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All the ideas for 'works', 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism' and 'Mental Files'

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90 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
There is practical wisdom (for action), and theoretical wisdom (for deep understanding) [Aristotle, by Whitcomb]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
Any statement can be held true if we make enough adjustment to the rest of the system [Quine]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 2. Logos
For Aristotle logos is essentially the ability to talk rationally about questions of value [Roochnik on Aristotle]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 4. Aims of Reason
Aristotle is the supreme optimist about the ability of logos to explain nature [Roochnik on Aristotle]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 1. Definitions
Definition rests on synonymy, rather than explaining it [Quine]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 4. Real Definition
Aristotelian definitions aim to give the essential properties of the thing defined [Aristotle, by Quine]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 5. Genus and Differentia
Aristotelian definition involves first stating the genus, then the differentia of the thing [Aristotle, by Urmson]
4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 1. Mereology
Aristotle relativises the notion of wholeness to different measures [Aristotle, by Koslicki]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
For Aristotle, the subject-predicate structure of Greek reflected a substance-accident structure of reality [Aristotle, by O'Grady]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / d. Singular terms
Mental files are the counterparts of singular terms [Recanati]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / f. Names eliminated
Quine's arguments fail because he naively conflates names with descriptions [Fine,K on Quine]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / a. Mathematical empiricism
Quine blurs the difference between knowledge of arithmetic and of physics [Jenkins on Quine]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / e. Ontological commitment problems
Quine is hopeless circular, deriving ontology from what is literal, and 'literal' from good ontology [Yablo on Quine]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
If physical objects are a myth, they are useful for making sense of experience [Quine]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / a. Hylomorphism
The unmoved mover and the soul show Aristotelian form as the ultimate mereological atom [Aristotle, by Koslicki]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / d. Form as unifier
The 'form' is the recipe for building wholes of a particular kind [Aristotle, by Koslicki]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
Aristotelian essence of the object has become the modern essence of meaning [Quine]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
Identity statements are informative if they link separate mental files [Recanati]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
Contrary to some claims, Quine does not deny logical necessity [Quine, by McFetridge]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 11. Denial of Necessity
Quine's attack on the analytic-synthetic distinction undermined necessary truths [Quine, by Shoemaker]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
For Aristotle, knowledge is of causes, and is theoretical, practical or productive [Aristotle, by Code]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 1. Perceptual Realism / b. Direct realism
There is a continuum from acquaintance to description in knowledge, depending on the link [Recanati]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 1. Nature of the A Priori
The notion of a priori truth is absent in Aristotle [Aristotle, by Politis]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 8. A Priori as Analytic
Metaphysical analyticity (and linguistic necessity) are hopeless, but epistemic analyticity is a priori [Boghossian on Quine]
Quine challenges the claim that analytic truths are knowable a priori [Quine, by Kitcher]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 11. Denying the A Priori
Quine's objections to a priori knowledge only work in the domain of science [Horwich on Quine]
Science is empirical, simple and conservative; any belief can hence be abandoned; so no a priori [Quine, by Horwich]
Logic, arithmetic and geometry are revisable and a posteriori; quantum logic could be right [Horwich on Quine]
12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
Aristotle is a rationalist, but reason is slowly acquired through perception and experience [Aristotle, by Frede,M]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 1. Empiricism
Empiricism makes a basic distinction between truths based or not based on facts [Quine]
Our outer beliefs must match experience, and our inner ones must be simple [Quine]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
The second dogma is linking every statement to some determinate observations [Quine, by Yablo]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 2. Intuition
Aristotle wants to fit common intuitions, and therefore uses language as a guide [Aristotle, by Gill,ML]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory
Plato says sciences are unified around Forms; Aristotle says they're unified around substance [Aristotle, by Moravcsik]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 6. Theory Holism
Statements about the external world face the tribunal of sense experience as a corporate body [Quine]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / a. Explanation
Aristotelian explanations are facts, while modern explanations depend on human conceptions [Aristotle, by Politis]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
Aristotle's standard analysis of species and genus involves specifying things in terms of something more general [Aristotle, by Benardete,JA]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / k. Explanations by essence
Aristotle regularly says that essential properties explain other significant properties [Aristotle, by Kung]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / c. Animal rationality
Aristotle and the Stoics denied rationality to animals, while Platonists affirmed it [Aristotle, by Sorabji]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 9. Indexical Thought
