Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Changes in Events and Changes in Things', 'Explanation and Reference' and 'Truth'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

24 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 3. Analysis of Preconditions
4739 In "if and only if" (iff), "if" expresses the sufficient condition, and "only if" the necessary condition [Engel]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 5. Truth Bearers
4737 Are truth-bearers propositions, or ideas/beliefs, or sentences/utterances? [Engel]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 2. Correspondence to Facts
4750 The redundancy theory gets rid of facts, for 'it is a fact that p' just means 'p' [Engel]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique
4744 We can't explain the corresponding structure of the world except by referring to our thoughts [Engel]
3. Truth / D. Coherence Truth / 1. Coherence Truth
4738 The coherence theory says truth is an internal relationship between groups of truth-bearers [Engel]
3. Truth / D. Coherence Truth / 2. Coherence Truth Critique
4745 Any coherent set of beliefs can be made more coherent by adding some false beliefs [Engel]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
4753 Deflationism seems to block philosophers' main occupation, asking metatheoretical questions [Engel]
4755 Deflationism cannot explain why we hold beliefs for reasons [Engel]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 3. Minimalist Truth
4751 Maybe there is no more to be said about 'true' than there is about the function of 'and' in logic [Engel]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 1. Bivalence
4752 Deflationism must reduce bivalence ('p is true or false') to excluded middle ('p or not-p') [Engel]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
17505 Using proper names properly doesn't involve necessary and sufficient conditions [Putnam]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / b. Types of fact
15201 That Queen Anne is dead is a 'general fact', not a fact about Queen Anne [Prior,AN]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
11908 Putnam bases essences on 'same kind', but same kinds may not share properties [Mackie,P on Putnam]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / a. Beliefs
4762 The Humean theory of motivation is that beliefs may be motivators as well as desires [Engel]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / c. Aim of beliefs
4754 Our beliefs are meant to fit the world (i.e. be true), where we want the world to fit our desires [Engel]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / d. Cause of beliefs
4763 'Evidentialists' say, and 'voluntarists' deny, that we only believe on the basis of evidence [Engel]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 3. Pragmatism
4746 Pragmatism is better understood as a theory of belief than as a theory of truth [Engel]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 5. Controlling Beliefs
4764 We cannot directly control our beliefs, but we can control the causes of our involuntary beliefs [Engel]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 2. Aim of Science
17508 Science aims at truth, not at 'simplicity' [Putnam]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 1. Functionalism
4759 Mental states as functions are second-order properties, realised by first-order physical properties [Engel]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
17506 I now think reference by the tests of experts is a special case of being causally connected [Putnam]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 5. Reference to Natural Kinds
17507 Natural kind stereotypes are 'strong' (obvious, like tiger) or 'weak' (obscure, like molybdenum) [Putnam]
11904 Express natural kinds as a posteriori predicate connections, not as singular terms [Putnam, by Mackie,P]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / e. Tensed (A) series
22899 'Thank goodness that's over' is not like 'thank goodness that happened on Friday' [Prior,AN]