14 ideas
21901 | 'Difference' refers to that which eludes capture [Deleuze, by May] |
21908 | Ontology can be continual creation, not to know being, but to probe the unknowable [Deleuze] |
21902 | 'Being' is univocal, but its subject matter is actually 'difference' [Deleuze] |
21903 | Ontology does not tell what there is; it is just a strange adventure [Deleuze, by May] |
21904 | Being is a problem to be engaged, not solved, and needs a new mode of thinking [Deleuze, by May] |
2590 | Dispositions need mental terms to define them [Putnam] |
2591 | Total paralysis would mean that there were mental states but no behaviour at all [Putnam] |
2592 | Functional states correlate with AND explain pain behaviour [Putnam] |
2589 | Functionalism is compatible with dualism, as pure mind could perform the functions [Putnam] |
2588 | Is pain a functional state of a complete organism? [Putnam] |
2587 | Temperature is mean molecular kinetic energy, but they are two different concepts [Putnam] |
6376 | Neuroscience does not support multiple realisability, and tends to support identity [Polger on Putnam] |
2330 | If humans and molluscs both feel pain, it can't be a single biological state [Putnam, by Kim] |
20328 | A thing is only seen as art in an 'artworld', which has a theory and a history [Danto] |