11 ideas
| 8967 | Not all predicates can be properties - 'is non-self-exemplifying', for example [Lowe] |
| 8965 | Neither mere matter nor pure form can individuate a sphere, so it must be a combination [Lowe] |
| 8845 | An experience's having propositional content doesn't make it a belief [Pryor] |
| 8842 | The best argument for immediate justification is not the Regress Argument, but considering examples [Pryor] |
| 8843 | Impure coherentists accept that perceptions can justify, unlike pure coherentists [Pryor] |
| 8844 | Coherentism rests on the claim that justifications must be beliefs, with propositional content [Pryor] |
| 8846 | Reasons for beliefs can be cited to others, unlike a raw headache experience [Pryor] |
| 8847 | Beliefs are not chosen, but you can seek ways to influence your belief [Pryor] |
| 22200 | If you eliminate the impossible, the truth will remain, even if it is weird [Conan Doyle] |
| 8968 | If the flagpole causally explains the shadow, the shadow cannot explain the flagpole [Lowe] |
| 8966 | Properties are facets of objects, only discussable separately by an act of abstraction [Lowe] |