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147 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
There is practical wisdom (for action), and theoretical wisdom (for deep understanding) [Aristotle, by Whitcomb]
1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 4. Later European Philosophy / b. Seventeenth century philosophy
Leibniz aims to give coherent rational support for empiricism [Leibniz, by Perkins]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
Metaphysics is a science of the intelligible nature of being [Leibniz, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 4. Metaphysics as Science
Leibniz tried to combine mechanistic physics with scholastic metaphysics [Leibniz, by Pasnau]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
Reason is the faculty for grasping apriori necessary truths [Leibniz, by Burge]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 2. Logos
For Aristotle logos is essentially the ability to talk rationally about questions of value [Roochnik on Aristotle]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 4. Aims of Reason
For Leibniz rationality is based on non-contradiction and the principle of sufficient reason [Leibniz, by Benardete,JA]
Aristotle is the supreme optimist about the ability of logos to explain nature [Roochnik on Aristotle]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 6. Coherence
Coherence is a primitive, intuitive notion, not reduced to something formal [Shapiro]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 2. Sufficient Reason
Leibniz said the principle of sufficient reason is synthetic a priori, since its denial is not illogical [Leibniz, by Benardete,JA]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 4. Real Definition
Aristotelian definitions aim to give the essential properties of the thing defined [Aristotle, by Quine]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 5. Genus and Differentia
Aristotelian definition involves first stating the genus, then the differentia of the thing [Aristotle, by Urmson]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 7. Contextual Definition
An 'implicit definition' gives a direct description of the relations of an entity [Shapiro]
2. Reason / E. Argument / 6. Conclusive Proof
Leibniz is inclined to regard all truths as provable [Leibniz, by Frege]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 1. Modal Logic
Modal operators are usually treated as quantifiers [Shapiro]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / j. Axiom of Choice IX
Axiom of Choice: some function has a value for every set in a given set [Shapiro]
The Axiom of Choice seems to license an infinite amount of choosing [Shapiro]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 8. Critique of Set Theory
Anti-realists reject set theory [Shapiro]
4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 1. Mereology
Aristotle relativises the notion of wholeness to different measures [Aristotle, by Koslicki]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 2. Types of Consequence
The two standard explanations of consequence are semantic (in models) and deductive [Shapiro]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 5. Modus Ponens
Intuitionism only sanctions modus ponens if all three components are proved [Shapiro]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 1. Ontology of Logic
Either logic determines objects, or objects determine logic, or they are separate [Shapiro]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 2. Excluded Middle
The law of excluded middle might be seen as a principle of omniscience [Shapiro]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
For Aristotle, the subject-predicate structure of Greek reflected a substance-accident structure of reality [Aristotle, by O'Grady]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / a. Logical connectives
Classical connectives differ from their ordinary language counterparts; '∧' is timeless, unlike 'and' [Shapiro]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 5. Functions in Logic
A function is just an arbitrary correspondence between collections [Shapiro]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 6. Plural Quantification
Maybe plural quantifiers should be understood in terms of classes or sets [Shapiro]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 4. Satisfaction
A sentence is 'satisfiable' if it has a model [Shapiro]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 1. Logical Models
Model theory deals with relations, reference and extensions [Shapiro]
The central notion of model theory is the relation of 'satisfaction' [Shapiro]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 2. Isomorphisms
Theory ontology is never complete, but is only determined 'up to isomorphism' [Shapiro]
The set-theoretical hierarchy contains as many isomorphism types as possible [Shapiro]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 3. Löwenheim-Skolem Theorems
Any theory with an infinite model has a model of every infinite cardinality [Shapiro]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 1. Mathematics
Virtually all of mathematics can be modeled in set theory [Shapiro]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / g. Real numbers
Real numbers are thought of as either Cauchy sequences or Dedekind cuts [Shapiro]
