Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Sign of Four', 'Naming and Necessity preface' and 'The Raft and the Pyramid'

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15 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 6. Coherence
8797 The negation of all my beliefs about my current headache would be fully coherent [Sosa]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 1. Modal Logic
16985 Possible worlds allowed the application of set-theoretic models to modal logic [Kripke]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
16982 A man has two names if the historical chains are different - even if they are the same! [Kripke]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
16981 With the necessity of self-identity plus Leibniz's Law, identity has to be an 'internal' relation [Kripke]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 8. Leibniz's Law
4942 The indiscernibility of identicals is as self-evident as the law of contradiction [Kripke]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
16984 I don't think possible worlds reductively reveal the natures of modal operators etc. [Kripke]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 2. A Priori Contingent
9385 The very act of designating of an object with properties gives knowledge of a contingent truth [Kripke]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
4943 Instead of talking about possible worlds, we can always say "It is possible that.." [Kripke]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
16983 Probability with dice uses possible worlds, abstractions which fictionally simplify things [Kripke]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 1. Common Sense
8794 There are very few really obvious truths, and not much can be proved from them [Sosa]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / e. Pro-foundations
8796 A single belief can trail two regresses, one terminating and one not [Sosa]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / f. Foundationalism critique
8799 If mental states are not propositional, they are logically dumb, and cannot be foundations [Sosa]
8795 Mental states cannot be foundational if they are not immune to error [Sosa]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 2. Causal Justification
8798 Vision causes and justifies beliefs; but to some extent the cause is the justification [Sosa]
14. Science / C. Induction / 1. Induction
22200 If you eliminate the impossible, the truth will remain, even if it is weird [Conan Doyle]