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All the ideas for 'Changes in Events and Changes in Things', 'What Does It Take to Refer?' and 'Essential vs Accidental Properties'

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29 ideas

4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 6. Free Logic
10455 Free logic at least allows empty names, but struggles to express non-existence [Bach]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 1. Ontology of Logic
10454 In first-order we can't just assert existence, and it is very hard to deny something's existence [Bach]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 3. Constants in Logic
10453 In logic constants play the role of proper names [Bach]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive
10452 Proper names can be non-referential - even predicate as well as attributive uses [Bach]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
10456 Millian names struggle with existence, empty names, identities and attitude ascription [Bach]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / a. Descriptions
10440 An object can be described without being referred to [Bach]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / b. Definite descriptions
10444 Definite descriptions can be used to refer, but are not semantically referential [Bach]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / b. Types of fact
15201 That Queen Anne is dead is a 'general fact', not a fact about Queen Anne [Prior,AN]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / a. Hylomorphism
10938 The extremes of essentialism are that all properties are essential, or only very trivial ones [Rami]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
10940 An 'individual essence' is possessed uniquely by a particular object [Rami]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
10939 'Sortal essentialism' says being a particular kind is what is essential [Rami]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / b. Essence not necessities
10934 Unlosable properties are not the same as essential properties [Rami]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
10933 Physical possibility is part of metaphysical possibility which is part of logical possibility [Rami]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 2. Epistemic possibility
10932 If it is possible 'for all I know' then it is 'epistemically possible' [Rami]
19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
10446 Fictional reference is different inside and outside the fiction [Bach]
10447 We can refer to fictional entities if they are abstract objects [Bach]
10443 You 'allude to', not 'refer to', an individual if you keep their identity vague [Bach]
19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / b. Reference by description
10439 What refers: indefinite or definite or demonstrative descriptions, names, indexicals, demonstratives? [Bach]
10441 If we can refer to things which change, we can't be obliged to single out their properties [Bach]
10442 We can think of an individual without have a uniquely characterizing description [Bach]
10445 It can't be real reference if it could refer to some other thing that satisfies the description [Bach]
10457 Since most expressions can be used non-referentially, none of them are inherently referential [Bach]
10463 Just alluding to or describing an object is not the same as referring to it [Bach]
19. Language / B. Reference / 5. Speaker's Reference
10459 Context does not create reference; it is just something speakers can exploit [Bach]
10460 'That duck' may not refer to the most obvious one in the group [Bach]
10461 What a pronoun like 'he' refers back to is usually a matter of speaker's intentions [Bach]
10462 Information comes from knowing who is speaking, not just from interpretation of the utterance [Bach]
19. Language / F. Communication / 5. Pragmatics / a. Contextual meaning
10458 People slide from contextual variability all the way to contextual determination [Bach]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / e. Tensed (A) series
22899 'Thank goodness that's over' is not like 'thank goodness that happened on Friday' [Prior,AN]