13 ideas
| 12129 | 'Truth' may only apply within a theory [Kuhn] |
| 7760 | Russell only uses descriptions attributively, and Strawson only referentially [Donnellan, by Lycan] |
| 5811 | A definite description can have a non-referential use [Donnellan] |
| 5812 | Definite descriptions are 'attributive' if they say something about x, and 'referential' if they pick x out [Donnellan] |
| 5814 | 'The x is F' only presumes that x exists; it does not actually entail the existence [Donnellan] |
| 15201 | That Queen Anne is dead is a 'general fact', not a fact about Queen Anne [Prior,AN] |
| 6809 | Kuhn came to accept that all scientists agree on a particular set of values [Kuhn, by Bird] |
| 12128 | In theory change, words shift their natural reference, so the theories are incommensurable [Kuhn] |
| 10435 | A definite description 'the F' is referential if the speaker could thereby be referring to something not-F [Donnellan, by Sainsbury] |
| 10451 | Donnellan is unclear whether the referential-attributive distinction is semantic or pragmatic [Bach on Donnellan] |
| 5813 | A description can successfully refer, even if its application to the subject is not believed [Donnellan] |
| 5815 | Whether a definite description is referential or attributive depends on the speaker's intention [Donnellan] |
| 22899 | 'Thank goodness that's over' is not like 'thank goodness that happened on Friday' [Prior,AN] |