, by Gill,ML]
Primary matter is what characterises other stuffs, and it has no distinct identity [Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / e. The One
It doesn't explain the world to say it was originally all one. How did it acquire diversity? [Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / f. Ancient elements
I claim that Aristotle's foundation is the four elements, and not wholly potential prime matter [Aristotle, by Gill,ML]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 1. Natural Kinds
Unusual kinds like mule are just a combination of two kinds [Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 4. Naturalised causation
Is there cause outside matter, and can it be separated, and is it one or many? [Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / c. Conditions of causation
There must be at least as much in the cause as there is in the effect [Descartes]
We exercise to be fit, but need fitness to exercise [Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / b. Nomological causation
Pure Forms and numbers can't cause anything, and especially not movement [Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / d. Causal necessity
When a power and its object meet in the right conditions, an action necessarily follows [Aristotle]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 3. Parts of Time / a. Beginning of time
It is hard to see how either time or movement could come into existence or be destroyed [Aristotle]
27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 3. The Beginning
The first mover is necessary, and because it is necessary it is good [Aristotle]
Even if the world is caused by fate, mind and nature are still prior causes [Aristotle]
Something which both moves and is moved is intermediate, so it follows that there must be an unmoved mover [Aristotle]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 2. Divine Nature
Nothing apart from God could have essential existence, and such a being must be unique and eternal [Descartes]
There must a source of movement which is eternal, indivisible and without magnitude [Aristotle]
God the creator is an intelligent, infinite, powerful substance [Descartes]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 3. Divine Perfections
It is self-evident that deception is a natural defect, so God could not be a deceiver [Descartes]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 5. God and Time
God is not a creator (involving time and change) and is not concerned with the inferior universe [Aristotle, by Armstrong,K]
28. God / B. Proving God / 1. Proof of God
For Aristotle God is defined in an axiom, for which there is no proof [Aristotle, by Frede,M]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / a. Ontological Proof
Existence and God's essence are inseparable, like a valley and a mountain, or a triangle and its properties [Descartes]
The idea of God in my mind is like the mark a craftsman puts on his work [Descartes]
I cannot think of a supremely perfect being without the supreme perfection of existence [Descartes]
One idea leads to another, but there must be an initial idea that contains the reality of all the others [Descartes]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / b. Ontological Proof critique
We mustn't worship God as an image because we have no idea of him [Hobbes on Descartes]
We can never conceive of an infinite being [Gassendi on Descartes]
Descartes cannot assume that a most perfect being exists without contradictions [Leibniz on Descartes]
Existence is not a perfection; it is what makes perfection possible [Gassendi on Descartes]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / b. Teleological Proof
The world can't be arranged at all if there is nothing eternal and separate [Aristotle]
29. Religion / A. Polytheistic Religion / 2. Greek Polytheism
There are as many eternal unmovable substances as there are movements of the stars [Aristotle]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 3. Problem of Evil / c. Human Error
God didn't give us good judgement even about our own lives [Gassendi on Descartes]
Error arises because my faculty for judging truth is not infinite [Descartes]
Since God does not wish to deceive me, my judgement won't make errors if I use it properly [Descartes]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 3. Problem of Evil / d. Natural Evil
If we ask whether God's works are perfect, we must not take a narrow viewpoint, but look at the universe as a whole [Descartes]