Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Changes in Events and Changes in Things', 'Why Medieval Philosophy Matters' and 'Causes and Conditions'

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19 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 4. Metaphysics as Science
Science rests on scholastic metaphysics, not on Hume, Kant or Carnap [Boulter]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / b. Types of fact
That Queen Anne is dead is a 'general fact', not a fact about Queen Anne [Prior,AN]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 2. Need for Universals
Thoughts are general, but the world isn't, so how can we think accurately? [Boulter]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
Logical possibility needs the concepts of the proposition to be adequate [Boulter]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 3. Experiment
Experiments don't just observe; they look to see what interventions change the natural order [Boulter]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory
Science begins with sufficient reason, de-animation, and the importance of nature [Boulter]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 1. Faculties
Our concepts can never fully capture reality, but simplification does not falsify [Boulter]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 3. Analytic and Synthetic
Aristotelians accept the analytic-synthetic distinction [Boulter]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / b. Fact and value
The facts about human health are the measure of the values in our lives [Boulter]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / a. Observation of causation
Some says mental causation is distinct because we can recognise single occurrences [Mackie]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
Mackie tries to analyse singular causal statements, but his entities are too vague for events [Kim on Mackie]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / c. Conditions of causation
Necessity and sufficiency are best suited to properties and generic events, not individual events [Kim on Mackie]
A cause is part of a wider set of conditions which suffices for its effect [Mackie, by Crane]
Necessary conditions are like counterfactuals, and sufficient conditions are like factual conditionals [Mackie]
The INUS account interprets single events, and sequences, causally, without laws being known [Mackie]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / d. Selecting the cause
A cause is an Insufficient but Necessary part of an Unnecessary but Sufficient condition [Mackie]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / b. Nomological causation
Mackie has a nomological account of general causes, and a subjunctive conditional account of single ones [Mackie, by Tooley]
The virus causes yellow fever, and is 'the' cause; sweets cause tooth decay, but they are not 'the' cause [Mackie]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / e. Tensed (A) series
'Thank goodness that's over' is not like 'thank goodness that happened on Friday' [Prior,AN]