14 ideas
| 13331 | Part and whole contribute asymmetrically to one another, so must differ [Fine,K] |
| 6402 | In 1927, Russell analysed force and matter in terms of events [Russell, by Grayling] |
| 14732 | A perceived physical object is events grouped around a centre [Russell] |
| 13332 | Hierarchical set membership models objects better than the subset or aggregate relations do [Fine,K] |
| 14733 | An object produces the same percepts with or without a substance, so that is irrelevant to science [Russell] |
| 13333 | The matter is a relatively unstructured version of the object, like a set without membership structure [Fine,K] |
| 13326 | A 'temporary' part is a part at one time, but may not be at another, like a carburetor [Fine,K] |
| 13327 | A 'timeless' part just is a part, not a part at some time; some atoms are timeless parts of a water molecule [Fine,K] |
| 13329 | An 'aggregative' sum is spread in time, and exists whenever a component exists [Fine,K] |
| 13330 | An 'compound' sum is not spread in time, and only exists when all the components exists [Fine,K] |
| 13328 | Two sorts of whole have 'rigid embodiment' (timeless parts) or 'variable embodiment' (temporary parts) [Fine,K] |
| 6418 | Russell rejected phenomenalism because it couldn't account for causal relations [Russell, by Grayling] |
| 22200 | If you eliminate the impossible, the truth will remain, even if it is weird [Conan Doyle] |
| 21706 | At first matter is basic and known by sense-data; later Russell says matter is constructed [Russell, by Linsky,B] |