Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Prior Analytics', 'Walking the Tightrope of Reason' and 'Ontology and the Vicious Circle Principle'

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38 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
6575 Philosophy may never find foundations, and may undermine our lives in the process [Fogelin]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
6585 Rationality is threatened by fear of inconsistency, illusions of absolutes or relativism, and doubt [Fogelin]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 9. Limits of Reason
6557 Humans may never be able to attain a world view which is both rich and consistent [Fogelin]
6568 A game can be played, despite having inconsistent rules [Fogelin]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 1. Laws of Thought
6560 The law of noncontradiction is traditionally the most basic principle of rationality [Fogelin]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 3. Non-Contradiction
6565 The law of noncontradiction makes the distinction between asserting something and denying it [Fogelin]
2. Reason / E. Argument / 3. Analogy
6574 Legal reasoning is analogical, not deductive [Fogelin]
4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 1. Aristotelian Logic
22271 Aristotle was the first to use schematic letters in logic [Aristotle, by Potter]
11060 Aristotelian syllogisms are three-part, subject-predicate, existentially committed, with laws of thought [Aristotle, by Hanna]
18909 Aristotelian sentences are made up by one of four 'formative' connectors [Aristotle, by Engelbretsen]
8080 Aristotelian identified 256 possible syllogisms, saying that 19 are valid [Aristotle, by Devlin]
13912 Aristotle replaced Plato's noun-verb form with unions of pairs of terms by one of four 'copulae' [Aristotle, by Engelbretsen/Sayward]
8071 Aristotle listed nineteen valid syllogisms (though a few of them were wrong) [Aristotle, by Devlin]
4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 2. Syllogistic Logic
13819 Aristotle's said some Fs are G or some Fs are not G, forgetting that there might be no Fs [Bostock on Aristotle]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 4. Alethic Modal Logic
9403 There are three different deductions for actual terms, necessary terms and possible terms [Aristotle]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 8. Critique of Set Theory
18151 Could we replace sets by the open sentences that define them? [Chihara, by Bostock]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 3. Deductive Consequence |-
11148 Deduction is when we suppose one thing, and another necessarily follows [Aristotle]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
18896 Aristotle places terms at opposite ends, joined by a quantified copula [Aristotle, by Sommers]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 7. Predicates in Logic
3300 Aristotle's logic is based on the subject/predicate distinction, which leads him to substances and properties [Aristotle, by Benardete,JA]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 1. Quantification
11149 Affirming/denying sentences are universal, particular, or indeterminate [Aristotle]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 3. Objectual Quantification
8079 Aristotelian logic has two quantifiers of the subject ('all' and 'some') [Aristotle, by Devlin]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 4. De re / De dicto modality
14641 A deduction is necessary if the major (but not the minor) premise is also necessary [Aristotle]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 3. Necessity by Convention
6582 Conventions can only work if they are based on something non-conventional [Fogelin]
12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
6576 My view is 'circumspect rationalism' - that only our intellect can comprehend the world [Fogelin]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / c. Defeasibility
6589 Knowledge is legitimate only if all relevant defeaters have been eliminated [Fogelin]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification
6596 For coherentists, circularity is acceptable if the circle is large, rich and coherent [Fogelin]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 6. Contextual Justification / a. Contextualism
6597 A rule of justification might be: don't raise the level of scrutiny without a good reason [Fogelin]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 2. Types of Scepticism
6588 Scepticism is cartesian (sceptical scenarios), or Humean (future), or Pyrrhonian (suspend belief) [Fogelin]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
6590 Scepticism deals in remote possibilities that are ineliminable and set the standard very high [Fogelin]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 1. Relativism
6583 Radical perspectivism replaces Kant's necessary scheme with many different schemes [Fogelin]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 5. Generalisation by mind
18911 Linguistic terms form a hierarchy, with higher terms predicable of increasing numbers of things [Aristotle, by Engelbretsen]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / b. Human rationality
6555 We are also irrational, with a unique ability to believe in bizarre self-created fictions [Fogelin]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 3. Taste
6605 Critics must be causally entangled with their subject matter [Fogelin]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 4. Beauty
6607 The word 'beautiful', when deprived of context, is nearly contentless [Fogelin]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 5. Objectivism in Art
6604 Saying 'It's all a matter to taste' ignores the properties of the object discussed [Fogelin]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
6586 Cynics are committed to morality, but disappointed or disgusted by human failings [Fogelin]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 3. Punishment / a. Right to punish
6572 Deterrence, prevention, rehabilitation and retribution can come into conflict in punishments [Fogelin]
6573 Retributivists say a crime can be 'paid for'; deterrentists still worry about potential victims [Fogelin]