15 ideas
| 17892 | For clear questions posed by reason, reason can also find clear answers [Gödel] |
| 16985 | Possible worlds allowed the application of set-theoretic models to modal logic [Kripke] |
| 9188 | Gödel proved that first-order logic is complete, and second-order logic incomplete [Gödel, by Dummett] |
| 16982 | A man has two names if the historical chains are different - even if they are the same! [Kripke] |
| 10620 | Originally truth was viewed with total suspicion, and only demonstrability was accepted [Gödel] |
| 17883 | Gödel's Theorems did not refute the claim that all good mathematical questions have answers [Gödel, by Koellner] |
| 17885 | Gödel eventually hoped for a generalised completeness theorem leaving nothing undecidable [Gödel, by Koellner] |
| 10614 | The real reason for Incompleteness in arithmetic is inability to define truth in a language [Gödel] |
| 16981 | With the necessity of self-identity plus Leibniz's Law, identity has to be an 'internal' relation [Kripke] |
| 4942 | The indiscernibility of identicals is as self-evident as the law of contradiction [Kripke] |
| 16984 | I don't think possible worlds reductively reveal the natures of modal operators etc. [Kripke] |
| 9385 | The very act of designating of an object with properties gives knowledge of a contingent truth [Kripke] |
| 4943 | Instead of talking about possible worlds, we can always say "It is possible that.." [Kripke] |
| 16983 | Probability with dice uses possible worlds, abstractions which fictionally simplify things [Kripke] |
| 22200 | If you eliminate the impossible, the truth will remain, even if it is weird [Conan Doyle] |