Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'De Anima', 'Essays on Intellectual Powers 4: Conception' and 'An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev)'

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90 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 2. Logos
An account is either a definition or a demonstration [Aristotle]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 4. Contraries
From one thing alone we can infer its contrary [Aristotle]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / a. Numbers
We perceive number by the denial of continuity [Aristotle]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 4. Ontological Dependence
What is prior is always potentially present in what is next in order [Aristotle]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 4. Powers as Essence
Sight is the essence of the eye, fitting its definition; the eye itself is just the matter [Aristotle]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance
The substance is the cause of a thing's being [Aristotle]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / a. Hylomorphism
Matter is potential, form is actual [Aristotle]
Scientists explain anger by the matter, dialecticians by the form and the account [Aristotle]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 4. Essence as Definition
Objects have an essential constitution, producing its qualities, which we are too ignorant to define [Reid]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / b. Conceivable but impossible
Impossibilites are easily conceived in mathematics and geometry [Reid, by Molnar]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 3. Innate Knowledge / c. Tabula rasa
The intellect has potential to think, like a tablet on which nothing has yet been written [Aristotle]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 1. Perception
Why can't we sense the senses? And why do senses need stimuli? [Aristotle]
Why do we have many senses, and not just one? [Aristotle]
Our minds take on the form of what is being perceived [Aristotle, by Mares]
Perception of sensible objects is virtually never wrong [Aristotle]
Perception necessitates pleasure and pain, which necessitates appetite [Aristotle]
Sense organs aren't the end of sensation, or they would know what does the sensing [Aristotle]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / c. Primary qualities
Many objects of sensation are common to all the senses [Aristotle]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / d. Secondary qualities
Some objects of sensation are unique to one sense, where deception is impossible [Aristotle]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 3. Representation
In moral thought images are essential, to be pursued or avoided [Aristotle]
12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
We may think when we wish, but not perceive, because universals are within the mind [Aristotle]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 2. Demonstration
Demonstrations move from starting-points to deduced conclusions [Aristotle]
Demonstration starts from a definition of essence, so we can derive (or conjecture about) the properties [Aristotle]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / k. Explanations by essence
To understand a triangle summing to two right angles, we need to know the essence of a line [Aristotle]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / c. Features of mind
Mind involves movement, perception, incorporeality [Aristotle]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 2. Psuche
Aristotle led to the view that there are several souls, all somewhat physical [Aristotle, by Martin/Barresi]
Soul is seen as what moves, or what is least physical, or a combination of elements [Aristotle]
Psuché is the form and actuality of a body which potentially has life [Aristotle]
The soul is the cause or source of movement, the essence of body, and its end [Aristotle]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 5. Unity of Mind
Understanding is impossible, if it involves the understanding having parts [Aristotle]
If the soul is composed of many physical parts, it can't be a true unity [Aristotle]
If a soul have parts, what unites them? [Aristotle]
What unifies the soul would have to be a super-soul, which seems absurd [Aristotle]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 6. Anti-Individualism
In a way the soul is everything which exists, through its perceptions and thoughts [Aristotle]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 1. Faculties
If we divide the mind up according to its capacities, there are a lot of them [Aristotle]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 2. Imagination
Self-moving animals must have desires, and that entails having imagination [Aristotle]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 1. Dualism
Emotion involves the body, thinking uses the mind, imagination hovers between them [Aristotle]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 2. Interactionism
All the emotions seem to involve the body, simultaneously with the feeling [Aristotle]
The soul (or parts of it) is not separable from the body [Aristotle]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 8. Dualism of Mind Critique
If soul is separate from body, why does it die when the body dies? [Aristotle]
Thinkers place the soul within the body, but never explain how they are attached [Aristotle]
Early thinkers concentrate on the soul but ignore the body, as if it didn't matter what body received the soul [Aristotle]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 1. Functionalism
Aristotle has a problem fitting his separate reason into the soul, which is said to be the form of the body [Ackrill on Aristotle]
Does the mind think or pity, or does the whole man do these things? [Aristotle]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
The soul and the body are inseparable, like the imprint in some wax [Aristotle]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 1. Thought
