Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Prior Analytics', 'Word and Object' and 'On 'Physics''

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47 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 4. Metaphysics as Science
6891 Quine's naturalistic and empirical view is based entirely on first-order logic and set theory [Quine, by Mautner]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 6. Metaphysics as Conceptual
6310 Enquiry needs a conceptual scheme, so we should retain the best available [Quine]
4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 1. Aristotelian Logic
22271 Aristotle was the first to use schematic letters in logic [Aristotle, by Potter]
11060 Aristotelian syllogisms are three-part, subject-predicate, existentially committed, with laws of thought [Aristotle, by Hanna]
18909 Aristotelian sentences are made up by one of four 'formative' connectors [Aristotle, by Engelbretsen]
8080 Aristotelian identified 256 possible syllogisms, saying that 19 are valid [Aristotle, by Devlin]
13912 Aristotle replaced Plato's noun-verb form with unions of pairs of terms by one of four 'copulae' [Aristotle, by Engelbretsen/Sayward]
8071 Aristotle listed nineteen valid syllogisms (though a few of them were wrong) [Aristotle, by Devlin]
4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 2. Syllogistic Logic
13819 Aristotle's said some Fs are G or some Fs are not G, forgetting that there might be no Fs [Bostock on Aristotle]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 4. Alethic Modal Logic
9403 There are three different deductions for actual terms, necessary terms and possible terms [Aristotle]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 3. Deductive Consequence |-
11148 Deduction is when we suppose one thing, and another necessarily follows [Aristotle]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
18896 Aristotle places terms at opposite ends, joined by a quantified copula [Aristotle, by Sommers]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 7. Predicates in Logic
3300 Aristotle's logic is based on the subject/predicate distinction, which leads him to substances and properties [Aristotle, by Benardete,JA]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 1. Quantification
11149 Affirming/denying sentences are universal, particular, or indeterminate [Aristotle]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 3. Objectual Quantification
8079 Aristotelian logic has two quantifiers of the subject ('all' and 'some') [Aristotle, by Devlin]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 6. Plural Quantification
12798 Plurals can in principle be paraphrased away altogether [Quine]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / e. Ordinal numbers
17905 Any progression will do nicely for numbers; they can all then be used to measure multiplicity [Quine]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / b. Indispensability of mathematics
9556 Nearly all of mathematics has to quantify over abstract objects [Quine]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 2. Types of Existence
16664 Everything that exists is either a substance or an accident [Albert of Saxony]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 4. Category Realism
16462 The quest for ultimate categories is the quest for a simple clear pattern of notation [Quine]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / a. Dispositions
15723 Either dispositions rest on structures, or we keep saying 'all things being equal' [Quine]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / d. Dispositions as occurrent
15490 Explain unmanifested dispositions as structural similarities to objects which have manifested them [Quine, by Martin,CB]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 5. Class Nominalism
8504 Quine aims to deal with properties by the use of eternal open sentences, or classes [Quine, by Devitt]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
8464 Physical objects in space-time are just events or processes, no matter how disconnected [Quine]
7924 The notion of a physical object is by far the most useful one for science [Quine]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
8482 Mathematicians must be rational but not two-legged, cyclists the opposite. So a mathematical cyclist? [Quine]
12136 Cyclist are not actually essentially two-legged [Brody on Quine]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 6. Successive Things
16703 God could make a successive thing so that previous parts cease to exist [Albert of Saxony]
16699 Successive entities just need parts to succeed one another, without their existence [Albert of Saxony]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 2. Defining Identity
17594 We can paraphrase 'x=y' as a sequence of the form 'if Fx then Fy' [Quine]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 4. De re / De dicto modality
14641 A deduction is necessary if the major (but not the minor) premise is also necessary [Aristotle]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / c. Truth-function conditionals
15725 Normal conditionals have a truth-value gap when the antecedent is false. [Quine]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / e. Supposition conditionals
15722 Conditionals are pointless if the truth value of the antecedent is known [Quine]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 9. Counterfactuals
15719 We feign belief in counterfactual antecedents, and assess how convincing the consequent is [Quine]
15721 Counterfactuals are plausible when dispositions are involved, as they imply structures [Quine]
15720 What stays the same in assessing a counterfactual antecedent depends on context [Quine]
15724 Counterfactuals have no place in a strict account of science [Quine]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory
4630 Two theories can be internally consistent and match all the facts, yet be inconsistent with one another [Quine, by Baggini /Fosl]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 5. Generalisation by mind
18911 Linguistic terms form a hierarchy, with higher terms predicable of increasing numbers of things [Aristotle, by Engelbretsen]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 3. Eliminativism
3131 Quine expresses the instrumental version of eliminativism [Quine, by Rey]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / b. Indeterminate translation
3988 Indeterminacy of translation also implies indeterminacy in interpreting people's mental states [Dennett on Quine]
6311 The firmer the links between sentences and stimuli, the less translations can diverge [Quine]
6312 We can never precisely pin down how to translate the native word 'Gavagai' [Quine]
6313 Stimulus synonymy of 'Gavagai' and 'Rabbit' does not even guarantee they are coextensive [Quine]
6317 Dispositions to speech behaviour, and actual speech, are never enough to fix any one translation [Quine]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / c. Principle of charity
6315 We should be suspicious of a translation which implies that a people have very strange beliefs [Quine]
6314 Weird translations are always possible, but they improve if we impose our own logic on them [Quine]