40 ideas
9136 | The paradox of analysis says that any conceptual analysis must be either trivial or false [Sorensen] |
9131 | Two long understandable sentences can have an unintelligible conjunction [Sorensen] |
1708 | In "Callias is just/not just/unjust", which of these are contraries? [Aristotle] |
9139 | If nothing exists, no truthmakers could make 'Nothing exists' true [Sorensen] |
1703 | It is necessary that either a sea-fight occurs tomorrow or it doesn't, though neither option is in itself necessary [Aristotle] |
9140 | Which toothbrush is the truthmaker for 'buy one, get one free'? [Sorensen] |
1704 | Statements are true according to how things actually are [Aristotle] |
22272 | Aristotle's later logic had to treat 'Socrates' as 'everything that is Socrates' [Potter on Aristotle] |
9405 | Square of Opposition: not both true, or not both false; one-way implication; opposite truth-values [Aristotle] |
9728 | Modal Square 1: □P and ¬◊¬P are 'contraries' of □¬P and ¬◊P [Aristotle, by Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
9729 | Modal Square 2: ¬□¬P and ◊P are 'subcontraries' of ¬□P and ◊¬P [Aristotle, by Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
9730 | Modal Square 3: □P and ¬◊¬P are 'contradictories' of ¬□P and ◊¬P [Aristotle, by Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
9731 | Modal Square 4: □¬P and ¬◊P are 'contradictories' of ¬□¬P and ◊P [Aristotle, by Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
9732 | Modal Square 5: □P and ¬◊¬P are 'subalternatives' of ¬□¬P and ◊P [Aristotle, by Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
9733 | Modal Square 6: □¬P and ¬◊P are 'subalternatives' of ¬□P and ◊¬P [Aristotle, by Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
9119 | No attempt to deny bivalence has ever been accepted [Sorensen] |
21593 | In talking of future sea-fights, Aristotle rejects bivalence [Aristotle, by Williamson] |
1701 | A prayer is a sentence which is neither true nor false [Aristotle] |
9135 | We now see that generalizations use variables rather than abstract entities [Sorensen] |
9125 | Denying problems, or being romantically defeated by them, won't make them go away [Sorensen] |
9137 | Banning self-reference would outlaw 'This very sentence is in English' [Sorensen] |
1706 | Non-existent things aren't made to exist by thought, because their non-existence is part of the thought [Aristotle] |
1707 | Maybe necessity and non-necessity are the first principles of ontology [Aristotle] |
9116 | Vague words have hidden boundaries [Sorensen] |
9132 | An offer of 'free coffee or juice' could slowly shift from exclusive 'or' to inclusive 'or' [Sorensen] |
9128 | It is propositional attitudes which can be a priori, not the propositions themselves [Sorensen] |
9130 | Attributing apriority to a proposition is attributing a cognitive ability to someone [Sorensen] |
9118 | The colour bands of the spectrum arise from our biology; they do not exist in the physics [Sorensen] |
9124 | We are unable to perceive a nose (on the back of a mask) as concave [Sorensen] |
9126 | Bayesians build near-certainty from lots of reasonably probable beliefs [Sorensen] |
9121 | Illusions are not a reason for skepticism, but a source of interesting scientific information [Sorensen] |
2337 | For Aristotle meaning and reference are linked to concepts [Aristotle, by Putnam] |
9134 | The negation of a meaningful sentence must itself be meaningful [Sorensen] |
13763 | Spoken sounds vary between people, but are signs of affections of soul, which are the same for all [Aristotle] |
9133 | Propositions are what settle problems of ambiguity in sentences [Sorensen] |
1705 | It doesn't have to be the case that in opposed views one is true and the other false [Aristotle] |
9129 | I can buy any litre of water, but not every litre of water [Sorensen] |
1702 | Things may be necessary once they occur, but not be unconditionally necessary [Aristotle] |
9122 | God cannot experience unwanted pain, so God cannot understand human beings [Sorensen] |
1513 | The Egyptians were the first to say the soul is immortal and reincarnated [Herodotus] |