56 ideas
| 16440 | I don't think Lewis's cost-benefit reflective equilibrium approach offers enough guidance [Stalnaker] |
| 1708 | In "Callias is just/not just/unjust", which of these are contraries? [Aristotle] |
| 1703 | It is necessary that either a sea-fight occurs tomorrow or it doesn't, though neither option is in itself necessary [Aristotle] |
| 1704 | Statements are true according to how things actually are [Aristotle] |
| 22272 | Aristotle's later logic had to treat 'Socrates' as 'everything that is Socrates' [Potter on Aristotle] |
| 9405 | Square of Opposition: not both true, or not both false; one-way implication; opposite truth-values [Aristotle] |
| 9728 | Modal Square 1: □P and ¬◊¬P are 'contraries' of □¬P and ¬◊P [Aristotle, by Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
| 9729 | Modal Square 2: ¬□¬P and ◊P are 'subcontraries' of ¬□P and ◊¬P [Aristotle, by Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
| 9730 | Modal Square 3: □P and ¬◊¬P are 'contradictories' of ¬□P and ◊¬P [Aristotle, by Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
| 9731 | Modal Square 4: □¬P and ¬◊P are 'contradictories' of ¬□¬P and ◊P [Aristotle, by Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
| 9732 | Modal Square 5: □P and ¬◊¬P are 'subalternatives' of ¬□¬P and ◊P [Aristotle, by Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
| 9733 | Modal Square 6: □¬P and ¬◊P are 'subalternatives' of ¬□P and ◊¬P [Aristotle, by Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
| 16468 | Non-S5 can talk of contingent or necessary necessities [Stalnaker] |
| 16449 | In modal set theory, sets only exist in a possible world if that world contains all of its members [Stalnaker] |
| 21593 | In talking of future sea-fights, Aristotle rejects bivalence [Aristotle, by Williamson] |
| 1701 | A prayer is a sentence which is neither true nor false [Aristotle] |
| 16464 | We regiment to get semantic structure, for evaluating arguments, and understanding complexities [Stalnaker] |
| 16465 | In 'S was F or some other than S was F', the disjuncts need S, but the whole disjunction doesn't [Stalnaker] |
| 16439 | A nominalist view says existence is having spatio-temporal location [Stalnaker] |
| 16434 | Some say what exists must do so, and nothing else could possible exist [Stalnaker] |
| 1706 | Non-existent things aren't made to exist by thought, because their non-existence is part of the thought [Aristotle] |
| 1707 | Maybe necessity and non-necessity are the first principles of ontology [Aristotle] |
| 22180 | Multiple realisability is said to make reduction impossible [Okasha] |
| 16443 | Properties are modal, involving possible situations where they are exemplified [Stalnaker] |
| 16471 | I accept a hierarchy of properties of properties of properties [Stalnaker] |
| 16452 | Dispositions have modal properties, of which properties things would have counterfactually [Stalnaker] |
| 16467 | 'Socrates is essentially human' seems to say nothing could be Socrates if it was not human [Stalnaker] |
| 16453 | The bundle theory makes the identity of indiscernibles a necessity, since the thing is the properties [Stalnaker] |
| 16466 | Strong necessity is always true; weak necessity is cannot be false [Stalnaker] |
| 16438 | Necessity and possibility are fundamental, and there can be no reductive analysis of them [Stalnaker] |
| 16436 | Modal concepts are central to the actual world, and shouldn't need extravagant metaphysics [Stalnaker] |
| 16433 | Given actualism, how can there be possible individuals, other than the actual ones? [Stalnaker] |
| 16437 | Possible worlds are properties [Stalnaker] |
| 16444 | Possible worlds don't reduce modality, they regiment it to reveal its structure [Stalnaker] |
| 16445 | I think of worlds as cells (rather than points) in logical space [Stalnaker] |
| 16454 | Modal properties depend on the choice of a counterpart, which is unconstrained by metaphysics [Stalnaker] |
| 16450 | Anti-haecceitism says there is no more to an individual than meeting some qualitative conditions [Stalnaker] |
| 22177 | Randomised Control Trials have a treatment and a control group, chosen at random [Okasha] |
| 22172 | Not all sciences are experimental; astronomy relies on careful observation [Okasha] |
| 22174 | The discoverers of Neptune didn't change their theory because of an anomaly [Okasha] |
| 22175 | Science mostly aims at confirming theories, rather than falsifying them [Okasha] |
| 22182 | Theories with unobservables are underdetermined by the evidence [Okasha] |
| 22185 | Two things can't be incompatible if they are incommensurable [Okasha] |
| 22176 | Induction is inferences from examined to unexamined instances of a given kind [Okasha] |
| 22178 | If the rules only concern changes of belief, and not the starting point, absurd views can look ratiional [Okasha] |
| 16474 | How can we know what we are thinking, if content depends on something we don't know? [Stalnaker] |
| 2337 | For Aristotle meaning and reference are linked to concepts [Aristotle, by Putnam] |
| 16461 | We still lack an agreed semantics for quantifiers in natural language [Stalnaker] |
| 16448 | Possible world semantics may not reduce modality, but it can explain it [Stalnaker] |
| 16442 | I take propositions to be truth conditions [Stalnaker] |
| 16447 | A theory of propositions at least needs primitive properties of consistency and of truth [Stalnaker] |
| 16446 | Propositions presumably don't exist if the things they refer to don't exist [Stalnaker] |
| 13763 | Spoken sounds vary between people, but are signs of affections of soul, which are the same for all [Aristotle] |
| 1705 | It doesn't have to be the case that in opposed views one is true and the other false [Aristotle] |
| 22173 | Galileo refuted the Aristotelian theory that heavier objects fall faster [Okasha] |
| 1702 | Things may be necessary once they occur, but not be unconditionally necessary [Aristotle] |