Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Changes in Events and Changes in Things', 'Beyond Good and Evil' and 'In a Critical Condition'

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79 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 1. Philosophy
Great philosophies are confessions by the author, growing out of moral intentions [Nietzsche]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 2. Possibility of Metaphysics
Metaphysics divided the old unified Greek world into two [Nietzsche, by Critchley]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 4. Conceptual Analysis
It seems likely that analysis of concepts is impossible, but justification can survive without it [Fodor]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 7. Limitations of Analysis
Despite all the efforts of philosophers, nothing can ever be reduced to anything [Fodor]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 8. Naturalising Reason
Turing invented the idea of mechanical rationality (just based on syntax) [Fodor]
2. Reason / E. Argument / 2. Transcendental Argument
Transcendental arguments move from knowing Q to knowing P because it depends on Q [Fodor]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 3. Value of Truth
Why do we want truth, rather than falsehood or ignorance? The value of truth is a problem [Nietzsche]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / c. Becoming
Nietzsche resists nihilism through new values, for a world of becoming, without worship [Nietzsche, by Critchley]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / b. Types of fact
That Queen Anne is dead is a 'general fact', not a fact about Queen Anne [Prior,AN]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 7. Emergent Properties
The world is full of messy small things producing stable large-scale properties (e.g. mountains) [Fodor]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / b. Partaking
Don't define something by a good instance of it; a good example is a special case of the ordinary example [Fodor]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / e. Belief holism
How do you count beliefs? [Fodor]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / c. Empirical idealism
Berkeley seems to have mistakenly thought that chairs are the same as after-images [Fodor]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 5. Interpretation
We see an approximation of a tree, not the full detail [Nietzsche]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 6. Inference in Perception
Maybe explaining the mechanics of perception will explain the concepts involved [Fodor]
12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
Rationalism can be based on an evolved computational brain with innate structure [Fodor]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 2. Associationism
According to empiricists abstraction is the fundamental mental process [Fodor]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
Rationalists say there is more to a concept than the experience that prompts it [Fodor]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 2. Pragmatic justification
We shouldn't object to a false judgement, if it enhances and preserves life [Nietzsche]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 4. Cultural relativism
Morality becomes a problem when we compare many moralities [Nietzsche]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / b. Purpose of mind
The function of a mind is obvious [Fodor]
Empirical approaches see mind connections as mirrors/maps of reality [Fodor]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / a. Nature of intentionality
Do intentional states explain our behaviour? [Fodor]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 10. Conatus/Striving
The ranking of a person's innermost drives reveals their true nature [Nietzsche]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 6. Self as Higher Awareness
If I have a set of mental modules, someone had better be in charge of them! [Fodor]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 5. Against Free Will
A thought comes when 'it' wants, not when 'I' want [Nietzsche]
Wanting 'freedom of will' is wanting to pull oneself into existence out of the swamp of nothingness by one's own hair [Nietzsche]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 1. Functionalism
Functionalists see pains as properties involving relations and causation [Fodor]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 3. Property Dualism
Why bother with neurons? You don't explain bird flight by examining feathers [Fodor]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
Type physicalism is a stronger claim than token physicalism [Fodor]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 4. Connectionism
Modern connectionism is just Hume's theory of the 'association' of 'ideas' [Fodor]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 1. Thought
The goal of thought is to understand the world, not instantly sort it into conceptual categories [Fodor]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 1. Psychology
It is psychology which reveals the basic problems [Nietzsche]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 3. Modularity of Mind
Rationality rises above modules [Fodor]
Modules make the world manageable [Fodor]
Babies talk in consistent patterns [Fodor]
Modules analyse stimuli, they don't tell you what to do [Fodor]
Blindness doesn't destroy spatial concepts [Fodor]
Something must take an overview of the modules [Fodor]
Modules have in-built specialist information [Fodor]
Modules have encapsulation, inaccessibility, private concepts, innateness [Fodor]
Obvious modules are language and commonsense explanation [Fodor]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 4. Language of Thought
Mentalese doesn't require a theory of meaning [Fodor]
Language is ambiguous, but thought isn't [Fodor]
Mentalese may also incorporate some natural language [Fodor]
18. Thought / C. Content / 9. Conceptual Role Semantics
Content can't be causal role, because causal role is decided by content [Fodor]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / c. Nativist concepts
Experience can't explain itself; the concepts needed must originate outside experience [Fodor]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / b. Concepts as abilities
Are concepts best seen as capacities? [Fodor]
For Pragmatists having a concept means being able to do something [Fodor]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 3. Meaning as Speaker's Intention
It seems unlikely that meaning can be reduced to communicative intentions, or any mental states [Fodor]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / b. Language holism
If to understand "fish" you must know facts about them, where does that end? [Fodor]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 3. Analytic and Synthetic
Analysis is impossible without the analytic/synthetic distinction [Fodor]
19. Language / F. Communication / 4. Private Language
The theory of the content of thought as 'Mentalese' explains why the Private Language Argument doesn't work [Fodor]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / a. Idealistic ethics
The most boring and dangerous of all errors is Plato's invention of pure spirit and goodness [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / d. Biological ethics
Nietzsche felt that Plato's views downgraded the human body and its brevity of life [Nietzsche, by Roochnik]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / f. Übermensch
Noble people see themselves as the determiners of values [Nietzsche]
Nietzsche's judgement of actions by psychology instead of outcome was poisonous [Foot on Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / j. Ethics by convention
That which is done out of love always takes place beyond good and evil [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / k. Ethics from nature
Nature is totally indifferent, so you should try to be different from it, not live by it [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / c. Right and good
Morality originally judged people, and actions only later on [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
In the earliest phase of human history only consequences mattered [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 1. Ethical Egoism
The noble soul has reverence for itself [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / c. Particularism
Moralities extravagantly address themselves to 'all', by falsely generalising [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / d. Virtue theory critique
Virtue has been greatly harmed by the boringness of its advocates [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
The four virtues are courage, insight, sympathy, solitude [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / f. Compassion
In ancient Rome pity was considered neither good nor bad [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 4. Categorical Imperative
The idea of the categorical imperative is just that we should all be very obedient [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 3. Motivation for Altruism
The morality of slaves is the morality of utility [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 1. Existentialism
The greatest possibilities in man are still unexhausted [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 3. Angst
The thought of suicide is a great reassurance on bad nights [Nietzsche]
The freedom of the subject means the collapse of moral certainty [Nietzsche, by Critchley]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 6. Authentic Self
Man is the animal whose nature has not yet been fixed [Nietzsche]
Nietzsche thinks the human condition is to overcome and remake itself [Nietzsche, by Ansell Pearson]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 8. Eternal Recurrence
The great person engages wholly with life, and is happy to endlessly relive the life they created [Nietzsche]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 2. Leaders / d. Elites
Only aristocratic societies can elevate the human species [Nietzsche]
A healthy aristocracy has no qualms about using multitudes of men as instruments [Nietzsche]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / f. Against democracy
Democracy diminishes mankind, making them mediocre and lowering their value [Nietzsche]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / e. Tensed (A) series
'Thank goodness that's over' is not like 'thank goodness that happened on Friday' [Prior,AN]
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 4. Christianity / a. Christianity
Christianity is Platonism for the people [Nietzsche]