Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Changes in Events and Changes in Things', 'Introduction to Mathematical Logic' and 'Mere Possibilities'

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48 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
16440 I don't think Lewis's cost-benefit reflective equilibrium approach offers enough guidance [Stalnaker]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 1. Propositional Logic
17749 Post proved the consistency of propositional logic in 1921 [Walicki]
17765 Propositional language can only relate statements as the same or as different [Walicki]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 3. Truth Tables
17764 Boolean connectives are interpreted as functions on the set {1,0} [Walicki]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / a. Systems of modal logic
16468 Non-S5 can talk of contingent or necessary necessities [Stalnaker]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / b. Empty (Null) Set
17752 The empty set is useful for defining sets by properties, when the members are not yet known [Walicki]
17753 The empty set avoids having to take special precautions in case members vanish [Walicki]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / b. Axiom of Extensionality I
16449 In modal set theory, sets only exist in a possible world if that world contains all of its members [Stalnaker]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 6. Ordering in Sets
17759 Ordinals play the central role in set theory, providing the model of well-ordering [Walicki]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
17741 To determine the patterns in logic, one must identify its 'building blocks' [Walicki]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
16464 We regiment to get semantic structure, for evaluating arguments, and understanding complexities [Stalnaker]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / e. or
16465 In 'S was F or some other than S was F', the disjuncts need S, but the whole disjunction doesn't [Stalnaker]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 1. Logical Models
17747 A 'model' of a theory specifies interpreting a language in a domain to make all theorems true [Walicki]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 3. Löwenheim-Skolem Theorems
17748 The L-S Theorem says no theory (even of reals) says more than a natural number theory [Walicki]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 1. Axiomatisation
17763 Axiomatic systems are purely syntactic, and do not presuppose any interpretation [Walicki]
17761 A compact axiomatisation makes it possible to understand a field as a whole [Walicki]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / e. Ordinal numbers
17757 Members of ordinals are ordinals, and also subsets of ordinals [Walicki]
17758 Ordinals are transitive sets of transitive sets; or transitive sets totally ordered by inclusion [Walicki]
17755 Ordinals are the empty set, union with the singleton, and any arbitrary union of ordinals [Walicki]
17756 The union of finite ordinals is the first 'limit ordinal'; 2ω is the second... [Walicki]
17760 Two infinite ordinals can represent a single infinite cardinal [Walicki]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 3. Axioms for Geometry
17762 In non-Euclidean geometry, all Euclidean theorems are valid that avoid the fifth postulate [Walicki]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / f. Mathematical induction
17754 Inductive proof depends on the choice of the ordering [Walicki]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 1. Nature of Existence
16439 A nominalist view says existence is having spatio-temporal location [Stalnaker]
16434 Some say what exists must do so, and nothing else could possible exist [Stalnaker]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / b. Types of fact
15201 That Queen Anne is dead is a 'general fact', not a fact about Queen Anne [Prior,AN]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
16443 Properties are modal, involving possible situations where they are exemplified [Stalnaker]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
16471 I accept a hierarchy of properties of properties of properties [Stalnaker]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / a. Dispositions
16452 Dispositions have modal properties, of which properties things would have counterfactually [Stalnaker]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties
16467 'Socrates is essentially human' seems to say nothing could be Socrates if it was not human [Stalnaker]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
16453 The bundle theory makes the identity of indiscernibles a necessity, since the thing is the properties [Stalnaker]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 2. Nature of Necessity
17742 Scotus based modality on semantic consistency, instead of on what the future could allow [Walicki]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
16466 Strong necessity is always true; weak necessity is cannot be false [Stalnaker]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 2. Necessity as Primitive
16438 Necessity and possibility are fundamental, and there can be no reductive analysis of them [Stalnaker]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 5. Modality from Actuality
16436 Modal concepts are central to the actual world, and shouldn't need extravagant metaphysics [Stalnaker]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / d. Possible worlds actualism
16433 Given actualism, how can there be possible individuals, other than the actual ones? [Stalnaker]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
16437 Possible worlds are properties [Stalnaker]
16444 Possible worlds don't reduce modality, they regiment it to reveal its structure [Stalnaker]
16445 I think of worlds as cells (rather than points) in logical space [Stalnaker]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
16454 Modal properties depend on the choice of a counterpart, which is unconstrained by metaphysics [Stalnaker]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / d. Haecceitism
16450 Anti-haecceitism says there is no more to an individual than meeting some qualitative conditions [Stalnaker]
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
16474 How can we know what we are thinking, if content depends on something we don't know? [Stalnaker]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 2. Semantics
16461 We still lack an agreed semantics for quantifiers in natural language [Stalnaker]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 8. Possible Worlds Semantics
16448 Possible world semantics may not reduce modality, but it can explain it [Stalnaker]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
16442 I take propositions to be truth conditions [Stalnaker]
16447 A theory of propositions at least needs primitive properties of consistency and of truth [Stalnaker]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 3. Concrete Propositions
16446 Propositions presumably don't exist if the things they refer to don't exist [Stalnaker]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / e. Tensed (A) series
22899 'Thank goodness that's over' is not like 'thank goodness that happened on Friday' [Prior,AN]