Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'works', 'Epistemology: contemporary introduction' and 'Propositions'

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68 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
There is practical wisdom (for action), and theoretical wisdom (for deep understanding) [Aristotle, by Whitcomb]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 2. Logos
For Aristotle logos is essentially the ability to talk rationally about questions of value [Roochnik on Aristotle]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 4. Aims of Reason
Aristotle is the supreme optimist about the ability of logos to explain nature [Roochnik on Aristotle]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 4. Real Definition
Aristotelian definitions aim to give the essential properties of the thing defined [Aristotle, by Quine]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 5. Genus and Differentia
Aristotelian definition involves first stating the genus, then the differentia of the thing [Aristotle, by Urmson]
2. Reason / E. Argument / 1. Argument
Arguers often turn the opponent's modus ponens into their own modus tollens [Merricks]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 2. Semantic Truth
'Snow is white' only contingently expresses the proposition that snow is white [Merricks]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 1. Modal Logic
Simple Quantified Modal Logc doesn't work, because the Converse Barcan is a theorem [Merricks]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 7. Barcan Formula
The Converse Barcan implies 'everything exists necessarily' is a consequence of 'necessarily, everything exists' [Merricks]
4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 1. Mereology
Aristotle relativises the notion of wholeness to different measures [Aristotle, by Koslicki]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
For Aristotle, the subject-predicate structure of Greek reflected a substance-accident structure of reality [Aristotle, by O'Grady]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 1. Logical Models
Sentence logic maps truth values; predicate logic maps objects and sets [Merricks]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / a. Hylomorphism
The unmoved mover and the soul show Aristotelian form as the ultimate mereological atom [Aristotle, by Koslicki]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / d. Form as unifier
The 'form' is the recipe for building wholes of a particular kind [Aristotle, by Koslicki]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 12. Origin as Essential
In twinning, one person has the same origin as another person [Merricks]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 7. Natural Necessity
Because 'gold is malleable' is necessary does not mean that it is analytic [Audi,R]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
For Aristotle, knowledge is of causes, and is theoretical, practical or productive [Aristotle, by Code]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / d. Cause of beliefs
Beliefs are based on perception, memory, introspection or reason [Audi,R]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / e. Belief holism
Could you have a single belief on its own? [Audi,R]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 1. Certainty
We can make certain of what we know, so knowing does not entail certainty [Audi,R]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 2. Phenomenalism
If you gradually remove a book's sensory properties, what is left at the end? [Audi,R]
Sense-data theory is indirect realism, but phenomenalism is direct irrealism [Audi,R]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 1. Nature of the A Priori
The notion of a priori truth is absent in Aristotle [Aristotle, by Politis]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 9. A Priori from Concepts
Red and green being exclusive colours seems to be rationally graspable but not analytic [Audi,R]
The concepts needed for a priori thought may come from experience [Audi,R]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 3. Representation
To see something as a field, I obviously need the concept of a field [Audi,R]
How could I see a field and believe nothing regarding it? [Audi,R]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / a. Sense-data theory
Sense-data (and the rival 'adverbial' theory) are to explain illusions and hallucinations [Audi,R]
Sense data imply representative realism, possibly only representing primary qualities [Audi,R]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 5. Interpretation
Perception is first simple, then objectual (with concepts) and then propositional [Audi,R]
12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
Aristotle is a rationalist, but reason is slowly acquired through perception and experience [Aristotle, by Frede,M]
The principles of justification have to be a priori [Audi,R]
Virtually all rationalists assert that we can have knowledge of synthetic a priori truths [Audi,R]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 2. Intuition
Aristotle wants to fit common intuitions, and therefore uses language as a guide [Aristotle, by Gill,ML]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 4. Memory
To remember something is to know it [Audi,R]
I might remember someone I can't recall or image, by recognising them on meeting [Audi,R]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / a. Agrippa's trilemma
Justification is either unanchored (infinite or circular), or anchored (in knowledge or non-knowledge) [Audi,R]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / a. Pro-internalism
Internalism about justification implies that there is a right to believe something [Audi,R]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / c. Coherentism critique
Maths may be consistent with observations, but not coherent [Audi,R]
It is very hard to show how much coherence is needed for justification [Audi,R]
A consistent madman could have a very coherent belief system [Audi,R]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification
Consistent accurate prediction looks like knowledge without justified belief [Audi,R]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / a. Reliable knowledge
A reliability theory of knowledge seems to involve truth as correspondence [Audi,R]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / b. Anti-reliabilism
'Reliable' is a very imprecise term, and may even mean 'justified' [Audi,R]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory
Plato says sciences are unified around Forms; Aristotle says they're unified around substance [Aristotle, by Moravcsik]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / a. Explanation
Aristotelian explanations are facts, while modern explanations depend on human conceptions [Aristotle, by Politis]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
Aristotle's standard analysis of species and genus involves specifying things in terms of something more general [Aristotle, by Benardete,JA]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / k. Explanations by essence
Aristotle regularly says that essential properties explain other significant properties [Aristotle, by Kung]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 4. Errors in Introspection
We can be ignorant about ourselves, for example, our desires and motives [Audi,R]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / c. Animal rationality
Aristotle and the Stoics denied rationality to animals, while Platonists affirmed it [Aristotle, by Sorabji]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
I don't accept that if a proposition is directly about an entity, it has a relation to the entity [Merricks]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
A sentence's truth conditions depend on context [Merricks]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
Propositions are standardly treated as possible worlds, or as structured [Merricks]
'Cicero is an orator' represents the same situation as 'Tully is an orator', so they are one proposition [Merricks]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 2. Abstract Propositions / a. Propositions as sense
Propositions are necessary existents which essentially (but inexplicably) represent things [Merricks]
True propositions existed prior to their being thought, and might never be thought [Merricks]
The standard view of propositions says they never change their truth-value [Merricks]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 3. Concrete Propositions
Propositions can be 'about' an entity, but that doesn't make the entity a constituent of it [Merricks]
Early Russell says a proposition is identical with its truthmaking state of affairs [Merricks]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 5. Unity of Propositions
Unity of the proposition questions: what unites them? can the same constituents make different ones? [Merricks]
We want to explain not just what unites the constituents, but what unites them into a proposition [Merricks]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 2. Analytic Truths
The notion of analytic truth is absent in Aristotle [Aristotle, by Politis]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
Aristotle never actually says that man is a rational animal [Aristotle, by Fogelin]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / a. Aims of education
It is the mark of an educated mind to be able to entertain an idea without accepting it [Aristotle]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / b. Education principles
Aristotle said the educated were superior to the uneducated as the living are to the dead [Aristotle, by Diog. Laertius]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 5. Infinite in Nature
There are potential infinities (never running out), but actual infinity is incoherent [Aristotle, by Friend]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / a. Greek matter
Aristotle's matter can become any other kind of matter [Aristotle, by Wiggins]
29. Religion / A. Polytheistic Religion / 2. Greek Polytheism
The concepts of gods arose from observing the soul, and the cosmos [Aristotle, by Sext.Empiricus]