52 ideas
| 125 | Is a gifted philosopher unmanly if he avoids the strife of the communal world? [Plato] |
| 1654 | In "Gorgias" Socrates is confident that his 'elenchus' will decide moral truth [Vlastos on Plato] |
| 4321 | We should test one another, by asking and answering questions [Plato] |
| 22355 | In the realist view, the real external world explains how it (and perceptions of it) are possible [Williams,B] |
| 4244 | It is very confused to deduce a nonrelativist morality of universal toleration from relativism [Williams,B] |
| 4243 | Our ability to react to an alien culture shows that ethical thought extends beyond cultural boundaries [Williams,B] |
| 22200 | If you eliminate the impossible, the truth will remain, even if it is weird [Conan Doyle] |
| 114 | Rhetoric can produce conviction, but not educate people about right and wrong [Plato] |
| 116 | Rhetoric is irrational about its means and its ends [Plato] |
| 135 | All activity aims at the good [Plato] |
| 4114 | Philosophers try to produce ethical theories because they falsely assume that ethics can be simple [Williams,B] |
| 4128 | Intuitionism has been demolished by critics, and no longer looks interesting [Williams,B] |
| 4132 | The category of person is a weak basis for ethics, because it is not fixed but comes in degrees [Williams,B] |
| 122 | Moral rules are made by the weak members of humanity [Plato] |
| 4134 | The weakness of prescriptivism is shown by "I simply don't like staying at good hotels" [Williams,B] |
| 4135 | Some ethical ideas, such as 'treachery' and 'promise', seem to express a union of facts and values [Williams,B] |
| 139 | A good person is bound to act well, and this brings happiness [Plato] |
| 128 | Is it natural to simply indulge our selfish desires? [Plato] |
| 4322 | In slaking our thirst the goodness of the action and the pleasure are clearly separate [Plato] |
| 136 | Good should be the aim of pleasant activity, not the other way round [Plato] |
| 4120 | It is an error of consequentialism to think we just aim at certain states of affairs; we also want to act [Williams,B] |
| 134 | Good and bad people seem to experience equal amounts of pleasure and pain [Plato] |
| 132 | If happiness is the satisfaction of desires, then a life of scratching itches should be happiness [Plato] |
| 4319 | In a fool's mind desire is like a leaky jar, insatiable in its desires, and order and contentment are better [Plato] |
| 130 | Is the happiest state one of sensual, self-indulgent freedom? [Plato] |
| 4252 | Promise keeping increases reliability, by making deliberation focus on something which would be overlooked [Williams,B] |
| 4116 | A weakness of contractual theories is the position of a person of superior ability and power [Williams,B] |
| 4112 | A crucial feature of moral thought is second-order desire - the desire to have certain desires [Williams,B] |
| 120 | Should we avoid evil because it will bring us bad consequences? [Plato] |
| 118 | I would rather be a victim of crime than a criminal [Plato] |
| 131 | If absence of desire is happiness, then nothing is happier than a stone or a corpse [Plato] |
| 140 | Self-indulgent desire makes friendship impossible, because it makes a person incapable of co-operation [Plato] |
| 119 | A criminal is worse off if he avoids punishment [Plato] |
| 129 | Do most people praise self-discipline and justice because they are too timid to gain their own pleasure? [Plato] |
| 4320 | The popular view is that health is first, good looks second, and honest wealth third [Plato] |
| 4113 | 'Deon' in Greek means what one must do; there was no word meaning 'duty' [Williams,B] |
| 4250 | The concept of a 'duty to myself' is fraudulent [Williams,B] |
| 4110 | Obligation and duty look backwards (because of a promise or job), although the acts are in the future [Williams,B] |
| 4249 | "Ought implies can" is a famous formula in connection with moral obligation [Williams,B] |
| 4248 | Not all moral deliberations lead to obligations; some merely reveal what 'may' be done [Williams,B] |
| 4121 | Why should I think of myself as both the legislator and the citizen who follows the laws? [Williams,B] |
| 4122 | If the self becomes completely impartial, it no longer has enough identity to worry about its interests [Williams,B] |
| 4124 | Utilitarian benevolence involves no particular attachments, and is immune to the inverse square law [Williams,B] |
| 4245 | Ethical conviction must be to some extent passive, and can't just depend on the will and decisions [Williams,B] |
| 4246 | Taking responsibility won't cure ethical uncertainty by; we are uncertain what to decide [Williams,B] |
| 137 | As with other things, a good state is organised and orderly [Plato] |
| 141 | A good citizen won't be passive, but will redirect the needs of the state [Plato] |
| 123 | Do most people like equality because they are second-rate? [Plato] |
| 124 | Does nature imply that it is right for better people to have greater benefits? [Plato] |
| 4247 | It is a mark of our having ethical values that we aim to reproduce them in our children [Williams,B] |
| 4131 | Most women see an early miscarriage and a late stillbirth as being very different in character [Williams,B] |
| 4133 | Speciesism isn't like racism, because the former implies a viewpoint which belongs to no one [Williams,B] |