90 ideas
14721 | Metaphysical enquiry can survive if its conclusions are tentative [Sider] |
24047 | An account is either a definition or a demonstration [Aristotle] |
24052 | From one thing alone we can infer its contrary [Aristotle] |
1729 | We perceive number by the denial of continuity [Aristotle] |
14760 | Four-dimensionalism sees things and processes as belonging in the same category [Sider] |
24057 | What is prior is always potentially present in what is next in order [Aristotle] |
14194 | Proper ontology should only use categorical (actual) properties, not hypothetical ones [Sider] |
16752 | Sight is the essence of the eye, fitting its definition; the eye itself is just the matter [Aristotle] |
14745 | If sortal terms fix the kind and the persistence conditions, we need to know what kinds there are [Sider] |
24058 | The substance is the cause of a thing's being [Aristotle] |
14740 | If Tib is all of Tibbles bar her tail, when Tibbles loses her tail, two different things become one [Sider] |
14752 | Artists 'create' statues because they are essentially statues, and so lack identity with the lump of clay [Sider] |
14743 | The stage view of objects is best for dealing with coincident entities [Sider] |
24055 | Matter is potential, form is actual [Aristotle] |
24040 | Scientists explain anger by the matter, dialecticians by the form and the account [Aristotle] |
14747 | 'Composition as identity' says that an object just is the objects which compose it [Sider] |
14757 | Mereological essentialism says an object's parts are necessary for its existence [Sider] |
14727 | Three-dimensionalists assert 'enduring', being wholly present at each moment, and deny 'temporal parts' [Sider] |
14738 | Some might say that its inconsistency with time travel is a reason to favour three-dimensionalism [Sider] |
14729 | 4D says each spatiotemporal object must have a temporal part at every moment at which it exists [Sider] |
14728 | 4D says intrinsic change is difference between successive parts [Sider] |
14726 | Four-dimensionalists assert 'temporal parts', 'perduring', and being spread out over time [Sider] |
14731 | Temporal parts are instantaneous [Sider] |
14730 | Temporal parts exist, but are not prior building blocks for objects [Sider] |
14758 | How can an instantaneous stage believe anything, if beliefs take time? [Sider] |
14762 | Four-dimensionalism says temporal parts are caused (through laws of motion) by previous temporal parts [Sider] |
14741 | The ship undergoes 'asymmetric' fission, where one candidate is seen as stronger [Sider] |
14754 | If you say Leibniz's Law doesn't apply to 'timebound' properties, you are no longer discussing identity [Sider] |
8361 | What is true used to be possible, but it may no longer be so [Wright,GHv] |
14763 | Counterparts rest on similarity, so there are many such relations in different contexts [Sider] |
5051 | The intellect has potential to think, like a tablet on which nothing has yet been written [Aristotle] |
1732 | Sense organs aren't the end of sensation, or they would know what does the sensing [Aristotle] |
16723 | Perception of sensible objects is virtually never wrong [Aristotle] |
1725 | Why can't we sense the senses? And why do senses need stimuli? [Aristotle] |
1724 | Perception necessitates pleasure and pain, which necessitates appetite [Aristotle] |
17711 | Our minds take on the form of what is being perceived [Aristotle, by Mares] |
1730 | Why do we have many senses, and not just one? [Aristotle] |
1728 | Many objects of sensation are common to all the senses [Aristotle] |
1727 | Some objects of sensation are unique to one sense, where deception is impossible [Aristotle] |
1734 | In moral thought images are essential, to be pursued or avoided [Aristotle] |
1726 | We may think when we wish, but not perceive, because universals are within the mind [Aristotle] |
16647 | Demonstration starts from a definition of essence, so we can derive (or conjecture about) the properties [Aristotle] |
24048 | Demonstrations move from starting-points to deduced conclusions [Aristotle] |
16646 | To understand a triangle summing to two right angles, we need to know the essence of a line [Aristotle] |
1714 | Mind involves movement, perception, incorporeality [Aristotle] |