Indexicals apply to singular thought, and mental files have essentially indexical features [Recanati]
Indexicality is closely related to singularity, exploiting our direct relations with things [Recanati]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 5. Mental Files
Files can be confused, if two files correctly have a single name, or one file has two names [Recanati]
Encylopedic files have further epistemic links, beyond the basic one [Recanati]
Singular thoughts need a mental file, and an acquaintance relation from file to object [Recanati]
Expected acquaintance can create a thought-vehicle file, but without singular content [Recanati]
An 'indexed' file marks a file which simulates the mental file of some other person [Recanati]
Reference by mental files is Millian, in emphasising acquaintance, rather than satisfaction [Recanati]
The reference of a file is fixed by what it relates to, not the information it contains [Recanati]
A mental file treats all of its contents as concerning one object [Recanati]
There are transient 'demonstrative' files, habitual 'recognitional' files, cumulative 'encyclopedic' files [Recanati]
Files are hierarchical: proto-files, then first-order, then higher-order encyclopedic [Recanati]
A file has a 'nucleus' through its relation to the object, and a 'periphery' of links to other files [Recanati]
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
The content of thought is what is required to understand it (which involves hearers) [Recanati]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 1. Concepts / a. Nature of concepts
Mental files are individual concepts (thought constituents) [Recanati]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
It is troublesome nonsense to split statements into a linguistic and a factual component [Quine]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 8. Synonymy
'Renate' and 'cordate' have identical extensions, but are not synonymous [Quine, by Miller,A]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 10. Denial of Meanings
Once meaning and reference are separated, meaning ceases to seem important [Quine]
19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
There may be two types of reference in language and thought: descriptive and direct [Recanati]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / a. Direct reference
In super-direct reference, the referent serves as its own vehicle of reference [Recanati]
Direct reference is strong Millian (just a tag) or weak Kaplanian (allowing descriptions as well) [Recanati]
19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / a. Sense and reference
Sense determines reference says same sense/same reference; new reference means new sense [Recanati]
We need sense as well as reference, but in a non-descriptive form, and mental files do that [Recanati]
Sense is a mental file (not its contents); similar files for Cicero and Tully are two senses [Recanati]
19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / b. Reference by description
Problems with descriptivism are reference by perception, by communications and by indexicals [Recanati]
Descriptivism says we mentally relate to objects through their properties [Recanati]
Definite descriptions reveal either a predicate (attributive use) or the file it belongs in (referential) [Recanati]
A rigid definite description can be attributive, not referential: 'the actual F, whoever he is….' [Recanati]
Singularity cannot be described, and it needs actual world relations [Recanati]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 5. Fregean Semantics
Fregean modes of presentation can be understood as mental files [Recanati]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 9. Indexical Semantics
If two people think 'I am tired', they think the same thing, and they think different things [Recanati]
Indexicals (like mental files) determine their reference relationally, not by satisfaction [Recanati]
Indexical don't refer; only their tokens do [Recanati]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 10. Two-Dimensional Semantics
In 2-D semantics, reference is determined, then singularity by the truth of a predication [Recanati]
Two-D semantics is said to help descriptivism of reference deal with singular objects [Recanati]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 3. Concrete Propositions
Russellian propositions are better than Fregean thoughts, by being constant through communication [Recanati]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 1. Analytic Propositions
Analytic statements are either logical truths (all reinterpretations) or they depend on synonymy [Quine]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 2. Analytic Truths
The notion of analytic truth is absent in Aristotle [Aristotle, by Politis]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 4. Analytic/Synthetic Critique
Did someone ever actually define 'bachelor' as 'unmarried man'? [Quine]
Quine's attack on analyticity undermined linguistic views of necessity, and analytic views of the a priori [Quine, by Boghossian]
Quine attacks the Fregean idea that we can define analyticity through synonyous substitution [Quine, by Thomasson]
The last two parts of 'Two Dogmas' are much the best [Miller,A on Quine]
Erasing the analytic/synthetic distinction got rid of meanings, and saved philosophy of language [Davidson on Quine]
The analytic needs excessively small units of meaning and empirical confirmation [Quine, by Jenkins]
If we try to define analyticity by synonymy, that leads back to analyticity [Quine]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
Aristotle never actually says that man is a rational animal [Aristotle, by Fogelin]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / a. Aims of education
It is the mark of an educated mind to be able to entertain an idea without accepting it [Aristotle]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / b. Education principles
Aristotle said the educated were superior to the uneducated as the living are to the dead [Aristotle, by Diog. Laertius]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 5. Infinite in Nature
There are potential infinities (never running out), but actual infinity is incoherent [Aristotle, by Friend]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / a. Greek matter
Aristotle's matter can become any other kind of matter [Aristotle, by Wiggins]
29. Religion / A. Polytheistic Religion / 2. Greek Polytheism
The concepts of gods arose from observing the soul, and the cosmos [Aristotle, by Sext.Empiricus]