22 ideas
4187 | 'There is nothing without a reason why it should be rather than not be' (a generalisation of 'Why?') [Schopenhauer] |
18851 | Pairing (with Extensionality) guarantees an infinity of sets, just from a single element [Rosen] |
8784 | Neo-logicism founds arithmetic on Hume's Principle along with second-order logic [Hale/Wright] |
8787 | The Julius Caesar problem asks for a criterion for the concept of a 'number' [Hale/Wright] |
8788 | Logicism is only noteworthy if logic has a privileged position in our ontology and epistemology [Hale/Wright] |
8783 | Logicism might also be revived with a quantificational approach, or an abstraction-free approach [Hale/Wright] |
18852 | A Meinongian principle might say that there is an object for any modest class of properties [Rosen] |
18850 | 'Metaphysical' modality is the one that makes the necessity or contingency of laws of nature interesting [Rosen] |
18849 | Metaphysical necessity is absolute and universal; metaphysical possibility is very tolerant [Rosen] |
18857 | Standard Metaphysical Necessity: P holds wherever the actual form of the world holds [Rosen] |
18858 | Sets, universals and aggregates may be metaphysically necessary in one sense, but not another [Rosen] |
18856 | Non-Standard Metaphysical Necessity: when ¬P is incompatible with the nature of things [Rosen] |
18848 | Something may be necessary because of logic, but is that therefore a special sort of necessity? [Rosen] |
18855 | Combinatorial theories of possibility assume the principles of combination don't change across worlds [Rosen] |
4192 | All necessity arises from causation, which is conditioned; there is no absolute or unconditioned necessity [Schopenhauer] |
18853 | A proposition is 'correctly' conceivable if an ominiscient being could conceive it [Rosen] |
4190 | All understanding is an immediate apprehension of the causal relation [Schopenhauer] |
4191 | What we know in ourselves is not a knower but a will [Schopenhauer] |
21368 | The knot of the world is the use of 'I' to refer to both willing and knowing [Schopenhauer] |
8786 | One first-order abstraction principle is Frege's definition of 'direction' in terms of parallel lines [Hale/Wright] |
18854 | The MRL view says laws are the theorems of the simplest and strongest account of the world [Rosen] |
4189 | Time may be defined as the possibility of mutually exclusive conditions of the same thing [Schopenhauer] |