32 ideas
19275 | You cannot understand what exists without understanding possibility and necessity [Hale] |
19291 | A canonical defintion specifies the type of thing, and what distinguish this specimen [Hale] |
16985 | Possible worlds allowed the application of set-theoretic models to modal logic [Kripke] |
19297 | The two Barcan principles are easily proved in fairly basic modal logic [Hale] |
19301 | With a negative free logic, we can dispense with the Barcan formulae [Hale] |
19296 | If second-order variables range over sets, those are just objects; properties and relations aren't sets [Hale] |
19289 | Maybe conventionalism applies to meaning, but not to the truth of propositions expressed [Hale] |
16982 | A man has two names if the historical chains are different - even if they are the same! [Kripke] |
19298 | Unlike axiom proofs, natural deduction proofs needn't focus on logical truths and theorems [Hale] |
19295 | Add Hume's principle to logic, to get numbers; arithmetic truths rest on the nature of the numbers [Hale] |
19281 | Interesting supervenience must characterise the base quite differently from what supervenes on it [Hale] |
19278 | There is no gap between a fact that p, and it is true that p; so we only have the truth-condtions for p [Hale] |
19302 | If a chair could be made of slightly different material, that could lead to big changes [Hale] |
16981 | With the necessity of self-identity plus Leibniz's Law, identity has to be an 'internal' relation [Kripke] |
4942 | The indiscernibility of identicals is as self-evident as the law of contradiction [Kripke] |
19290 | Absolute necessities are necessarily necessary [Hale] |
19286 | 'Absolute necessity' is when there is no restriction on the things which necessitate p [Hale] |
19288 | Logical and metaphysical necessities differ in their vocabulary, and their underlying entities [Hale] |
19285 | Logical necessity is something which is true, no matter what else is the case [Hale] |
19287 | Maybe each type of logic has its own necessity, gradually becoming broader [Hale] |
16984 | I don't think possible worlds reductively reveal the natures of modal operators etc. [Kripke] |
19282 | It seems that we cannot show that modal facts depend on non-modal facts [Hale] |
19276 | The big challenge for essentialist views of modality is things having necessary existence [Hale] |
19293 | Essentialism doesn't explain necessity reductively; it explains all necessities in terms of a few basic natures [Hale] |
19294 | If necessity derives from essences, how do we explain the necessary existence of essences? [Hale] |
9385 | The very act of designating of an object with properties gives knowledge of a contingent truth [Kripke] |
4943 | Instead of talking about possible worlds, we can always say "It is possible that.." [Kripke] |
19279 | What are these worlds, that being true in all of them makes something necessary? [Hale] |
19299 | Possible worlds make every proposition true or false, which endorses classical logic [Hale] |
16983 | Probability with dice uses possible worlds, abstractions which fictionally simplify things [Kripke] |
22200 | If you eliminate the impossible, the truth will remain, even if it is weird [Conan Doyle] |
19300 | The molecules may explain the water, but they are not what 'water' means [Hale] |