Understanding the real-number structure is knowing usage of the axiomatic language of analysis [Shapiro]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / i. Reals from cuts
Cuts are made by the smallest upper or largest lower number, some of them not rational [Shapiro]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / a. Units
Number cannot be defined as addition of ones, since that needs the number; it is a single act of abstraction [Fine,K on Leibniz]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / j. Infinite divisibility
The continuum is not divided like sand, but folded like paper [Leibniz, by Arthur,R]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / k. Infinitesimals
A tangent is a line connecting two points on a curve that are infinitely close together [Leibniz]
Nature uses the infinite everywhere [Leibniz]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 1. Foundations for Mathematics
There is no grounding for mathematics that is more secure than mathematics [Shapiro]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 2. Proof in Mathematics
For intuitionists, proof is inherently informal [Shapiro]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / d. Peano arithmetic
Natural numbers just need an initial object, successors, and an induction principle [Shapiro]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / b. Greek arithmetic
Mathematics originally concerned the continuous (geometry) and the discrete (arithmetic) [Shapiro]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 6. Mathematics as Set Theory / b. Mathematics is not set theory
Mathematical foundations may not be sets; categories are a popular rival [Shapiro]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / a. Structuralism
Baseball positions and chess pieces depend entirely on context [Shapiro]
The even numbers have the natural-number structure, with 6 playing the role of 3 [Shapiro]
Could infinite structures be apprehended by pattern recognition? [Shapiro]
The 4-pattern is the structure common to all collections of four objects [Shapiro]
The main mathematical structures are algebraic, ordered, and topological [Shapiro]
Some structures are exemplified by both abstract and concrete [Shapiro]
Mathematical structures are defined by axioms, or in set theory [Shapiro]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / b. Varieties of structuralism
The main versions of structuralism are all definitionally equivalent [Shapiro]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / c. Nominalist structuralism
Is there is no more to structures than the systems that exemplify them? [Shapiro]
Number statements are generalizations about number sequences, and are bound variables [Shapiro]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / d. Platonist structuralism
Because one structure exemplifies several systems, a structure is a one-over-many [Shapiro]
There is no 'structure of all structures', just as there is no set of all sets [Shapiro]
Shapiro's structuralism says model theory (comparing structures) is the essence of mathematics [Shapiro, by Friend]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / e. Structuralism critique
Does someone using small numbers really need to know the infinite structure of arithmetic? [Shapiro]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / a. For mathematical platonism
We distinguish realism 'in ontology' (for objects), and 'in truth-value' (for being either true or false) [Shapiro]
If mathematical objects are accepted, then a number of standard principles will follow [Shapiro]
Platonists claim we can state the essence of a number without reference to the others [Shapiro]
Platonism must accept that the Peano Axioms could all be false [Shapiro]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 2. Intuition of Mathematics
Intuition is an outright hindrance to five-dimensional geometry [Shapiro]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / a. Mathematical empiricism
A stone is a position in some pattern, and can be viewed as an object, or as a location [Shapiro]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / a. Constructivism
Can the ideal constructor also destroy objects? [Shapiro]
Presumably nothing can block a possible dynamic operation? [Shapiro]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 1. Nature of Existence
Can we discover whether a deck is fifty-two cards, or a person is time-slices or molecules? [Shapiro]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 6. Fundamentals / c. Monads
Leibniz proposes monads, since there must be basic things, which are immaterial in order to have unity [Leibniz, by Jolley]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 7. Abstract/Concrete / a. Abstract/concrete
The abstract/concrete boundary now seems blurred, and would need a defence [Shapiro]
Mathematicians regard arithmetic as concrete, and group theory as abstract [Shapiro]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 7. Fictionalism
Fictionalism eschews the abstract, but it still needs the possible (without model theory) [Shapiro]
Structuralism blurs the distinction between mathematical and ordinary objects [Shapiro]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 1. Nature of Relations
If relations can be reduced to, or supervene on, monadic properties of relata, they are not real [Leibniz, by Swoyer]
Relations aren't in any monad, so they are distributed, so they are not real [Leibniz]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 4. Powers as Essence
