18 ideas
10301 | The axiom of choice is controversial, but it could be replaced [Shapiro] |
10588 | First-order logic is Complete, and Compact, with the Löwenheim-Skolem Theorems [Shapiro] |
10298 | Some say that second-order logic is mathematics, not logic [Shapiro] |
10299 | If the aim of logic is to codify inferences, second-order logic is useless [Shapiro] |
10300 | Logical consequence can be defined in terms of the logical terminology [Shapiro] |
12394 | If the result is bad, we change the rule; if we like the rule, we reject the result [Goodman] |
10290 | Second-order variables also range over properties, sets, relations or functions [Shapiro] |
10297 | The Löwenheim-Skolem theorem seems to be a defect of first-order logic [Shapiro] |
10590 | Up Löwenheim-Skolem: if natural numbers satisfy wffs, then an infinite domain satisfies them [Shapiro] |
10292 | Downward Löwenheim-Skolem: if there's an infinite model, there is a countable model [Shapiro] |
10296 | The Löwenheim-Skolem Theorems fail for second-order languages with standard semantics [Shapiro] |
10294 | Second-order logic has the expressive power for mathematics, but an unworkable model theory [Shapiro] |
10591 | Logicians use 'property' and 'set' interchangeably, with little hanging on it [Shapiro] |
14292 | Dispositions seem more ethereal than behaviour; a non-occult account of them would be nice [Goodman] |
22200 | If you eliminate the impossible, the truth will remain, even if it is weird [Conan Doyle] |
18749 | Goodman argued that the confirmation relation can never be formalised [Goodman, by Horsten/Pettigrew] |
17646 | Goodman showed that every sound inductive argument has an unsound one of the same form [Goodman, by Putnam] |
4794 | We don't use laws to make predictions, we call things laws if we make predictions with them [Goodman] |