5507 | Aristotle led to the view that there are several souls, all somewhat physical [Aristotle, by Martin/Barresi] |
24051 | Soul is seen as what moves, or what is least physical, or a combination of elements [Aristotle] |
12086 | Psuché is the form and actuality of a body which potentially has life [Aristotle] |
16754 | The soul is the cause or source of movement, the essence of body, and its end [Aristotle] |
24046 | Understanding is impossible, if it involves the understanding having parts [Aristotle] |
1717 | If the soul is composed of many physical parts, it can't be a true unity [Aristotle] |
24053 | If a soul have parts, what unites them? [Aristotle] |
1721 | What unifies the soul would have to be a super-soul, which seems absurd [Aristotle] |
1735 | In a way the soul is everything which exists, through its perceptions and thoughts [Aristotle] |
24061 | If we divide the mind up according to its capacities, there are a lot of them [Aristotle] |
24062 | Self-moving animals must have desires, and that entails having imagination [Aristotle] |
1710 | Emotion involves the body, thinking uses the mind, imagination hovers between them [Aristotle] |
24056 | The soul (or parts of it) is not separable from the body [Aristotle] |
24039 | All the emotions seem to involve the body, simultaneously with the feeling [Aristotle] |
24050 | If soul is separate from body, why does it die when the body dies? [Aristotle] |
24049 | Thinkers place the soul within the body, but never explain how they are attached [Aristotle] |
1514 | Early thinkers concentrate on the soul but ignore the body, as if it didn't matter what body received the soul [Aristotle] |
1718 | Does the mind think or pity, or does the whole man do these things? [Aristotle] |
2683 | Aristotle has a problem fitting his separate reason into the soul, which is said to be the form of the body [Ackrill on Aristotle] |
13275 | The soul and the body are inseparable, like the imprint in some wax [Aristotle] |
1733 | Thinking is not perceiving, but takes the form of imagination and speculation [Aristotle] |
23307 | Aristotle makes belief a part of reason, but sees desires as separate [Aristotle, by Sorabji] |
24060 | Self-controlled follow understanding, when it is opposed to desires [Aristotle] |
4376 | Pleasure and pain are perceptions of things as good or bad [Aristotle] |
1740 | Nature does nothing in vain [Aristotle] |
8363 | p is a cause and q an effect (not vice versa) if manipulations of p change q [Wright,GHv] |
8364 | We can imagine controlling floods by controlling rain, but not vice versa [Wright,GHv] |
8366 | The very notion of a cause depends on agency and action [Wright,GHv] |
8362 | We give regularities a causal character by subjecting them to experiment [Wright,GHv] |
8360 | We must further analyse conditions for causation, into quantifiers or modal concepts [Wright,GHv] |
8365 | Some laws are causal (Ohm's Law), but others are conceptual principles (conservation of energy) [Wright,GHv] |
14725 | Maybe motion is a dynamical quantity intrinsic to a thing at a particular time [Sider] |
24044 | Movement can be intrinsic (like a ship) or relative (like its sailors) [Aristotle] |
24045 | Movement is spatial, alteration, withering or growth [Aristotle] |
1738 | Practical reason is based on desire, so desire must be the ultimate producer of movement [Aristotle] |
1739 | If all movement is either pushing or pulling, there must be a still point in between where it all starts [Aristotle] |
24064 | If something is pushed, it pushes back [Aristotle] |
14735 | Space is 3D and lacks a direction; time seems connected to causation [Sider] |
14722 | Between presentism and eternalism is the 'growing block' view - the past is real, the future is not [Sider] |
14724 | Presentists must deny truths about multiple times [Sider] |
14756 | For Presentists there must always be a temporal vantage point for any description [Sider] |
14723 | Talk using tenses can be eliminated, by reducing it to indexical connections for an utterance [Sider] |
14734 | The B-series involves eternalism, and the reduction of tense [Sider] |
14736 | The B-theory is adequate, except that it omits to say which time is present [Sider] |
24063 | What is born has growth, a prime, and a withering away [Aristotle] |