17 ideas
| 4187 | 'There is nothing without a reason why it should be rather than not be' (a generalisation of 'Why?') [Schopenhauer] |
| 12797 | If plural variables have 'some values', then non-count variables have 'some value' [Laycock] |
| 12794 | Plurals are semantical but not ontological [Laycock] |
| 17694 | Some non-count nouns can be used for counting, as in 'several wines' or 'fewer cheeses' [Laycock] |
| 17695 | Some apparent non-count words can take plural forms, such as 'snows' or 'waters' [Laycock] |
| 12792 | The category of stuff does not suit reference [Laycock] |
| 12799 | Descriptions of stuff are neither singular aggregates nor plural collections [Laycock] |
| 12818 | We shouldn't think some water retains its identity when it is mixed with air [Laycock] |
| 12795 | Parts must be of the same very general type as the wholes [Laycock] |
| 4192 | All necessity arises from causation, which is conditioned; there is no absolute or unconditioned necessity [Schopenhauer] |
| 4190 | All understanding is an immediate apprehension of the causal relation [Schopenhauer] |
| 17696 | 'Humility is a virtue' has an abstract noun, but 'water is a liquid' has a generic concrete noun [Laycock] |
| 4191 | What we know in ourselves is not a knower but a will [Schopenhauer] |
| 21368 | The knot of the world is the use of 'I' to refer to both willing and knowing [Schopenhauer] |
| 12791 | It is said that proper reference is our intellectual link with the world [Laycock] |
| 23834 | Friendship is partly universal - the love of a person is like the ideal of loving everyone [Weil] |
| 4189 | Time may be defined as the possibility of mutually exclusive conditions of the same thing [Schopenhauer] |