115 ideas
| 24047 | An account is either a definition or a demonstration [Aristotle] |
| 24052 | From one thing alone we can infer its contrary [Aristotle] |
| 3137 | Varieties of singular terms are used to designate token particulars [Rey] |
| 1729 | We perceive number by the denial of continuity [Aristotle] |
| 3143 | Physics requires the existence of properties, and also the abstract objects of arithmetic [Rey] |
| 24057 | What is prior is always potentially present in what is next in order [Aristotle] |
| 18438 | Every worldly event, without exception, is a redistribution of microphysical states [Quine] |
| 16752 | Sight is the essence of the eye, fitting its definition; the eye itself is just the matter [Aristotle] |
| 24058 | The substance is the cause of a thing's being [Aristotle] |
| 24055 | Matter is potential, form is actual [Aristotle] |
| 24040 | Scientists explain anger by the matter, dialecticians by the form and the account [Aristotle] |
| 3145 | The Indiscernibility of Identicals is a truism; but the Identity of Indiscernibles depends on possible identical worlds [Rey] |
| 5051 | The intellect has potential to think, like a tablet on which nothing has yet been written [Aristotle] |
| 16723 | Perception of sensible objects is virtually never wrong [Aristotle] |
| 1724 | Perception necessitates pleasure and pain, which necessitates appetite [Aristotle] |
| 1730 | Why do we have many senses, and not just one? [Aristotle] |
| 17711 | Our minds take on the form of what is being perceived [Aristotle, by Mares] |
| 1725 | Why can't we sense the senses? And why do senses need stimuli? [Aristotle] |
| 1732 | Sense organs aren't the end of sensation, or they would know what does the sensing [Aristotle] |
| 1728 | Many objects of sensation are common to all the senses [Aristotle] |
| 1727 | Some objects of sensation are unique to one sense, where deception is impossible [Aristotle] |
| 1734 | In moral thought images are essential, to be pursued or avoided [Aristotle] |
| 1726 | We may think when we wish, but not perceive, because universals are within the mind [Aristotle] |
| 3172 | Empiricism says experience is both origin and justification of all knowledge [Rey] |
| 3166 | Animal learning is separate from their behaviour [Rey] |
| 16647 | Demonstration starts from a definition of essence, so we can derive (or conjecture about) the properties [Aristotle] |
| 24048 | Demonstrations move from starting-points to deduced conclusions [Aristotle] |
| 16646 | To understand a triangle summing to two right angles, we need to know the essence of a line [Aristotle] |
| 3232 | Abduction could have true data and a false conclusion, and may include data not originally mentioned [Rey] |
| 3128 | It's not at all clear that explanation needs to stop anywhere [Rey] |
| 1714 | Mind involves movement, perception, incorporeality [Aristotle] |
| 3136 | The three theories are reduction, dualism, eliminativism [Rey] |
| 5507 | Aristotle led to the view that there are several souls, all somewhat physical [Aristotle, by Martin/Barresi] |
| 24051 | Soul is seen as what moves, or what is least physical, or a combination of elements [Aristotle] |
| 12086 | Psuché is the form and actuality of a body which potentially has life [Aristotle] |
| 16754 | The soul is the cause or source of movement, the essence of body, and its end [Aristotle] |
| 24046 | Understanding is impossible, if it involves the understanding having parts [Aristotle] |
| 1717 | If the soul is composed of many physical parts, it can't be a true unity [Aristotle] |
| 24053 | If a soul have parts, what unites them? [Aristotle] |
| 1721 | What unifies the soul would have to be a super-soul, which seems absurd [Aristotle] |
| 1735 | In a way the soul is everything which exists, through its perceptions and thoughts [Aristotle] |
| 3141 | Is consciousness 40Hz oscillations in layers 5 and 6 of the visual cortex? [Rey] |
| 3148 | Dualist privacy is seen as too deep for even telepathy to reach [Rey] |
| 3164 | Intentional explanations are always circular [Rey] |
| 3138 | Arithmetic and unconscious attitudes have no qualia [Rey] |
| 3142 | Why qualia, and why this particular quale? [Rey] |
| 3224 | If qualia have no function, their attachment to thoughts is accidental [Rey] |
| 3227 | Are qualia a type of propositional attitude? [Rey] |
| 3226 | Are qualia irrelevant to explaining the mind? [Rey] |
| 3229 | If colour fits a cone mapping hue, brightness and saturation, rotating the cone could give spectrum inversion [Rey] |
| 24061 | If we divide the mind up according to its capacities, there are a lot of them [Aristotle] |
| 24062 | Self-moving animals must have desires, and that entails having imagination [Aristotle] |
| 3223 | Self-consciousness may just be nested intentionality [Rey] |
| 3162 | Experiments prove that people are often unaware of their motives [Rey] |
| 3163 | Brain damage makes the unreliability of introspection obvious [Rey] |
| 3195 | If reason could be explained in computational terms, there would be no need for the concept of 'free will' [Rey] |
| 3196 | Free will isn't evidence against a theory of thought if there is no evidence for free will [Rey] |