Thinking is not perceiving, but takes the form of imagination and speculation [Aristotle]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / b. Human rationality
Aristotle makes belief a part of reason, but sees desires as separate [Aristotle, by Sorabji]
19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
Reference is by name, or a term-plus-circumstance, or ostensively, or by description [Reid]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / c. Social reference
A word's meaning is the thing conceived, as fixed by linguistic experts [Reid]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / d. Weakness of will
Self-controlled follow understanding, when it is opposed to desires [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / a. Nature of pleasure
Pleasure and pain are perceptions of things as good or bad [Aristotle]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / b. The natural life
Human beings can never really flourish in a long-term state of nature [Wolff,J]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / c. A unified people
Collective rationality is individuals doing their best, assuming others all do the same [Wolff,J]
Should love be the first virtue of a society, as it is of the family? [Wolff,J]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / c. Social contract
For utilitarians, consent to the state is irrelevant, if it produces more happiness [Wolff,J]
Social contract theory has the attracton of including everyone, and being voluntary [Wolff,J]
Maybe voting in elections is a grant of legitimacy to the winners [Wolff,J]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / d. General will
We can see the 'general will' as what is in the general interest [Wolff,J]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 2. Leaders / c. Despotism
How can dictators advance the interests of the people, if they don't consult them about interests? [Wolff,J]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 3. Government / a. Government
'Separation of powers' allows legislative, executive and judicial functions to monitor one another [Wolff,J]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 1. Ideology
Political choice can be by utility, or maximin, or maximax [Wolff,J]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 2. Anarchism
A realistic and less utopian anarchism looks increasingly like liberal democracy [Wolff,J]
It is hard for anarchists to deny that we need experts [Wolff,J]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 4. Social Utilitarianism
Utilitarianism probably implies a free market plus welfare [Wolff,J]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / a. Nature of democracy
A system of democracy which includes both freedom and equality is almost impossible [Wolff,J]
Democracy expresses equal respect (which explains why criminals forfeit the vote) [Wolff,J]
Democracy has been seen as consistent with many types of inequality [Wolff,J]
A true democracy could not tolerate slavery, exploitation or colonialism [Wolff,J]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / b. Consultation
We should decide whether voting is for self-interests, or for the common good [Wolff,J]
Condorcet proved that sensible voting leads to an emphatically right answer [Wolff,J]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / e. Democratic minorities
Occasional defeat is acceptable, but a minority that is continually defeated is a problem [Wolff,J]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 4. Free market
Market prices indicate shortages and gluts, and where the profits are to be made [Wolff,J]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 5. Freedom of lifestyle
Liberty principles can't justify laws against duelling, incest between siblings and euthanasia [Wolff,J]
Either Difference allows unequal liberty, or Liberty makes implementing Difference impossible [Wolff,J]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 1. Grounds of equality
Utilitarians argue for equal distribution because of diminishing utility of repetition [Wolff,J]
Difference Principle: all inequalities should be in favour of the disadvantaged [Wolff,J]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 2. Political equality
Political equality is not much use without social equality [Wolff,J]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 1. Basis of Rights
If natural rights are axiomatic, there is then no way we can defend them [Wolff,J]
Standard rights: life, free speech, assembly, movement, vote, stand (plus shelter, food, health?) [Wolff,J]
If rights are natural, rather than inferred, how do we know which rights we have? [Wolff,J]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 4. Property rights
Utilitarians might say property ownership encourages the best use of the land [Wolff,J]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 1. Basis of justice
Rights and justice are only the last resorts of a society, something to fall back on [Wolff,J]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 2. The Law / d. Legal positivism
Following some laws is not a moral matter; trivial traffic rules, for example [Wolff,J]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 1. Nature
Nature does nothing in vain [Aristotle]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / a. Explaining movement
If all movement is either pushing or pulling, there must be a still point in between where it all starts [Aristotle]
Movement can be intrinsic (like a ship) or relative (like its sailors) [Aristotle]
Movement is spatial, alteration, withering or growth [Aristotle]
Practical reason is based on desire, so desire must be the ultimate producer of movement [Aristotle]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / b. Laws of motion
If something is pushed, it pushes back [Aristotle]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 2. Life
What is born has growth, a prime, and a withering away [Aristotle]