Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Sign of Four', 'Questions on Aristotle's Physics' and 'Knowledge First (and reply)'

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16 ideas

9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 4. Quantity of an Object
Without magnitude a thing would retain its parts, but they would have no location [Buridan]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 8. Continuity of Rivers
A thing is (less properly) the same over time if each part is succeeded by another [Buridan]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 7. Knowledge First
We don't acquire evidence and then derive some knowledge, because evidence IS knowledge [Williamson]
Knowledge is prior to believing, just as doing is prior to trying to do [Williamson]
Belief explains justification, and knowledge explains belief, so knowledge explains justification [Williamson]
A neutral state of experience, between error and knowledge, is not basic; the successful state is basic [Williamson]
Internalism about mind is an obsolete view, and knowledge-first epistemology develops externalism [Williamson]
Knowledge-first says your total evidence IS your knowledge [Williamson]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 1. Perceptual Realism / b. Direct realism
Surely I am acquainted with physical objects, not with appearances? [Williamson]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 2. Demonstration
Induction is not demonstration, because not all of the instances can be observed [Buridan]
14. Science / C. Induction / 1. Induction
If you eliminate the impossible, the truth will remain, even if it is weird [Conan Doyle]
14. Science / C. Induction / 2. Aims of Induction
Science is based on induction, for general truths about fire, rhubarb and magnets [Buridan]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 2. Semantics
How does inferentialism distinguish the patterns of inference that are essential to meaning? [Williamson]
Internalist inferentialism has trouble explaining how meaning and reference relate [Williamson]
Inferentialist semantics relies on internal inference relations, not on external references [Williamson]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 7. Extensional Semantics
Truth-conditional referential semantics is externalist, referring to worldly items [Williamson]