18 ideas
4187 | 'There is nothing without a reason why it should be rather than not be' (a generalisation of 'Why?') [Schopenhauer] |
19081 | Coherence with a set of propositions suggests we can know the proposition corresponds [Davidson, by Donnellan] |
12129 | 'Truth' may only apply within a theory [Kuhn] |
4192 | All necessity arises from causation, which is conditioned; there is no absolute or unconditioned necessity [Schopenhauer] |
4190 | All understanding is an immediate apprehension of the causal relation [Schopenhauer] |
8806 | The concepts of belief and truth are linked, since beliefs are meant to fit reality [Davidson] |
8252 | Davidson believes experience is non-conceptual, and outside the space of reasons [Davidson, by McDowell] |
8255 | Davidson says the world influences us causally; I say it influences us rationally [McDowell on Davidson] |
8804 | Reasons for beliefs are not the same as evidence [Davidson] |
8802 | Sensations lack the content to be logical; they cause beliefs, but they cannot justify them [Davidson] |
8801 | Coherent justification says only beliefs can be reasons for holding other beliefs [Davidson] |
8805 | Skepticism is false because our utterances agree, because they are caused by the same objects [Davidson] |
6809 | Kuhn came to accept that all scientists agree on a particular set of values [Kuhn, by Bird] |
12128 | In theory change, words shift their natural reference, so the theories are incommensurable [Kuhn] |
4191 | What we know in ourselves is not a knower but a will [Schopenhauer] |
21368 | The knot of the world is the use of 'I' to refer to both willing and knowing [Schopenhauer] |
18703 | Davidson's Cogito: 'I think, therefore I am generally right' [Davidson, by Button] |
4189 | Time may be defined as the possibility of mutually exclusive conditions of the same thing [Schopenhauer] |