45 ideas
| 14092 | Philosophers are often too fussy about words, dismissing perfectly useful ordinary terms [Rosen] |
| 14100 | Figuring in the definition of a thing doesn't make it a part of that thing [Rosen] |
| 22271 | Aristotle was the first to use schematic letters in logic [Aristotle, by Potter] |
| 11060 | Aristotelian syllogisms are three-part, subject-predicate, existentially committed, with laws of thought [Aristotle, by Hanna] |
| 18909 | Aristotelian sentences are made up by one of four 'formative' connectors [Aristotle, by Engelbretsen] |
| 8080 | Aristotelian identified 256 possible syllogisms, saying that 19 are valid [Aristotle, by Devlin] |
| 13912 | Aristotle replaced Plato's noun-verb form with unions of pairs of terms by one of four 'copulae' [Aristotle, by Engelbretsen/Sayward] |
| 8071 | Aristotle listed nineteen valid syllogisms (though a few of them were wrong) [Aristotle, by Devlin] |
| 13819 | Aristotle's said some Fs are G or some Fs are not G, forgetting that there might be no Fs [Bostock on Aristotle] |
| 9403 | There are three different deductions for actual terms, necessary terms and possible terms [Aristotle] |
| 11148 | Deduction is when we suppose one thing, and another necessarily follows [Aristotle] |
| 18896 | Aristotle places terms at opposite ends, joined by a quantified copula [Aristotle, by Sommers] |
| 3300 | Aristotle's logic is based on the subject/predicate distinction, which leads him to substances and properties [Aristotle, by Benardete,JA] |
| 11149 | Affirming/denying sentences are universal, particular, or indeterminate [Aristotle] |
| 8079 | Aristotelian logic has two quantifiers of the subject ('all' and 'some') [Aristotle, by Devlin] |
| 14096 | Explanations fail to be monotonic [Rosen] |
| 14097 | Things could be true 'in virtue of' others as relations between truths, or between truths and items [Rosen] |
| 14095 | Facts are structures of worldly items, rather like sentences, individuated by their ingredients [Rosen] |
| 14093 | An 'intrinsic' property is one that depends on a thing and its parts, and not on its relations [Rosen] |
| 14641 | A deduction is necessary if the major (but not the minor) premise is also necessary [Aristotle] |
| 14094 | The excellent notion of metaphysical 'necessity' cannot be defined [Rosen] |
| 14101 | Are necessary truths rooted in essences, or also in basic grounding laws? [Rosen] |
| 13047 | It is knowing 'why' that gives scientific understanding, not knowing 'that' [Salmon] |
| 13065 | Understanding is an extremely vague concept [Salmon] |
| 13054 | Correlations can provide predictions, but only causes can give explanations [Salmon] |
| 13067 | For the instrumentalists there are no scientific explanations [Salmon] |
| 13055 | Good induction needs 'total evidence' - the absence at the time of any undermining evidence [Salmon] |
| 13046 | Scientific explanation is not reducing the unfamiliar to the familiar [Salmon] |
| 13058 | Why-questions can seek evidence as well as explanation [Salmon] |
| 13064 | The three basic conceptions of scientific explanation are modal, epistemic, and ontic [Salmon] |
| 13050 | The 'inferential' conception is that all scientific explanations are arguments [Salmon] |
| 13059 | Ontic explanations can be facts, or reports of facts [Salmon] |
| 13049 | We must distinguish true laws because they (unlike accidental generalizations) explain things [Salmon] |
| 13051 | Deductive-nomological explanations will predict, and their predictions will explain [Salmon] |
| 13053 | A law is not enough for explanation - we need information about what makes a difference [Salmon] |
| 13061 | Flagpoles explain shadows, and not vice versa, because of temporal ordering [Salmon] |
| 13045 | Explanation at the quantum level will probably be by entirely new mechanisms [Salmon] |
| 13062 | Does an item have a function the first time it occurs? [Salmon] |
| 13063 | Explanations reveal the mechanisms which produce the facts [Salmon] |
| 13060 | Can events whose probabilities are low be explained? [Salmon] |
| 13056 | Statistical explanation needs relevance, not high probability [Salmon] |
| 13057 | Think of probabilities in terms of propensities rather than frequencies [Salmon] |
| 18911 | Linguistic terms form a hierarchy, with higher terms predicable of increasing numbers of things [Aristotle, by Engelbretsen] |
| 14099 | 'Bachelor' consists in or reduces to 'unmarried' male, but not the other way around [Rosen] |
| 14098 | An acid is just a proton donor [Rosen] |