Forms have sensation and appetite, the latter being the ability to act on other bodies [Leibniz, by Garber]
The essence of a thing is its real possibilities [Leibniz, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
The notion of 'object' is at least partially structural and mathematical [Shapiro]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
Leibniz moved from individuation by whole entity to individuation by substantial form [Leibniz, by Garber]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
The laws-of-the-series plays a haecceitist role [Leibniz, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / a. Intrinsic unification
Identity of a substance is the law of its persistence [Leibniz]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / c. Unity as conceptual
Leibniz bases pure primitive entities on conjunctions of qualitative properties [Leibniz, by Adams,RM]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / d. Substance defined
Leibnizian substances add concept, law, force, form and soul [Leibniz, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
Substances are essentially active [Leibniz, by Jolley]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects
A blurry border is still a border [Shapiro]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / a. Hylomorphism
The unmoved mover and the soul show Aristotelian form as the ultimate mereological atom [Aristotle, by Koslicki]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / c. Form as causal
Leibniz strengthened hylomorphism by connecting it to force in physics [Leibniz, by Garber]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / d. Form as unifier
The 'form' is the recipe for building wholes of a particular kind [Aristotle, by Koslicki]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
Leibniz's view (that all properties are essential) is extreme essentialism, not its denial [Leibniz, by Mackie,P]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
Leibniz was not an essentialist [Leibniz, by Wiggins]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
Two eggs can't be identical, because the same truths can't apply to both of them [Leibniz]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 9. Sameness
Things are the same if one can be substituted for the other without loss of truth [Leibniz]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 2. Nature of Necessity
Necessary truths are those provable from identities by pure logic in finite steps [Leibniz, by Hacking]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
Logical modalities may be acceptable, because they are reducible to satisfaction in models [Shapiro]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
How can things be incompatible, if all positive terms seem to be compatible? [Leibniz]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 5. Contingency
A reason must be given why contingent beings should exist rather than not exist [Leibniz]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
Leibniz narrows down God's options to one, by non-contradiction, sufficient reason, indiscernibles, compossibility [Leibniz, by Harré]
Each monad expresses all its compatible monads; a possible world is the resulting equivalence class [Leibniz, by Rumfitt]
Leibniz proposed possible worlds, because they might be evil, where God would not create evil things [Leibniz, by Stewart,M]
Why does the 'myth' of possible worlds produce correct modal logic? [Shapiro]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
Leibniz has a counterpart view of de re counterfactuals [Leibniz, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
For Aristotle, knowledge is of causes, and is theoretical, practical or productive [Aristotle, by Code]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
For Leibniz, divine understanding grasps every conceivable possibility [Leibniz, by Perkins]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / a. Idealism
Leibniz said dualism of mind and body is illusion, and there is only mind [Leibniz, by Martin/Barresi]
Leibniz is an idealist insofar as the basic components of his universe are all mental [Leibniz, by Jolley]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 1. Nature of the A Priori
The notion of a priori truth is absent in Aristotle [Aristotle, by Politis]
12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
Aristotle is a rationalist, but reason is slowly acquired through perception and experience [Aristotle, by Frede,M]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 2. Intuition
Aristotle wants to fit common intuitions, and therefore uses language as a guide [Aristotle, by Gill,ML]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory
Plato says sciences are unified around Forms; Aristotle says they're unified around substance [Aristotle, by Moravcsik]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / a. Explanation
Aristotelian explanations are facts, while modern explanations depend on human conceptions [Aristotle, by Politis]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
Aristotle's standard analysis of species and genus involves specifying things in terms of something more general [Aristotle, by Benardete,JA]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / k. Explanations by essence
Aristotle regularly says that essential properties explain other significant properties [Aristotle, by Kung]