| 1710 | Emotion involves the body, thinking uses the mind, imagination hovers between them [Aristotle] |
| 24039 | All the emotions seem to involve the body, simultaneously with the feeling [Aristotle] |
| 24056 | The soul (or parts of it) is not separable from the body [Aristotle] |
| 24050 | If soul is separate from body, why does it die when the body dies? [Aristotle] |
| 24049 | Thinkers place the soul within the body, but never explain how they are attached [Aristotle] |
| 1514 | Early thinkers concentrate on the soul but ignore the body, as if it didn't matter what body received the soul [Aristotle] |
| 3180 | Maybe behaviourists should define mental states as a group [Rey] |
| 3165 | Behaviourism is eliminative, or reductionist, or methodological [Rey] |
| 3167 | Animals don't just respond to stimuli, they experiment [Rey] |
| 3173 | How are stimuli and responses 'similar'? [Rey] |
| 3179 | Behaviour is too contingent and irrelevant to be the mind [Rey] |
| 2683 | Aristotle has a problem fitting his separate reason into the soul, which is said to be the form of the body [Ackrill on Aristotle] |
| 1718 | Does the mind think or pity, or does the whole man do these things? [Aristotle] |
| 3127 | Dualism and physicalism explain nothing, and don't suggest any research [Rey] |
| 3186 | If a normal person lacked a brain, would you say they had no mind? [Rey] |
| 3188 | Homuncular functionalism (e.g. Freud) could be based on simpler mechanical processes [Rey] |
| 3216 | Is the room functionally the same as a Chinese speaker? [Rey] |
| 3220 | Searle is guilty of the fallacy of division - attributing a property of the whole to a part [Rey] |
| 3206 | One computer program could either play chess or fight a war [Rey] |
| 13275 | The soul and the body are inseparable, like the imprint in some wax [Aristotle] |
| 3140 | If you explain water as H2O, you have reduced water, but not eliminated it [Rey] |
| 3134 | Human behaviour can show law-like regularity, which eliminativism can't explain [Rey] |
| 3200 | Pattern recognition is puzzling for computation, but makes sense for connectionism [Rey] |
| 3201 | Connectionism explains well speed of perception and 'graceful degradation' [Rey] |
| 3202 | Connectionism explains irrationality (such as the Gamblers' Fallacy) quite well [Rey] |
| 3199 | Connectionism assigns numbers to nodes and branches, and plots the outcomes [Rey] |
| 3150 | Can identity explain reason, free will, non-extension, intentionality, subjectivity, experience? [Rey] |
| 3129 | Physicalism offers something called "complexity" instead of mental substance [Rey] |
| 1733 | Thinking is not perceiving, but takes the form of imagination and speculation [Aristotle] |
| 3139 | Some attitudes are information (belief), others motivate (hatred) [Rey] |
| 23307 | Aristotle makes belief a part of reason, but sees desires as separate [Aristotle, by Sorabji] |
| 3171 | Children speak 90% good grammar [Rey] |
| 3174 | Good grammar can't come simply from stimuli [Rey] |
| 3213 | Animals may also use a language of thought [Rey] |
| 3170 | We train children in truth, not in grammar [Rey] |
| 3215 | Images can't replace computation, as they need it [Rey] |
| 3194 | CRTT is good on deduction, but not so hot on induction, abduction and practical reason [Rey] |
| 3147 | Problem-solving clearly involves manipulating images [Rey] |
| 3175 | Animals map things over time as well as over space [Rey] |
| 3207 | Simple externalism is that the meaning just is the object [Rey] |
| 3176 | Anything bears a family resemblance to a game, but obviously not anything counts as one [Rey] |
| 3181 | A one hour gap in time might be indirectly verified, but then almost anything could be [Rey] |
| 3204 | The meaning of "and" may be its use, but not of "animal" [Rey] |
| 3205 | Semantic holism means new evidence for a belief changes the belief, and we can't agree on concepts [Rey] |
| 3209 | Causal theories of reference (by 'dubbing') don't eliminate meanings in the heads of dubbers [Rey] |
| 3210 | If meaning and reference are based on causation, then virtually everything has meaning [Rey] |
| 3149 | Referential Opacity says truth is lost when you substitute one referring term ('mother') for another ('Jocasta') [Rey] |
| 3169 | A simple chaining device can't build sentences containing 'either..or', or 'if..then' [Rey] |
| 24060 | Self-controlled follow understanding, when it is opposed to desires [Aristotle] |
| 4376 | Pleasure and pain are perceptions of things as good or bad [Aristotle] |
| 3221 | Our desires become important when we have desires about desires [Rey] |
| 1740 | Nature does nothing in vain [Aristotle] |
| 1739 | If all movement is either pushing or pulling, there must be a still point in between where it all starts [Aristotle] |
| 24045 | Movement is spatial, alteration, withering or growth [Aristotle] |
| 1738 | Practical reason is based on desire, so desire must be the ultimate producer of movement [Aristotle] |
| 24044 | Movement can be intrinsic (like a ship) or relative (like its sailors) [Aristotle] |
| 24064 | If something is pushed, it pushes back [Aristotle] |
| 24063 | What is born has growth, a prime, and a withering away [Aristotle] |