The essence of substance is the law of its changes, as in the series of numbers [Leibniz]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / a. Consciousness
Leibniz introduced the idea of degrees of consciousness, essential for his monads [Leibniz, by Perkins]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 3. Abstraction by mind
We apprehend small, finite mathematical structures by abstraction from patterns [Shapiro]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / a. Determinism
We think we are free because the causes of the will are unknown; determinism is a false problem [Leibniz]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 3. Panpsychism
Leibniz has a panpsychist view that physical points are spiritual [Leibniz, by Martin/Barresi]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 4. Occasionalism
Occasionalism give a false view of natural laws, miracles, and substances [Leibniz, by Jolley]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / c. Animal rationality
Aristotle and the Stoics denied rationality to animals, while Platonists affirmed it [Aristotle, by Sorabji]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / a. Origin of concepts
Concepts are ordered, and show eternal possibilities, deriving from God [Leibniz, by Arthur,R]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 2. Abstracta by Selection
Simple types can be apprehended through their tokens, via abstraction [Shapiro]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 3. Abstracta by Ignoring
We can apprehend structures by focusing on or ignoring features of patterns [Shapiro]
We can focus on relations between objects (like baseballers), ignoring their other features [Shapiro]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 7. Abstracta by Equivalence
Abstract objects might come by abstraction over an equivalence class of base entities [Shapiro]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / a. Sentence meaning
Leibniz was the first modern to focus on sentence-sized units (where empiricists preferred word-size) [Leibniz, by Hart,WD]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 2. Analytic Truths
The notion of analytic truth is absent in Aristotle [Aristotle, by Politis]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / d. Weakness of will
Limited awareness leads to bad choices, and unconscious awareness makes us choose the bad [Leibniz, by Perkins]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 4. Beauty
Leibniz identified beauty with intellectual perfection [Leibniz, by Gardner]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
Humans are moral, and capable of reward and punishment, because of memory and self-consciousness [Leibniz, by Jolley]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
Aristotle never actually says that man is a rational animal [Aristotle, by Fogelin]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 2. The Law / c. Natural law
Natural law theory is found in Aquinas, in Leibniz, and at the Nuremberg trials [Leibniz, by Jolley]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / a. Aims of education
It is the mark of an educated mind to be able to entertain an idea without accepting it [Aristotle]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / b. Education principles
Aristotle said the educated were superior to the uneducated as the living are to the dead [Aristotle, by Diog. Laertius]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 5. Infinite in Nature
There are potential infinities (never running out), but actual infinity is incoherent [Aristotle, by Friend]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / a. Greek matter
Aristotle's matter can become any other kind of matter [Aristotle, by Wiggins]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / g. Atomism
Leibniz rejected atoms, because they must be elastic, and hence have parts [Leibniz, by Garber]
Microscopes and the continuum suggest that matter is endlessly divisible [Leibniz]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 7. Later Matter Theories / a. Early Modern matter
Leibniz struggled to reconcile bodies with a reality of purely soul-like entities [Jolley on Leibniz]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 7. Later Matter Theories / c. Matter as extension
Leibniz eventually said resistance, rather than extension, was the essence of body [Leibniz, by Pasnau]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / c. Essence and laws
Leibniz wanted to explain motion and its laws by the nature of body [Leibniz, by Garber]
The law within something fixes its persistence, and accords with general laws of nature [Leibniz]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 10. Closure of Physics
Leibniz had an unusual commitment to the causal completeness of physics [Leibniz, by Papineau]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / c. Forces
Leibniz uses 'force' to mean both activity and potential [Leibniz]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / a. Ontological Proof
God's existence is either necessary or impossible [Leibniz, by Scruton]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 5. Atheism
Leibniz was closer than Spinoza to atheism [Leibniz, by Stewart,M]
29. Religion / A. Polytheistic Religion / 2. Greek Polytheism
The concepts of gods arose from observing the soul, and the cosmos [Aristotle, by Sext.Empiricus]